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Abstract 
This thesis presents an investigation of sensemaking within emergency response command and 
control (C2) systems. Sensemaking is considered from a novel perspective – that of sensemaking as 
distributed cognition – which proposes that sensemaking is a technologically mediated and socially 
distributed cognitive activity. This qualitative study adopted a multi-method approach and used two 
case studies to examine sensemaking in response to ‘routine emergencies’ and multi-agency major 
incidents. During routine emergencies, agents within the C2 network appear to function as a 
distributed Community of Practice, making use of rapid, highly compact, formalised communications 
– mediated by formal (designed) and informal (adapted) artefacts – in order to frame the problem. 
In contrast, whilst multi-agency major incidents display many of the features of Exploration 
Networks, the responding agencies were initially found to maintain their individual Communities of 
Practice, with inter-agency collaboration apparently hampered by the lack of shared artefacts to 
represent the ‘problem space’. In addition to presenting a comprehensive description of emergency 
response C2, the thesis supports the assertion that – in this domain at least – sensemaking is a 
systems-level activity that is supported by artefacts and collaborative processes. The thesis also 
suggests future directions for sensemaking, distributed cognition and C2 research. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Thesis summary 
1.1.1 Positioning statement 
This thesis proposes an original approach to the study of sensemaking – that of sensemaking as 
distributed cognition. This approach asserts that cognitive processes involved in sensemaking are 
mediated through interactions with artefacts and other agents. Three perspectives of sensemaking 
as distributed cognition are presented: making sense with artefacts, making sense through artefacts 
and making sense through collaboration. This approach is explored within the emergency response 
domain, where sensemaking is concerned with framing the problem – a collaborative process 
involving agents and artefacts from across the Command and Control (C2) network. 
1.1.2 Aims 
The aim of this thesis was to construct accounts of how sensemaking is undertaken within 
emergency response C2 systems, both during normal operations and crises. These accounts were 
intended to establish the role of distributed cognition processes within systems-level sensemaking 
activities. 
1.1.3 Research question 
A single research question has been posed, which the following chapters attempt to answer: 
How is sensemaking supported through distributed cognition during emergency responses? 
In addition, the three perspectives of sensemaking as distributed cognition suggested specific 
research themes that were investigated in this thesis (Table 1.1). The research question has been 
addressed through the construction of two case studies of emergency response sensemaking, based 
on a series of field studies and interviews with Subject Matter Experts. 
1.1.4 Scope 
The thesis examines sensemaking during routine emergencies and multi-agency major incidents in 
the United Kingdom (UK). The primary focus of attention has been on the police response activity, 
which has largely been neglected by sensemaking and distributed cognition research. The activities 
of Fire and Rescue and other agencies were also investigated for the case study of a multi-agency 
major incident.  
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The duties of the emergency services include far more than just responding to sudden emergencies, 
however in order to maintain focus to the thesis and keep the work to a manageable length, these 
other activities have not been included. Equally, emergency service C2 structures are involved in a 
number of activities in addition to coordinating the responses to emergency incidents; these are not 
discussed in this thesis. 
Research perspective Investigatory themes 
Making sense with 
artefacts 
How are artefacts used to represent and transform information to 
support sensemaking activity? 
How are formal and informal artefacts made use of during sensemaking 
activity? 
Making sense through 
artefacts 
How do artefacts act as resources for action during sensemaking?  
Does the use of artefacts follow the original design intent, or have agents 
developed their own strategies? 
Making sense through 
collaboration 
How do groups organize and coordinate activity to jointly make sense of 
situations? 
How are artefacts used to facilitate coordination? 
How do groups adapt their sensemaking practices to take account of 
their circumstances? 
Table 1.1: Sensemaking as distributed cognition: research perspectives and investigatory themes 
1.2 Command and Control in the emergency services1 
1.2.1 UK emergency services overview 
Although there are a number of ‘Category 1’ response agencies (the main agencies involved in the 
response to emergency situations, HM Government, 2005a) the initial response to the majority of 
emergency incidents on land in the UK is provided by the Police, Fire and Rescue and Ambulance 
services. Within each of these emergency services, a number of separate organisations are 
responsible for the provision of emergency response cover within specific geographic regions; in 
England and Wales, there are 43 regional Police forces, 50 Fire and Rescue services and 13 
Ambulance trusts. 
The emergency services operate three main levels of incident C2: strategic, tactical and operational; 
these are commonly referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze (Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, 2003). In the main, most responses to emergency incidents are handled at Bronze 
                                                          
1 Information in this section is based on observations and interviews with personnel from Warwickshire, West 
Midlands and Gloucestershire Police forces, as well as Fire and Rescue service incident commanders. 
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(Operational) Command level. Silver (Tactical) Command monitors activity at the force-wide level 
and only becomes involved if the complexity or the severity of the incident requires the planning, 
coordination and decision-making activities associated with this higher command level (HM 
Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1999). Finally, Gold (Strategic) Command is only initiated when an 
incident has been, or is expected to be declared a major incident. 
1.2.2 The concept of ‘command and control’ 
The term ‘command and control’ (C2) originates in the military domain and at its broadest simply 
refers to the running of an organisation (Oxford English Dictionary). NATO (2010)2 attempt to further 
define ‘command’ and ‘control’ though in doing so, they reveal that the two terms are not easily 
separated, determining that ‘Command’ encompasses not only the authority to direct military 
forces, but also the exercise of authority, the organisation under this authority and the orders 
themselves. ‘Control’ – the authority exercised by a commander – is therefore seen as a subset of 
‘command’ and may be delegated to others to perform NATO (2010). The important difference 
between ‘command’ and ‘control’ is that ‘command’ includes the authority and (by implication) 
ability to form new intentions (i.e. goals), whilst ‘control’ is those delegated actions to communicate 
and achieve those intentions. 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) assert that there are four minimum essential capabilities of successful 
military C2, which are: 
1. The ability to make sense of the situation; 
2. The ability to work in a coalition environment; 
3. Possession of the appropriate means to respond; 
4. The ability to orchestrate the means to respond in a timely manner. 
(adapted from Alberts and Hayes, 2003; page 98) 
van Creveld (1985) asserts that whilst the functions of command are eternal, the means by which 
command is achieved – i.e. the organization, procedures and technology –are subject to continuous 
development and any command system can be described in terms of these fundamental 
components. In this thesis, it is the means by which emergency service C2 systems set about 
performing these high-level functions that has been under investigation. 
                                                          
2 NATO (2010) NATO Glossary of terms and definitions, AAP-6 http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap-
6-2010.pdf  
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1.2.3 Police emergency response C2 organization 
Each regional emergency service organisation operates its own C2 network, which handles 999 calls 
and coordinates their response to the incident. These networks can be highly complex, with a large 
number of control rooms and different communications media in use. Figure 1.1 provides an 
overview of the command centres and main lines of communication used by West Midlands Police 
(WMP) during responses to emergency incidents (West Midlands Fire and Ambulance Services each 
operate separate C2 systems.). The WMP C2 structure is centred on the Force Communications 
Centre (FCC), which handles all incoming 999 calls, controls force-wide assets and performs the 
Silver Command role when required. The C2 network also features smaller local Control Rooms in 
each of the 21 Operational Command Units (OCUs) that the force is divided into3.  
Communication across this C2 network is achieved via the electronic Incident Management System 
(IMS – used within and between control rooms), radio (control room to Officers and Officer to 
Officer), and telephone (used with external organisations: Fire and Rescue, Ambulance, etc.). 
1.2.4 The process of C2 
1.2.4.1 Police: The Conflict Management Model 
The Conflict Management Model (CMM) is a generic process for the assessment and response to any 
police incident; it is widely used throughout Police Services for both planned and unplanned events. 
Whilst the CMM is viewed as the key framework for operational planning, it may also be used to 
assist with decision making at strategic and tactical levels (NPIA, 2010a). Figure 1.2 below represents 
the CMM as an iterative process for gathering information, making assessments, planning and then 
acting upon the environment: 
"Information and intelligence received leads to a threat assessment. Then, following a consideration 
of the relevant powers and policy, the appropriate tactical options are chosen to manage the threat 
and resolve the conflict. The model is intended to be used in a cyclical manner to allow constant 
reassessment of the situation and appropriate action to be taken on the basis of the most up to date 
information." (IPCC, 2010, page 20) 
 
 
                                                          
3 Following the completion of data collection, the force was restructured into 10 Local Policing Units. 
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Figure 1.2: The Conflict Management Model (adapted from NPIA 2010a, page 45) 
Police Officers must ensure that at all times their actions are proportionate, legal, appropriate and 
necessary, which they are trained to do by using the CMM when assessing situations. 
1.2.4.2 Fire and Rescue: The Incident Command Model 
Figure 1.3 is the Fire and Rescue Incident Command Model, which summarises the process that Fire 
incident commanders are trained to follow during incident responses. The model identifies two main 
activities, with the stages to the left of the model fall into the ‘deciding’ activity, whilst the stages to 
the right form the ‘acting’ phase of the cyclical process.  
Information on 
Progress
CONTROLLING
GATHERING 
& 
THINKING
OBJECTIVES
DECIDING ACTING
PLAN OUTCOME
EVALUATING
Information 
about
Hazards & 
Safety
Information 
about
the Incident
COMMUNICATING
 
Figure 1.3: The Fire and Rescue Incident Command Model (courtesy of Avon Fire and Rescue Service) 
Both of these models are essentially describing the same cyclical process; although the Fire and 
Rescue model appears more complex than the CMM, this is mainly because it makes explicit a 
number of activities that are implicit in the CMM. These models also call to mind the Boyd Cycle or 
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Observe Orient Decide Act (‘OODA’) loop, which typifies an approach that has been prevalent in 
military C2 thinking since the 1970s.  
1.2.4.3 Military: The OODA loop 
The OODA loop was refined over a number of years and Figure 1.4 represents the final version, 
which reflects the complexity of C2 as Boyd saw it, with numerous connections and feedback loops 
(Boyd 1982, cited in Osinga (2005). Some of the main themes associated with the OODA loop are: 
 The notion that Performing OODA more effectively than the adversary meant that you could 
take the advantage during conflict; 
 Orientation is a highly complex process, made up of a number of factors, including cultural 
factors and previous experience, as well as new information and analysis; 
 Orientation influences observation, as well as decision and acting; 
 All processes are taking place at once and with multiple influences on one another. 
(Boyd (1982), cited in Osinga (2005), page 273) 
Observe Orient Decide Act
Implicit 
guidance 
& 
control
Unfolding 
circumstances
Outside 
information
Feed
forward
Observations
Cultural 
traditions
Analysis & 
synthesis
Previous 
experience
New 
information
Genetic 
heritage
Decision 
(Hypothesis)
Action 
(Test)
Implicit guidance 
& control
  Feedback .
  Feedback .
  Unfolding interaction with the environment .
Feed
forward
Feed
forward
 
Figure 1.4: The Boyd Cycle / OODA loop in full detail  
(redrawn from Boyd (19954), page 4, cited in Osinga (2005), page 270) 
There are clear similarities between the OODA loop and the two emergency services models (Figures 
1.2 and 1.3). For example, the stages of the CMM broadly correspond to the stages of Observe 
(Information/Intelligence Received), Orient (Threat Assessment, Powers and Policy), Decide (Tactical 
Options, Working Strategy) and Act (Actions and Contingencies). Whilst these similarities suggest a 
                                                          
4 Boyd, J. (1995) The Essence of Winning and Losing, unpublished presentation. 
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level of consensus on describing the ‘how’ of C2 in uncertain environments, Boyd’s OODA model also 
bears some relation to theories of sensemaking and situation awareness described in Chapter Two 
of this thesis. 
1.2.4.4 A generic process model of C2 
Stanton et al. (2008) developed their generic process model of C2 from a series of field studies of 
three domains: the emergency services, civilian (power and transport) networks and military 
operations (Figure 1.5). In this model, C2 activities within the network are triggered by information 
received (orders, requests, intelligence or reports); the mission and description of current events are 
then derived from the incoming information and the subsequent gap identified between the current 
and goal states prompts the C2 system to determine the effects required to close this gap (Stanton 
et al., 2008). Once the necessary effects, available resources and any constraints are identified, the 
C2 system is able to generate a plan of action, which is then rehearsed, communicated and enacted, 
with a feedback loop to repeat the process as necessary (Stanton et al., 2008).  
Being an iterative process with recognisable ‘observe’, ‘orient’, ‘decide’ and ‘act’ phases, this C2 
model shares many features with those described earlier. Whilst there are concerns that the 
expanded planning activity in this model perhaps owes more to the slow and medium tempo 
environments observed by Stanton et al. (i.e., civilian power, strategic military headquarters) rather 
than high tempo emergency response activities, this model makes two assertions that are relevant 
to this discussion of C2. Firstly, the generic process model makes a distinction between ‘command’ 
and ‘control’ activities. Command (shaded triangle on the left side of the figure) consists of 
proactive, goal-based activities, whilst Control (shaded triangle on the right side of the figure) 
involves reactive monitoring and communication activities (Stanton et al., 2008). Secondly, whilst 
many C2 models make the assumption that ‘command’ is a centralised, solely headquarters 
function, this model recognises that the ownership of the various C2 process elements can change, 
depending on the type of network and that the decentralisation of command can occur “…right 
down to the level of personnel in the field.” (Stanton et al., 2008, page 233). 
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Figure 1.5: Generic process model of command and control  
(redrawn from Stanton et al., 2008, page 232) 
1.2.5 ‘Routine emergencies’ 
Emergency incidents are classed as those where:  
a) There is a threat to life or limb, or where a crime is in progress; 
b) An urgent response is required; 
c) More than one service may be required to attend, but the incident does not necessitate 
special measures by the emergency services; 
d) The response may be dealt with under operational command, with tactical oversight and 
occasional input. 
This thesis has applied the term ‘routine emergencies’ to such incidents, as whilst they are of an 
urgent nature, they are regularly encountered and staff are familiar with dealing with them, 
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following standard procedures. As such, whilst there is command oversight, the organisation is 
largely capable of responding to these incidents with minimal direct command involvement.  
Table 1.2 summarises the routine emergency response process as three high-level tasks, each of 
which is performed by specific agents from across the C2 network shown in Figure 1.1. These agents 
make use of several artefacts, which support them in completing their tasks and also mediate their 
communications with one another. The high-level tasks are re-presented in Figure 1.6 as a network 
diagram, showing the agents and lines of communication involved in coordinating the incident 
response.  
Task Role Location Artefacts 
1. Take 999 call Call Handler 
Force Communications Centre 
(FCC) 
Call Handler’s notepad 
IMS 
2. Support 
responding 
units 
Controllers 
21 OCU Control Rooms (Local 
Controller) 
FCC (Traffic Controller) 
IMS 
Digital radio 
3. Respond to 
incident 
Responding 
Officers 
Patrolling 21 OCUs (Local Units) 
Patrolling 3 regional areas 
(Traffic Units) 
Digital radio 
Pocket notebook 
Table 1.2: Key incident response tasks, personnel, their locations and associated artefacts 
Caller
IMS
OCU 
Controller
Traffic 
Controller
Local 
unit A
Traffic 
unit
Local 
unit B
Call 
Handler
1. Take 999 
call
2. Support 
responding 
units
3. Respond 
to incident
 
Figure 1.6: Routine emergency response tasks, personnel and lines of communication 
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Typical examples of ‘routine emergencies’ include: 
 Burglaries in progress; 
 Criminal damage (including arson); 
 Domestic violence; 
 Medical emergencies (including suicidal and acute mental health problems); 
 Retail thefts; 
 Road traffic incidents 
 Serious assaults; 
 Street robberies; 
 Urgent welfare concerns (e.g. elderly and disabled persons collapsed in their homes); 
 Vehicle crime (e.g. theft from, theft of and driving offences). 
These different types of emergency present a range of challenges, uppermost of which is managing 
the risks to the public and responding Officers. Consequently, the type of emergency and any 
contextual factors will dictate the approaches that are used to respond to them (Flin et al. 2007). 
Ensuring that an appropriate response is put in place is therefore the primary concern of the 
emergency service C2 system and given the level of uncertainty that surrounds emergencies, making 
sense of the unfolding incident is crucial to identifying the correct response. This echoes Alberts and 
Hayes’ (2003) C2 capabilities described earlier. Thus, the purpose of emergency response C2 is to 
detect and make sense of unfolding emergency incidents, in order to put in place appropriate 
responses to minimise or avoid loss or harm, and then to monitor and direct the resolution of the 
situation, coordinating with partner agencies where necessary. 
Despite the designation of 999 as for emergency use only, many calls to this number relate to non-
urgent matters for example, where the crime is historical or where the caller’s problem is not within 
the remit of the emergency services. Such incidents are not dealt with in this thesis. 
Returning to Stanton et al.’s (2008) generic process model of C2, routine emergency response could 
be viewed as largely representing ‘control’ activity. If ‘command’ is interpreted as meaning 
‘Commanders / Command Intent’, then this is largely latent within the system during routine 
emergencies – goals are those as stated for each emergency service (e.g. protect life), as well as 
particular local priorities (as articulated in shift briefings); resources are those response Officers on 
duty; constraints include the legislative framework, standards of performance and other ongoing 
incidents. Plans are largely standard responses to defined emergency types. Whilst monitoring of 
district-wide events takes place (Shift Sergeant, Control Room Supervisor, FCC Duty Inspector, OCU 
Duty Inspector), the vast majority of routine emergencies are resolved without any command-level 
input. Operational command-related activity (i.e. determining the mission, identifying resources, 
determining, communicating and enacting the plan) is instead carried out by the C2 network agents 
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directly involved in coordinating the response (i.e. Call Handlers, Controllers and response Officers). 
This is similar to the military notion of mission command, whereby subordinate command levels are 
briefed on the goal of the mission, but are then given freedom to determine how best to achieve 
their assignment. Consequently, ‘control’ level activity is a valid focus for research intended to 
investigate sensemaking during routine emergency responses. Similarly, as several artefacts have 
been designed or adapted to support individual and collaborative emergency response activities, 
they are a logical focus of attention for research into sensemaking within the C2 system. 
1.2.6 Major incidents 
Major incidents occur only very rarely in relation to the total number of incidents that are dealt with 
by the emergency services. A major incident is defined as a situation that requires special 
arrangements to be made by one or more of the emergency services, the National Health Service or 
the local authority, in order to provide an adequate response (Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat, 2003). A major incident may require: 
 The initial treatment, rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties; 
 The involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people; 
 The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and 
the news media, usually to the Police; 
 The need for the large scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services; 
 The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations 
(e.g. local authority), to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a 
large number of people. 
(Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 2003) 
By declaring that an emergency is a major incident, the emergency services are able to allocate 
additional resources to the response. They can cancel non-emergency activities, call up off-duty 
personnel and they may draw on neighbouring forces to provide support for the duration of the 
incident.  
Major incidents can require large numbers of resources from the three emergency services and 
other agencies, and often involve working across large or hazardous sites. In order to enable a 
coordinated response with all personnel working effectively towards agreed objectives, the 
emergency services implement the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure (Figure 1.7). Gold, Silver 
and Bronze are role-based designations and do not automatically equate to levels of seniority. 
During a response to a sudden, unanticipated major incident, this command structure will often be 
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constructed from the bottom up, as any emergency service member is able to initiate a major 
incident response. 
The process of establishing the major incident command structure is broadly similar for all three 
services (cf. Baber et al., 2004). In the case of the Police, the Control Room duty Inspector would 
contact the duty Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) to inform them of the situation, Gold Control is 
opened and the duty ACC assumes overall responsibility for the Incident (Gold Command). 
Meanwhile, another Inspector would proceed to the incident site to act as the Bronze Commander. 
Major incidents can deteriorate rapidly, necessitating that the emergency services continue to 
respond whilst the command structure is being put into place. Thus, before Gold Control is 
operational, the FCC acts as the default Gold Command and the OCU for the incident area is the 
default Silver Command. Until the designated Bronze Commander reaches the scene, the most 
senior attending Officer is in charge. Once on-scene, the Bronze Commander will assess the situation 
and form a plan of action to deal with the incident, including requesting appropriate additional 
resources (LESLP, 2007). 
Major incident procedures emphasise liaison between levels of the command hierarchy and across 
the emergency services from the start of an incident (LESLP, 2007), so by the time that Gold Control 
is up and running, the three services should already have a response well underway at the scene.  
 
Figure 1.7: Emergency services major incident command structure  
(redrawn from Cheshire Police website) 
Within Gold Control, senior representatives of all three emergency services (plus other agencies as 
required) will form the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG); they will discuss and agree the high-level 
approach to the incident, to ensure that there is a coherent response across all of the agencies 
involved. The police and other emergency services have contingency plans for different types of 
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major incidents, which set out the broad structure and identify initial priorities. However, each 
major incident takes place within a unique context, so the role of the SCG is to formulate the 
strategic response to the incident. This strategic intent is then translated into tactical plans via Silver 
Commanders and operational decisions on the ground via Bronze Commanders (Figure 1.8). Again, 
this application of the principle of subsidiarity is similar to the military notion of mission command. 
The command structure also provides a means of communicating feedback as the situation changes, 
or as additional support or resources are required. An incident may be divided into different 
locations or types of activity, so several Bronze Commanders for each service may be present at the 
same site; this is reflected in Figure 1.7, by the widening of the triangle at lower levels. 
As major incident response C2 involves applying new meaning to information and formulating new 
intentions, it would appear to match the ‘command’ aspect of Stanton et al.’s (2008) generic process 
model. Stanton et al.’s (2008) model was developed by studying C2 within single-agency scenarios; 
this raises the question of how readily this model can be applied to multi-agency operations, such as 
large-scale major incidents. For example, is this C2 process shared across the agencies, or do they 
interact at specific points (e.g. ‘determine mission’, ‘communicate plan’). Section 1.2.5 described the 
role of artefacts in supporting police routine emergency response activity; a further question is 
therefore to establish the role of artefacts in supporting multi-agency major incident responses. 
 
Figure 1.8: From strategic intent to operational decision-making 
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1.2.7 Challenges of major incidents 
Whilst there are a number of common themes to routine emergencies and major incidents (i.e. 
urgency, risk to life and high levels of uncertainty), major incidents differ from ‘routine’ emergencies 
in a number of ways: 
 The scale of the problem (for example the risk/impact may be to hundreds of lives); 
 Complexity (both of the incident and the required response); 
 Novelty (major incidents represent an exceptional set of circumstances); 
 Timescale (the period of emergency may last several days). 
Major emergencies have been described in terms of “un-ness”, i.e. they are unexpected, 
unprecedented and unmanageable (Hewitt, 1983), requiring special measures and resources outside 
of the normal response C2 system. Close cooperation between agencies is required, in order to 
enable a coherent response to the emergency. However, cooperation does not appear to come 
easily during crises; a review of the crisis response literature identified several problematical 
features that often characterise major incidents5: 
 Little or no notice; 
 Temporary, ad hoc teams that rarely (if ever) work together; 
 Multiple objectives and interdependent tasks; 
 High psychological demands, with people working under time pressure and in stressful 
conditions; 
 High levels of uncertainty (concerning both the nature of the problem and the best solution); 
 Role specialisation, with the need to pool different types of expertise; 
 Improvised organisational structures; 
 Require the application of knowledge outside of traditional emergency response domains. 
The challenge of major incidents therefore is not only to make sense of a novel situation, but also to 
develop an appropriate response and to use non-standard organisational structures and procedures 
to coordinate the execution of that response. Given these difficulties, effective management of 
major emergencies would appear to be an impossible task (Boin and T’ Hart, 2003). Two recent 
disasters demonstrated a number of these features. During the response to the South Asian Tsunami 
in December 2004, local and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) involved in the 
subsequent relief efforts were deemed to have failed to coordinate activity amongst themselves and 
with local government, engaged in competitive practices and displayed a lack of trust in one another 
                                                          
5 Summarised from, Dynes, 1970; Auf der Heide, 1989; de Marchi, 1995; Smith and Dowell, 2000; Crichton, 
Flin and Rattray, 2000; Boin, 2004; Mendonça, Jefferson and Harrald, 2007; Boin and T’ Hart, 2007; 
Becerra-Fernandez et al., 2008; von Lubitz, Beakley and Patricelli. 2008. 
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(Bennett, et al., 2006). In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, the response was slow 
to mobilize, with the result that tens of thousands of survivors were left without resources for nearly 
five days (Schneider, 2005; Chua, Kaynak and Foo, 2007; Kapucu, 2008). Specific criticisms of the 
response included a failure to share information, poorly defined lines of command and a lack of trust 
between agencies involved in the response, widespread interoperability failures and a lack of 
awareness amongst response coordinators of the presence of agencies working on the ground (Chua 
et al., 2007; Rojek and Smith, 2007). Case studies of earlier floods reveal similar evaluations; for 
example, Rahman (1996) found that there was a lack of coordination of the response to the 1988 
floods in Bangladesh, including a lack of trust of NGOs by local administrators, resulting in their 
exclusion from planning programs.  
This recurring failure of agencies to effectively coordinate their responses to emergencies warrants 
further investigation. Eleven problematical issues with multi-agency emergency response work have 
been identified from these earlier studies and are listed in Table 1.3. The fact that these issues recur 
so often implies that they are inherent challenges associated with the C2 of multi-agency emergency 
responses. The eleven issues have been used to generate three broad interrelated research themes 
that have been used to guide further investigation in this thesis (Table 1.3). 
Issues identified from previous multi-agency emergency 
response studies 
Research theme 
Response systems overwhelmed by the scale of the 
emergency 
C2 structures 
Poorly defined chains of command 
Slow mobilization of response; 
Failure to share information between agencies; 
Inter-agency communications 
Lack of awareness of the presence and activity of other 
agencies in the area; 
Failure to communicate warnings and other information; 
Lack of coordination between agencies; 
Common ground 
Competitive practices; 
Lack of trust between agencies and disagreement over who 
is in charge; 
Interoperability failures; 
Failure to fully integrate other agencies into the response. 
Table 1.3: Deriving multi-agency emergency response C2 research themes 
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1.3 The future of C2? 
1.3.1 The edge organisation 
Over the last decade, attempts to rethink C2 have focussed on the design of organisations to enable 
them to behave in an agile manner – i.e., to be more resilient, efficient and responsive to sudden 
changes (Alberts and Hayes, 2003). In the same way that the concept of Command and Control 
originated in the military domain, so more recent proposals for C2 redesign have principally been 
concerned with the transformation of military operations. Alberts and Hayes’ (2003) book ‘Power to 
the Edge’ provides a description of an edge organisation as one where those individuals who interact 
with the organisation’s operating environment are empowered to immediately act decisively as 
circumstances change, rather than having to wait for new orders to be issued. This would be done by 
giving individuals access to all relevant information and expertise and through the removal of 
procedural constraints. In order to provide the conditions for agility, it is thought necessary to fully 
connect all agents within the network, thus radically altering the organisational structure away from 
the traditional centralised hierarchy (Figure 1.9). 
Figure 1.9: Hierarchical (left) and fully connected (right) networks (after Alberts and Hayes, 2003) 
The precursor for these radical changes is the perception that the longstanding trade-off between 
the ‘reach’ and ‘richness’ of information has been resolved, i.e. groups of individuals no longer 
require physical proximity in order to be able to share detailed information quickly (Evans and 
Wurster, 2000). 
Within this technology-centric view, it is thought that information management systems will enable 
widespread sharing of information and the creation of task-focussed communities of interest that 
develop in order to collaborate on specific issues that arise (Grimes, 2007). This notion of 
distributed, ad-hoc groups acting autonomously and asynchronously is in stark contrast to the more 
Chapter One: Introduction 
18 
regimented, synchronised and deconflicted operations associated with traditional hierarchical C2. 
Alberts and Hayes (2003) argue that as well as efficiency gains, such distributed communities will 
display improved decision making through greater flexibility (generation and consideration of 
various approaches), innovation (new ways of doing things) and adaptiveness (capacity to change in 
response to circumstances). However, Baber et al. (2008, page 2) caution against the assumption 
that "the structure and behaviour of a network are equivalent", i.e. that changes to one will 
automatically lead to changes in the other. 
1.3.2 Emergency services interoperability 
Inspired by developments in military C2, the UK emergency services are currently engaged in a 
programme of interoperability improvement. Interoperability is defined as: 
“…the capability of organisations or discrete parts of the same organisation to exchange operational 
information and to use it to inform their decision making.” 
(NPIA, 2009, page 14) 
Developed by the US Department for Homeland Security for coordinated emergency response 
planning, the Interoperability Continuum (NPIA, 2010b) has been adopted by UK emergency services 
as the model for their interoperability programme (Figure 1.10). The model presents interoperability 
as consisting of five elements, which range from the lowest ‘unacceptable’ level (with limited 
leadership, planning and collaboration) to the highest ‘optimal’ level (featuring a high degree of 
collaboration and cooperation).  
As part of the drive to improve interoperability, from 2005 analogue emergency services radio 
systems were gradually replaced with a secure digital radio communications network, known as 
Airwave. This move was intended to modernise the coordination of both single and multi-agency 
emergency response activity and Airwave has brought with it a number of new functions, including 
data transmission, location information, improved resilience and emergency priority transmission. 
This new functionality had the potential to radically alter the nature of emergency response activity, 
by offering organisations new ways of undertaking their activities and coordinating with each other. 
However, this technologically focussed programme limited the circumstances in which 
interoperability was to be used (NPIA, 2010b) and fundamentally did not envisage changing the way 
that the emergency services respond to major incidents, intending that they remain “…grounded 
within organisations’ existing functions and their familiar ways of working…” (HM Government, 
2005b, page 4). The rationale for this approach is likely based on major incident response doctrine, 
as espoused in procedures such as the Major Incident Procedure Manual (LESLP, 2007) and Guidance 
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on multi-agency interoperability (NPIA, 2009) which are primarily concerned with the mechanics of 
multi-agency coordination, assuming that: 
 Emergency situations are easily detected; 
 Their nature can be ascertained by the first responding units to reach the scene; 
 There is a clear delineation of activities between the response agencies; 
 The appropriate response is self-evident and may be achieved through standard operating 
procedures. 
These assumptions are evident in the anticipated on-site major incident arrangements shown in 
Figure 1.11. These expectations are valid, provided the emergency services are dealing with simple, 
well-defined and practiced incidents. However, as previous major incidents demonstrate, these 
assumptions do not hold during large, complex, poorly defined emergencies, which raises the 
concern that multi-agency response coordination will continue to be problematical. 
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Figure 1.10: The Interoperability Continuum (NPIA, 2010, page 62)
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Figure 1.11: Emergency service responsibilities during a major incident 
(Redrawn from Wiltshire Constabulary Major Incident Planning) 
1.4 Chapter summary 
The purpose of emergency response C2 is to detect and make sense of unfolding emergency 
incidents, in order to put in place appropriate responses. C2 systems are complex, comprising a 
number of agents, connected by technological artefacts. During routine emergencies, these agents 
respond in a coordinated manner using established procedures, with minimal command oversight. In 
contrast, major incidents occur infrequently and require proactive command activity at all levels. 
Major incidents may involve several emergency services who must collaborate in order to deal with 
a unique and uncertain set of circumstances. However, C2 models and emergency response 
procedures make assumptions regarding the unequivocal nature of emergency incidents, whilst the 
development of multi-agency cooperation is largely seen in terms of the technological challenges. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis comprises six chapters, the remainder of which are briefly described below: 
Chapter 2: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
Chapter Two provides a review of academic literature relating to sensemaking and distributed 
cognition; these theories are discussed in terms of how they relate to one another and how they 
may be applied to the domain of emergency response C2.  
Chapter 3: Method 
A multi-method approach to the collection and analysis of data has been developed for this research 
and is described in Chapter Three. 
Chapter 4: ‘Routine’ emergencies 
Chapter Four presents an illustrative case study that describes the process of responding to Police 
emergencies and supports the argument that sensemaking during ‘routine’ police emergency 
response work is a distributed cognition activity that is spread across the system, supported by key 
artefacts. This work is predominantly based on research conducted with Warwickshire and West 
Midlands Police forces. 
Chapter 5: Major incidents 
Chapter Five is concerned with the challenges associated with multi-agency sensemaking and 
coordination during major incidents. The chapter is based on a critical instance case study of the 
defence of Walham Electricity Substation from rising floodwater July 2007. 
Chapter 6: Discussion 
This chapter reflects on the findings of the thesis and considers their implications for the future 
development of sensemaking and distributed cognition theories, as well as for emergency response 
C2. 
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2. Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
2.1 Overview 
Chapter One gave a description of emergency response C2 as a system for detecting, making sense 
of and resourcing incidents. These systems feature distributed networks of agents that collaborate 
through artefacts. Consequently, the central question for this thesis is to establish the role of 
artefacts and collaborative processes in emergency response sensemaking. 
Chapter Two introduces the concepts of sensemaking and distributed cognition, which form the 
theoretical perspectives adopted in this thesis. It explains their complementary nature and suggests 
how they could be combined to produce a novel approach that describes sensemaking through 
distributed cognition processes. This approach proposes three perspectives on sensemaking as 
distributed cognition: making sense with artefacts, making sense through artefacts and making 
sense through collaboration. 
2.2 Sensemaking 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Sensemaking is conceptualised as the ongoing process by which people identify problems, construct 
meaning and develop explanations (Weick, 1995). It is thought to build on other cognitive processes 
– such as problem detection – and initiates and influences adaptive planning and decision-making 
(Klein et al., 2007; Lin and Klein, 2008). Decision-making addresses the question of what shall we do, 
whereas sensemaking is thought to be a combination of retrospection and projection that aims to 
establish what is going on (Landgren, 2005a). Bjørking (2010) sees sensemaking as a process for 
reducing discord between one’s expectations and the actual development of events. Dervin (2003) 
characterises this discord as a gap, with sensemaking as the process of recognising and negotiating 
it. This thesis focuses on how emergency response C2 systems recognise these gaps in 
understanding and the processes they undertake to negotiate them and thereby normalise the 
situation. 
The key element in sensemaking is thought to be the interplay between alternative interpretations 
of the situation, based on different combinations of available information (Weick, 1995). The 
uncertainty surrounding these alternative interpretations may in part indicate the gap as described 
by Dervin (2003). Similarly, Landgren (2004; 2005b) describes sensemaking as the progressive 
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clarification of a situation, which involves an iterative process of ‘committed interpretation’, where 
an individual’s behaviour (actions) influences further sensemaking (and further actions):  
“…committed action creates the context for interpretation by narrowing the actors’ focus to a 
subset of cues in the available information that suggest reasonable justification of those 
actions.” (Landgren, 2004, page 91) 
In this way, sensemaking is about more than just interpretation, but is instead the study of how 
people “generate what they interpret” (Weick, 1995). Proponents of sensemaking use the term 
‘action’ to mean different things; in Klein (2011) and Landgren’s (2004) discussions of sensemaking 
during emergency responses, ‘action’ means acting on the situation, whereas in Weick’s (1995) 
discussions of organisational sensemaking, ‘action’ largely refers to seeking out and interpreting (i.e. 
acting on) information. Sensemaking may be summarised as a continuous processes used to order 
reality, to reduce ambiguity and manage the unexpected:  
“Sensemaking involves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in 
words and that serves as a springboard into action.” (Weick et al., 2005). 
Given the uncertain nature of emergency incidents, sensemaking is seen as a central activity within 
emergency response C2 (Jensen, 2009). Furthermore, Landgren (2005a) notes that situations 
featuring ambiguity or unexpected events make people’s sensemaking efforts visible, which means 
that the emergency response domain should provide fertile territory for the study of the 
phenomena. During emergency response work, action (both physical and interpretative) is 
intrinsically linked with sensemaking. Responding units are dispatched to the scene of an incident 
whilst the Call Handler is still gathering and interpreting details; Officers attending the scene will first 
act to take control of the situation and only then begin the process of establishing what has taken 
place – “their actions affect the emergency and the emergency affects their future actions” 
(Landgren, 2007). This description raises the question of where in the emergency response C2 
system does sensemaking take place? The design of emergency response networks seem to imply 
that sensemaking is a centralised function, as information is channelled to central agents (i.e. 
Controllers), who then allocate the resources that provide the incident responses (cf. Figure 1.6). 
However, Chapter One described emergency response C2 as a collaborative process involving a 
wider set of individuals, suggesting both that sensemaking takes place across the network and that it 
involves collaboration between agents. Chapter One also described major incidents as potentially 
involving several emergency services – each with their own C2 system, which implies several 
sensemaking loci. 
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2.2.2 Schemata 
Schemata have been proposed as the basis for sensemaking, offering a means for making 
comparisons between the current situation and previous experiences, thereby providing structure 
and guiding subsequent information gathering (Klein et al. 2007; Pirolli and Card, 2005). Schemata 
have been described as knowledge structures that are based on past experiences (Bartlett, 1932). 
Taylor and Crocker (1981, cited in Harris, 1994) identified seven functions of schemata; they:  
1. Provide a structure against which experience is mapped;  
2. Guide information encoding and retrieval; 
3. Affect information processing efficiency; 
4. Guide the filling of gaps in the available information; 
5. Act as templates for problem solving; 
6. Enable the evaluation of experience; 
7. Enable anticipations of future states, goal setting, planning, and action. 
Schemata are thought to help reduce the mental workload associated with making sense of 
situations by “…providing a ready-made knowledge system for interpreting and storing 
information…” (Lord and Foti, 1986, cited in Harris, 1994). The use of a schema means that 
sensemaking is concerned with action and interpretation (i.e. fitting data to a schema) rather than 
the choice of options (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). A key stage in sensemaking is therefore 
deriving a sufficient understanding of the situation in order to be able to match it to an appropriate 
schema (Klein et al., 2007). 
For some writers, the environment and the objects it contains can shape the way in which cognition 
is performed (Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b; Zhang and Norman, 1994; Scaife and Rogers, 1996). This 
approach may be interpreted as presenting a contrast between schemata as ‘internal 
representations’ and artefacts in the world as ‘external representations’. The role of external 
representation in cognition can be seen in the observation that the nature of the representation can 
influence the strategies individuals use to solve problems (Larkin et al., 1980; Chi et al., 1981; Chase 
and Simon, 1973); for example, changing the layout of a puzzle can make it easier or harder to solve. 
This perspective also highlights the importance of interactivity in cognition, for example players of 
Tetris and Scrabble can benefit from being allowed to manipulate and rearrange the playing pieces 
(Kirsh and Maglio, 1994; Maglio et al., 1999). This points to the need to not simply focus on the 
arrangement and design of the external representation, but also to consider the nature of the 
interaction between individuals and artefacts. The manner in which external representations are 
used to support cognition is the focus of Distributed Cognition, which is discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.3. The remainder of Section 2.2 reviews two concepts that are related to sensemaking –
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naturalistic decision making and situation awareness – before describing three contemporary 
perspectives on sensemaking. 
2.2.3 Related concepts 
Naturalistic and recognition-primed decision making 
Over the last three decades, researchers interested in collaborative activity have increasingly 
focussed attention on how problem solving is achieved in complex and uncertain real world 
environments, rather than in idealised, carefully controlled laboratory settings. This approach has 
become known as Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) and contrasts starkly with previous theories 
that envisaged decision making as a logical evaluation of the available options and the selection of 
the one thought most likely to succeed (Schraagen et al., 2008).  
A number of features of real world situations have been used to characterise NDM, including: 
uncertain dynamic environments, time pressure, ill-defined problems and goals, multiple players and 
high stakes – all features of emergency response activity as described in Chapter One (Klein et al., 
1993; Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). Rather than working towards a single, unified theory of NDM, 
researchers within the field have developed a number of models to account for decision making in a 
range of challenging contexts (Lipshitz, 1993). However, there are areas of agreement amongst the 
various approaches; in a review of nine NDM models Lipshitz (1993) identified six common themes, 
which were: 
a) Diversity of form  
Decision-making takes many different forms – both within and across the various models – 
depending on the context; 
b) Situation assessment 
Problem solving is as much about constructing and revising a representation of the situation 
as about evaluating potential courses of action; problems have to be identified and defined 
by the decision maker; 
c) Use of mental imagery 
Performance is founded on the decision maker’s representation of the situation, either in 
the form of categorization, knowledge structures or narrative; 
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d) Context dependence 
Features of the situation and the decision maker (e.g. expert vs. novice) dictate the form of 
decision-making processes adopted; thus, understanding the context surrounding the 
decision process is essential; 
e) Dynamic processes 
Decision-making does not take place in isolation, but instead forms part of a wider shifting 
arrangement of interconnected mental processes. 
f) Description-based prescriptions 
NDM models seek to define effective decision making within a context based on how it is 
accomplished by experts, rather than imposing an idealised process of how they ought to 
function. 
(Summarised from Lipshitz, 1993, page 131) 
This thesis focuses on (b) the construction and revision of representations of the situation, through 
(f) a description of how this is accomplished by experts. 
Of the various models, one approach to NDM that is of particular relevance to this thesis is the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model (Figure 2.1). The RPD model was primarily developed 
through field studies and was initially centred on the decision-making processes of experienced fire 
service commanders (Klein and Crandall, 1996). Subsequently, support for the model was 
demonstrated through a number of empirical studies in a range of similarly uncertain, dynamic and 
time-pressured contexts (Klein and Crandall, 1996; Klein, 2011). 
The central argument of the RPD model is that experienced decision makers rarely compare 
alternative options, but instead identify a suitable course of action through two cognitive processes: 
situation assessment and mental simulation (Lipshitz, 1993; Klein and Crandall, 1996). During 
situation assessment, experienced personnel identify the essential characteristics of a situation and 
from there formulate achievable goals and a credible course of action (Klein and Crandall, 1996). The 
course of action identified is then evaluated through mental simulation, which may lead to 
modification or rejection of the option (Klein, 1993). The process of evaluation does not require that 
multiple options are generated and compared to one another: 
“If they cannot see any negative consequence to adopting that action, they proceed with it, not 
bothering to generate additional options or to systematically compare alternatives.”  
(Schraagen et al., 2008, page 4) 
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In fact, RPD research indicates that experienced decision makers seldom generate multiple options, 
instead largely managing to identify a satisfactory course of action in the first instance (Klein, 1993; 
Klein and Crandall, 1996). The subsequent evaluation process is considered optional, depending on 
the closeness of fit between the current situation and previous similar incidents (Cohen, 1993; Klein 
and Crandall, 1996). Proponents argue that it is through the use of RPD that experienced personnel 
are able to make rapid, effective decisions in stressful, time pressured environments (Lipshitz, 1993; 
Klein and Crandall, 1996): 
“The fireground commanders argued that they were not "making choices," "considering 
alternatives," or "assessing probabilities." They saw themselves as acting and reacting on the 
basis of prior experience; they were generating, monitoring, and modifying plans to meet the 
needs of the situations. We found no evidence for extensive option generation. Rarely did the 
fireground commanders contrast even two options. Moreover, it appeared that a search for an 
optimal choice could stall the fireground commanders long enough to lose control of the 
operation altogether. The fireground commanders were more interested in finding actions that 
were workable, timely, and cost effective.” (Klein, 1993 page 139) 
As this quote demonstrates, NDM and RPD research are typically concerned with understanding how 
the lone, expert commander responds to a situation which is usually taken as a given. The apparent 
reason for this is that many accounts tend to be retrospective, based on descriptions given by the 
commanders, reduce the incident to moments of ‘decisive action’ and fail to ask what other 
interpretations could have been applied to that situation. In contrast, this thesis begins the analysis 
from the moment that an incident is detected, seeks to explore how the interpretation of the 
situation is generated and takes the emergency response system (agents and artefacts) as the unit of 
analysis. From this description of RPD and the common themes of NDM summarised earlier, both 
approaches can be characterised as schema-based, with the situation assessment forming a crucial 
role in the whole process: 
“…all nine models suggest that making decisions in realistic settings is a process of constructing 
and revising situation representations as much as (if not more than) a process of evaluating the 
merits of potential courses of action.” 
(Lipshitz, 1993 page 133) 
This process of recognizing a situation and pattern matching it to a schema is complex – potentially 
involving “a series of transformations and retransformations of the problem until the expert finally 
"knows" how to solve it” (Cohen, 1993 page 67). Research from within the NDM field has identified 
situation assessment ability as the major factor that distinguishes decision-making performance 
between experienced and inexperienced personnel (Chi et al., 1988; Klein, 1989; Orasanu, 1990, all 
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cited in Orasanu and Connolly, 1993). It is this ability to make sense of the situation that is explored 
in this thesis.  
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Figure 2.1: Recognition-Primed Decision model (Klein, 2004, cited in Klein, 2011) 
NDM, RPD and sensemaking 
As iterative, schema-based processes for understanding what is going on, the concepts of ‘Situation 
assessment’ and ‘sensemaking’ would appear to have some overlap. Further, the NDM view of 
decisions as “…committing oneself to a certain course of action…” based on that assessment 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu and Salas, 2001, page 331) echoes the sensemaking concept of ‘committed 
interpretation’ described earlier, where action and interpretation are linked in an iterative process. 
However, descriptions of RPD fail to explain how the ‘essential characteristics’ of the situation are 
selected and largely ignore the alternative schemata which could have been used to explain the 
situation. As the process by which the range of possible interpretations of a situation is reduced to a 
single, most plausible explanation, sensemaking would appear to be a precursor to situation 
assessment.  
Given the tendency for experienced personnel to produce only a single schema-driven course of 
action in the majority of instances (which may not even be evaluated), this raises the question of 
what contribution ‘deciding’ actually makes to both NDM and RPD. Whilst Klein (1993; 2011) 
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acknowledges that sensemaking and decision-making are related (with the former cueing the latter), 
he maintains that they are distinct processes and that sensemaking does not wholly determine 
decision making. This thesis does not set out to challenge the distinction between the processes of 
matching a situation to a schema (sensemaking) and schema-based decision-making (NDM/RPD). 
Instead, it draws support from the NDM literature in viewing sensemaking as a crucial cognitive 
activity when responding to challenging real world environments and is therefore an important 
research subject in its own right. Given that emergency response activity involves a wider, 
collaborative C2 system, rather than the lone expert commander of NDM research, this thesis 
expands on the NDM viewpoint to consider how this network of individuals and artefacts 
collaboratively makes sense of incidents. 
Situation awareness 
Human Factors studies of C2 have frequently drawn on the concept of situation awareness (SA) 
when trying to describe how individuals assess their environment and anticipate future events. 
Endsley (1995) defines SA as: 
“…the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.” 
(Endsley, 1987; 1988, both cited in Endsley 1995, page 36) 
Endsley (1995) elaborates the elements of this definition through the three-level model of SA (Figure 
2.2), which sees situation awareness as an iterative, individual process that guides decision-making 
and subsequent action. 
Situation awareness emerged as a key theme during Blandford and Wong’s (2004) investigation of 
emergency medical dispatch – a complex collaborative process, which involves discrete computer-
supported and paper-based phases of activity. Senior staff described their situation awareness as a 
‘picture in the head’; this awareness enabled them to determine the type of units to allocate to an 
incident and to estimate the locations of resources (Blandford and Wong, 2004). Allocators employ a 
number of strategies to maintain and refresh their awareness of the situation; drawing on colleagues 
and physical artefacts as resources. Allocators reported employing selective attention to other 
activity within the control room, which they refer to as ‘control ears’, in order to notice early cues 
(such as vehicle and job status changes) which they use to plan activities ahead of formal 
notifications. Additionally, Allocators frequently refer to the spatial location of tickets and their 
position in relation to one another to maintain awareness of allocated (in the allocator’s box) and 
unallocated (laid out on the desk) incidents (Blandford and Wong, 2004). 
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Figure 2.2: The three-level model of situation awareness (redrawn from Endsley, 1995) 
The concept of SA shares some similarities with sensemaking, for example drawing on schema 
theory to explain the organisation of information (Endsley, 2000; Klein et al., 2007). Endsley’s 
approach has even been used to underpin some interpretations of sensemaking in C2 environments 
(c.f. Alberts and Hayes, 2003). However, it has been argued that important differences exist between 
SA and sensemaking. Firstly, sensemaking is conceptualised as an ongoing goal-based process of 
generating a plausible understanding of what is happening (Burnett et al., 2004), whilst situation 
awareness is concerned with building a description of the current state of the environment and then 
using this to inform decision-making. Secondly, Endsley’s (1995) model of SA is centred on the 
individual, with SA considered to be their internal mental model of the state of the environment 
(Endsley, 2000). Where groups of individuals are required to collaborate to achieve a goal, it is 
thought that they each develop their own SA and then communicate goal-relevant situation 
information (‘mission-critical factors’) to develop sufficient overlap in SA to achieve the task 
(Endsley, 1995; Nofi, 2000). This attempt to study group phenomena at the level of individual 
members has been criticised for missing systems-level processes that take place (Leedom, 2001): 
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“Domains such as surgery, air traffic and underground line control, process industry and 
military command all constitute examples of dynamic systems where teamwork is essential and 
where non-individual-centred approach is also necessary.” (Artman and Garbis, 1998, page 151) 
Thirdly, in contrast to sensemaking, where action is an integral component of ‘making sense’ (Weick, 
1995), within Endsley’s (1995) model, understanding is seen as a separate and preceding step to 
acting and so “knowing what is going on around you” (Endsley, 2000, page 5) is therefore 
understood to be a passive process (Leedom, 2001). Turner (2007) argues that the passive nature of 
the process is inadequate to explain activity during complex and dynamic situations, where “...an 
effective ‘way of perceiving’ environmental behaviour may be difficult to develop (due to complexity) 
and, even then, may only be fleeting in its utility (due to variability).” (Turner, 2007, page 6).  
Klein et al. (2006a) make the distinction between sensemaking as the process of making sense of a 
situation and SA as the knowledge state ‘product’ that is achieved. Similarly, Duffy et al. (2013) view 
sensemaking as a necessary precursor to SA in complex situations, which then feeds into ongoing 
processes that support SA. This difference between product and process recalls Dervin’s perspective 
of sensemaking as the mechanism for bridging a gap between one’s expectations (i.e. SA) and the 
actual development of events (Bjørking, 2010). 
Whilst the concepts of sensemaking and SA are clearly associated and appear more complementary 
than contradictory, this thesis is primarily concerned with how C2 systems make sense of complex 
emergencies, i.e. how they identify and negotiate the gap between what is recognised as normal and 
what is recognised as unfamiliar, rather than the maintenance of this state of awareness. 
Summary 
From an emergency response perspective, it is often the case that decision-making is heavily 
constrained by well-rehearsed procedures, such that once a situation is understood, a prescribed 
response ‘path’ becomes evident. As Klein’s fireground commanders noted, this does not give the 
impression of decision making, as for experts the answer to the question of ‘what to do’ is obvious 
(Klein, 1993). The less obvious problem in emergencies is the precursory problem of how to define 
the situation, i.e. sensemaking. Once the response to a defined emergency has been initiated, SA 
largely becomes a passive process of monitoring events and evaluating them against expectations. 
Only if an unexpected turn of events occurs, will further sensemaking activity be required in order to 
redefine the situation and ‘bridge the gap’ in understanding. 
The study of decision making in complex naturalistic settings – including emergency response – has 
already received extensive research attention, so instead this thesis concentrates on understanding 
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in detail how the equally important preceding process of sensemaking is achieved within emergency 
response C2 systems. This thesis also seeks to move beyond the individualistic, largely ‘in the head’ 
approaches taken by both NDM and SA in order to consider the role of artefacts in mediating 
collaborative sensemaking by groups of individuals. 
2.2.4 Three perspectives on sensemaking 
Pirolli and Russell (2011) propose that contemporary theories of sensemaking can be divided into 
three broad perspectives: the first involves the processes of representation construction; the second 
perspective involves the mapping of data to frames; the third perspective is the collaborative search-
after-meaning.  
Representation construction 
Pirolli and Card (2005) produced the sensemaking process summarised in Figure 2.3, based on a 
cognitive task analysis of intelligence analysts. The rectangular boxes represent data flow, whilst the 
circles represent the process flow. Pirolli and Card (2005) describe sensemaking activity as 
containing a number of iterative loops that form part of two sub-processes, firstly of foraging for 
information and then of developing a mental model to fit the information. According to this 
approach, in order for information to support expert assessment (and then the communication of 
that assessment), as it passes through the various stages in the process, it is progressively 
transformed from raw information into intelligence products: 
· ‘External data sources’ contains all of the raw evidence presented to the analyst; 
· The ‘shoebox’ is a smaller subset of the total information and represents that which they 
deem to be relevant to the task;  
· The ‘evidence file’ contains small components extracted from items in the shoebox; 
· ‘Schemas’ contain information that has been reorganised or re-represented, in order that it 
can be used more easily to draw conclusions; 
· ‘Hypotheses’ are the initial representation of those conclusions (complete with supporting 
arguments); 
· The ‘presentation’ is the final intelligence product that will be shared. 
(Pirolli and Card, 2005) 
Pirolli and Card (2005) define three broad activities involved in foraging for information: exploring 
(increasing the scope of information included in the analysis), enriching (narrowing the set of items 
collected) and exploiting (extracting information and generating inferences). In terms of making 
sense of information, the key activities are thought to be problem structuring (generating, exploring 
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and managing hypotheses), evidentiary reasoning (organising evidence to support or refute 
hypotheses) and decision making. Schemas are seen as taking a central role within both the foraging 
and sensemaking loops (Pirolli and Card, 2005). The process described in Figure 2.3 can be top down 
as well as bottom up, as new hypotheses can prompt re-evaluation of schemas and source material 
and initiate the search for new information (Pirolli and Card, 2005). 
Attfield and Blandford (2011) describe the process of sensemaking involved in legal investigations as 
being broadly similar to Pirolli and Card (2005), again identifying two main processes – data 
focussing (review and shortlisting of relevant information) and issue focussing (identification and 
organisation of areas of enquiry). Sensemaking in legal investigation is also a bi-directional (i.e. top 
down and bottom up) activity, as theories are formulated and re-evaluated (Attfield and Blandford, 
2011). Both Pirolli and Card (2005) and Attfield and Blandford (2011) consider the transformation of 
external representations to be a key component of the sensemaking process: Pirolli and Card (2005) 
describe how intelligence analysts use artefacts, such as maps, databases and networks to organise 
and understand information about people, organizations, tasks and time, in order to develop and 
communicate insights. Similarly, Attfield and Blandford (2011) give an account of legal teams 
creating and manipulating a range of artefacts in order to make sense of and communicate their 
findings during investigations. As such, Figure 2.3 provides a view of sensemaking as a process of the 
transformation of internal (10, 13) and external (1, 4, 7, 16) representations of information “...from 
its raw state into a form where expertise can apply (such as for interpretation or taking action) and 
then out to another form suited for communication” (Pirolli and Russell, 2011, page 3). 
For Faisal, Attfield and Blandford (2009) these external representations form the frames or schemas 
which guide and influence interactions with the data. Treating external representations as schemas 
moves beyond the purely ‘in the head’ view of sensemaking and towards one in which sensemaking 
is a technologically mediated activity (Attfield and Blandford, 2011). Consequently, sensemaking 
may be viewed as partly defined by the tools that are available. 
Data-frame 
Klein, Moon and Hoffman’s (2006a) data-frame model treats frames in a similar manner to 
schemas1, i.e. that they take the form of a retrospective narrative account, based on expertise and 
experience; these frames are used to organise data and anticipate future events (Pirolli and Card, 
2005). For Klein et al. (2006a) the process of sensemaking involves the recognition and fitting of data 
into an appropriate frame, which then guides further data collection and influences the filtering of 
                                                          
1 Klein et al. (2007) describe the frame as the synthesis of concepts proposed by earlier researchers, 
including frames, scripts and schemas. 
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data viewed as relevant to the situation. These processes of frame construction/modification and 
frame-defined data collection are thought to occur in parallel (Klein et al., 2005). For Minsky (1975, 
cited in Klein et al., 2006a) frames primarily serve to aid recognition, by guiding attention to fill in 
the missing elements of the frame and to search for information that allows the frame to be tested. 
Klein et al. (2006a) expand on this view by noting both that frames themselves change with the 
acquisition of data and also that frames shape (transform) the data they encapsulate.  
 
Figure 2.3: Notional model of the sensemaking loop for intelligence analysis derived from CTA  
(Pirolli and Card, 2005) 
From this perspective, problem detection is seen as part of sensemaking and is characterised as a 
rising suspicion that “the way events are being interpreted is incomplete and perhaps incorrect” 
(Klein et al., 2005). The suspicion that forms the basis of questioning a frame is based on the 
available data and may result from direct contradictions to the frame, the accumulation of 
discrepancies or the detection of subtle anomalies (Klein et al., 2005). Klein et al. (2004; cited in 
Klein et al. 2005) describe how the questioning of a frame may lead to elaboration (discovery of new 
data or relationships), frame preservation (explaining away anomalies), the comparison of alternate 
frames, or reframing (recovering discarded data and reinterpreting data). These activities are 
summarised in Figure 2.4; which represents each activity as an oval, each of which contains actions 
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relating to frame-driven data collection (on the left) and ways in which the data can affect the frame 
(on the right). The top oval represents the basic sensemaking cycle of frame-defined data collection 
and data based frame modification (Klein et al., 2007). Any of the activities in Figure 2.4 can be a 
starting point for sensemaking, depending on the nature of the ‘surprise’ or perception of 
inadequacy of the existing frame that triggered it (Klein et al., 2007). According to Klein et al. (2005; 
2007) difficulties in describing sensemaking stem from this wide range of associated activities and 
the fact that they operate in different ways, with different strategies and obstacles that must be 
overcome. Klein at al. (2007) also state nine assertions related to the data-frame theory of 
sensemaking:  
1. Sensemaking is the simultaneous process of fitting data into a frame and fitting a frame 
around the data.  
2. Data elements are inferred, using the frame; different people may derive different data 
elements from a situation. 
3. The frame is inferred from a few key anchors and that frame is used to search for more data 
elements. 
4. The inferences used in sensemaking rely on abductive reasoning (i.e. the most plausible 
explanation) as well as logical deduction. 
5. Sensemaking usually ceases when the data and frame are brought into congruence. 
6. Experts reason the same way as novices, but have a richer repertoire of frames. 
7. Sensemaking is used to achieve a functional understanding – what to do in a situation – as 
well as an abstract understanding. 
8. People primarily rely on just-in-time mental models. “...constructed from fragments...In 
complex and open systems, a comprehensive mental model is unrealistic.” (Klein et al., 2007, 
page 151). 
9. Sensemaking takes different forms, each with its own dynamics. 
(Klein et al., 2007, page 120) 
Looking at these assertions, it is clear that there are some similarities with the representation 
construction approach to sensemaking: the various cyclical processes associated with the data-frame 
theory (i.e. elaboration, questioning, seeking, reframing, etc.) could be seen as expanding on Pirolli 
and Card’s (2005) foraging and sensemaking loops, thereby providing the ‘how’ of sensemaking that 
is absent from their description. Additionally, Klein et al.’s (2007) assertion that sensemaking 
involves abductive, as well as deductive reasoning could be seen as similar to the top-down and 
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bottom-up approaches in Pirolli and Card’s (2005) account. However, Klein et al. (2007) view 
sensemaking as a process that takes place in dynamic situations, in order to guide not only 
understanding, but also action: 
“The active exploration of an environment, conducted for a purpose, reminds us that 
sensemaking is an active process and not the passive receipt and combination of messages.” 
(Klein et al., 2007 page 118) 
Thus, the process of sensemaking can be viewed as being partly defined by the situation. 
 
Figure 2.4: The seven types of sensemaking in the data-frame model (redrawn from Klein, Phillips, 
Rall and Peluso, 2007, page 133) 
Klein (2006, page 227) acknowledges that “it is rare to find an important task being performed by an 
individual without any sort of team and organizational coordination” and Klein et al. (2006b) 
describe sensemaking as often being a social activity that enables the development of common 
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ground. Nevertheless, the view adopted by Klein et al. (2006b) is that sensemaking in teams is only 
performed by certain expert individuals to whom information is passed, i.e. it is socially mediated, 
rather than an inherently social process. As a result, Klein (2006) views the distribution of tasks and 
data across team members as more of a barrier to effective sensemaking than an enabler: 
“Experts must be able to explore data, and their analysis can suffer when data are hidden from 
them in layers of someone else’s interpretations.”  (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006b page 71) 
A consequence of this individualistic view is that Klein and associates only see technology as being 
involved in sensemaking through the use of intelligent systems – something which they are highly 
sceptical of (Klein, Moon and Hoffman, 2006a). Klein et al. (2007) seem to suggest that artefacts may 
function as frames: 
“A frame can take the form of a story, explaining the chronology of events and the causal 
relationships between them; a map, explaining where we are by showing distances and 
directions to various landmarks and showing routes to destinations; a script, explaining our role 
or job as complementary to the roles or jobs of others; or a plan for describing a sequence of 
intended actions. Thus, a frame is a structure for accounting for the data and guiding the 
search for more data.” (Klein et al., 2007 page 118) 
However, they quickly retreat from this interpretation, by clarifying that “...a frame is that portion of 
the perceptual cycle that is internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and specific to what is 
being perceived” (Klein et al., 2007, page 119). 
Collaborative search after meaning 
Weick’s (1995) framework for sensemaking provides the third perspective referenced in this thesis 
and specifies a number of characteristics of the process: 
1. Identity 
Perception of the environment is affected by the perception of self or group; 
2. Retrospective 
Sensemaking is concerned with making sense of events that have already happened; 
3. Enactment 
The process of making sense necessitates active involvement with the environment and the 
situation – action precedes understanding (Landgren, 2005a); 
Chapter Two: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
39 
4. Social 
Making sense involves the creation of shared meaning and shared experience that guides 
organizational decision-making; 
5. Ongoing 
Sensemaking is a continuous process that starts before and continues after an event; 
6. Extracted cues 
Information is provided by interactions with the environment, this prompts further data 
collection (to confirm or refute the hypothesis); 
7. Plausible rather than ‘true’ 
Sensemaking generates a coherent, reasonable and memorable understanding of an event 
that guides action, rather than attempting accuracy. 
This list is not exhaustive; Weick (1995) acknowledges that new elements could be added to the 
framework – describing sensemaking as being more of “a developing set of ideas” than a formalised 
corpus. Weick’s (1995) view of sensemaking shares a number of similarities with the data-frame 
model, including the notion that people draw on frames in order to provide structure when 
searching for and interpreting new information. Klein et al. (2007) also draw on several aspects of 
Weick’s (1995) framework in their description of the sensemaking process. However, where the two 
perspectives diverge is that Weick (1995) sees sensemaking principally as a collective process, based 
on interactions between people involved in equivocal situations. As with Klein et al. (2007) Weick 
(1988; 1995) holds that the meaning and significance of elements within a situation may be open to 
different interpretations; consequently, the different expertise and experience of those actors 
involved in the process of action and interpretation are crucial variables in resolving uncertain 
situations. However, for Weick (1988; 1995) these experts are now collaboratively involved in the 
interpretation of events. Weick (2005) describes three key points concerning sensemaking as a social 
construct: 
“First, sensemaking occurs when a flow of organizational circumstances is turned into words 
and salient categories. Second, organizing itself is embodied in written and spoken texts. Third, 
reading, writing, conversing, and editing are crucial actions that serve as the media through 
which the invisible hand of institutions shapes conduct (Gioia et al. 1994, p. 365).”  
(Weick, 2005, page 409) 
For Weick (2005, citing Obstfeld, 2004) sharing understanding involves making explicit, public, 
relevant, ordered and clear that which is otherwise tacit, private, complex, haphazard and historical. 
This is achieved through interactive dialogue, drawing on language “...in order to formulate and 
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exchange through talk...symbolically encoded representations of these circumstances” (Taylor and 
Van Every, 2000, page 58, Cited in Weick, 2005, page 413). Such dialogue requires a shared language 
and some degree of joint knowledge, or common ground (Johannesen, 2008). Johannesen (2008, 
page 190) defines common ground between individuals as “...what they take to be their mutual 
knowledge and mutual beliefs (Stalnaker 1978; Clark and Schaefer, 1989).” Mutual knowledge is 
thought to take the form of shared context, such as domain, team, historical or 
artefact/environmental (Johannesen, 2008). Johannesen (2008) provides a detailed description of 
how operating theatre staff work to maintain common ground during operations, drawing on a 
range of explicit and implicit communication strategies. This allows them to make joint assessments, 
collaboratively solve problems and quickly detect and recover from inappropriate actions 
(Johannesen, 2008). However, Johannesen (2008) notes that when team members have common 
ground “...less needs to be said because information can be communicated relative to what is 
already mutually known.” (Johannesen, 2008, page 198). Additionally, mutual knowledge means that 
verbal communications are characterised by their ‘compactness’ i.e. phrases, words and gestures 
carry meaning that is not generally accessible by lay persons without additional explanation 
(Johannesen, 2008). Similarly, Heath and Luff (2000) describe how when London Underground 
control room staff collaborate to resolve problems, they rarely provide explicit information to one 
another; instead they monitor and respond to one another’s actions, through reciprocal monitoring 
of activity and use of shared artefacts. This process is enabled by their awareness and maintenance 
of a body of practice (procedures and conventions) relating to coordinated action, which “...informs 
the production, recognition, and coordination of routine conduct within the line control room” (Heath 
and Luff, 2000, page 102). This notion of mutual knowledge or a body of practice would seem to 
apply to sensemaking during single-agency emergency response activity, where team membership is 
relatively stable, members share common training and experience and use technical jargon to 
communicate. In contrast, Umapathy (2010) argues that collaborative sensemaking takes place 
when “...a group of people with diverse backgrounds engage in the process of making sense of 
information rich, complex and dynamic situations.” (Umapathy, 2010, page 1). This description is 
reminiscent of the multi-agency major incident environment described in Chapter One and raises 
questions regarding the baseline level of common ground that might exist between diverse agencies 
and how it may be established or improved, if that is indeed possible.  
These conflicting perspectives may relate to the type of network under investigation and the nature 
of the problem being faced. For Weick (1995), collaborative sensemaking is described with reference 
to how individual organisations solve specific problems which effectively relate to ‘culturally defined 
disagreements’. In contrast, Umapathy (2010) assumes that collaborative sensemaking involves the 
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formation of groups of individuals with different worldviews, citing military coalition operations as 
an example. Burnett, Wooding and Prekop (2004) provide a possible solution to this problem, by 
taking the concept of the community of practice (cf. Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, 2002) and 
comparing it with their own account of the exploration network. The community of practice is: 
"...centered on a well-defined domain of knowledge and expertise; it taps into depth of 
specialist knowledge reflecting an environment of ‘conventional wisdom’. The members of  
the community share a common set of patterns of interpretation, implicit assumptions, and 
beliefs. The goal of the community is to create, maintain and share its knowledge within a  
well-defined domain.” (Burnett et al., 2004, page 12) 
Where the community of practice produces a depth of knowledge, the exploration network instead 
emphasizes breadth:  
"…this relates to the formation of new patterns of perceptions, new ways of understanding the 
world, the disruption of existing beliefs and ultimately innovation across the entire enterprise. 
In effect it seeks to tap into breadth of knowledge to create an environment encouraging 
counterintuitive insight…Memberships to these communities is loosely defined, with members 
having similar or very different patterns of interpretation, assumptions and beliefs. Potentially 
these networks can work at the edges of what is known where existing patterns of 
interpretation, implicit assumptions, and beliefs fail.” (Burnett et al., 2004, page 13) 
Burnett et al.’s (2004) summarization of the features of these two types of organizations as 
sensemaking entities is reproduced in Table 2.1.  
The community of practice would appear to be applicable to situations in which well-defined 
procedures could be applied to recognizable problems by established teams, whilst the exploration 
network would be more relevant to novel situations that require ad hoc groupings to engage in 
innovative practices. 
In ‘Thinking Through Crisis’ Fraher (2011) examines the role of organisational sensemaking during 
five crisis events from the aviation, medical care, military and emergency services domains. Fraher 
(2011) identifies the fundamental role of problem identification in crisis response and notes the 
impact that organisational structures, procedures and supporting technologies can have on the 
ability to make sense of events. Fraher criticises the persistence of the centralized C2 paradigm, 
where communication is seen as the “exchange of ‘information’ and ‘instructions’ from one leader to 
recipients” (Fraher, 2011, page 181), advocating instead decentralized, exploratory structures, where 
the leadership role may be shared and sensemaking is a collaborative process. Fraher (2011) cites 
the example of 1989s Hillsborough football disaster, where the highly centralised C2 structure, 
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reliance on SOPs and lack of adequate communications hampered the ability of the organisation to 
detect the developing problem or improvise means to deal with it. At the same time, Fraher (2011) 
asserts that the incident commander was fixated on the risks posed by hooliganism, even as 
evidence mounted that this mental model was flawed. Finally, once the situation tipped over into a 
mass casualty crisis, the incident commander was unable to sustain this highly centralised leadership 
model and the C2 network was put into a state of paralysis.  
This section raises the question of whether – in the event of a multi-agency major incident – the 
emergency services would be able to reconfigure not only their C2 structures (as described in 
Chapter One), but also their sensemaking arrangements. 
Community of practice Exploration network 
Specialized terminology Everyday language 
High levels of abstraction Low levels of abstraction 
Shared practice and domain of interest Shared experiences, values and beliefs 
Well-defined practice within the domain – the 
set of frameworks, tools, information, language 
and documents that the community shares. 
The development of a practice is a possible, 
long-term outcome of exploration, not a given 
Well-defined areas of common interest (the 
domain of the community) 
Often poorly defined areas of common interest 
Long-lived, relatively static membership Short-lived, dynamic associations 
Community members defined by professional or 
organizational groupings 
Networks form and re-form depending on task 
and need 
Goal is incremental improvement in applying 
knowledge in a well-defined area 
Goal is to develop new interpretations, 
conjectures, ideas and ways of looking at the 
world that may be exploited for a purpose 
Table 2.1: The characteristics of communities of practice and exploration networks  
(Burnett, Wooding and Prekop, 2004, page 13) 
2.2.5 Sensemaking summary 
The three sensemaking approaches of representation construction, mapping data to frames and 
collaborative search after meaning appear to complement, rather contradict one another. All three 
are founded on the use of frames to structure the search for meaning, the representation 
construction and data-frame models feature broadly similar iterative processes for searching for, 
elaborating and questioning frames, and the data-frame and collaborative models share a largely 
common view of the fundamental characteristics of the sensemaking process. Many of the perceived 
differences between the approaches appear to stem from the contexts within which they have been 
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studied. Taken individually, each approach has specific advantages and shortcomings associated with 
it for the purposes of this thesis: 
Representation construction 
This approach views sensemaking as a technologically mediated activity (Attfield and Blandford, 
2011), which matches the artefact dependent nature of emergency response C2 activity. However, it 
fails to describe how the cognitive process of sensemaking itself is undertaken. The sensemaking 
accounts provided by Pirolli and Card (2005) and Attfield and Blandford (2011) are procedural, but 
fail to provide detail regarding how hypotheses are generated, or in what way they are challenged or 
tested. 
Data-frame 
Unlike the representation construction and collaborative search after meaning approaches, the data-
frame model of sensemaking has been extensively applied to dynamic, uncertain, high-stakes 
environments from a range of domains, including emergency response activity (Klein et al., 2007). A 
criticism that has been levelled at RPD and which could equally be made of the data-frame theory is 
that it applies primarily to situations in which expert decision makers have relevant experience for 
sensing and interpreting a dynamic situation, whereas the more difficult case for decision makers is 
dealing with novel or unknown problems in uncertain situations (Leedom, 2001).  
Collaborative search after meaning 
Both the representation construction and data-frame theories view sensemaking as an individual 
activity; this appears to be at variance with the reality of emergency response C2 as a complex, 
distributed system, which is not controlled by a single person. In contrast, Weick (1995) views 
sensemaking as firmly grounded within social activity, taking the organisation as the level of analysis. 
When combined with theories on the different types of collaborative networks (i.e. communities of 
practice and exploration networks), this approach may help to explain how emergency response 
sensemaking can be conducted as a systems-level activity. However, whilst Weick describes many of 
the characteristics of collaborative sensemaking, he offers little by way of explanation of how it is 
achieved in practice. 
Table 2.2 summarises the three perspectives. Taken individually, each is limited in its ability to 
describe sensemaking within complex dynamic multi-agent systems. Combining the strengths of the 
three related perspectives offers the potential for a more comprehensive approach: the data-frame 
model offers a process by which sensemaking takes place; introducing the representation 
construction view of frames as external to the individual offers the potential for collaborative 
interactions between individuals, which in turn provides a means for novel frame development.  
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Type Process Frame Application Context of study Advantage Limitations 
Representation 
construction 
Case building  External 
representation 
(artefacts) 
Individual Non-emergency 
case building 
Considers 
artefacts as 
frames  
· Fails to describe 
how sensemaking 
takes place 
· Fails to account for 
collaboration 
Data-frame 
model 
Ongoing In the head 
(previous 
experience) 
Individual Emergency 
response 
command 
Describes a 
process by 
which 
sensemaking 
can take place 
· Fails to account for 
the development of 
new frames 
· Fails to account for 
collaboration 
Collaborative 
sensemaking 
Ongoing, 
retrospective 
Collaboratively 
agreed 
(narrative) 
Group Non-emergency 
organisational  
Provides a 
means of 
generating novel 
frames 
· Fails to describe 
how sensemaking 
takes place 
Table 2.2: Three approaches to sensemaking
Chapter Two: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
45 
Acknowledging the role of artefacts in mediating sensemaking (Attfield and Blandford, 2011) enables 
the development of a more holistic view of sensemaking within emergency response C2. The 
remaining sections of this chapter introduce the concept of distributed cognition and then propose a 
fourth approach to the study of sensemaking – that of sensemaking as distributed cognition. 
2.3 Distributed cognition 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Distributed cognition is the study of the cognitive processes of individuals and groups engaged in the 
performance of tasks, enabled by man-made artefacts (Flor & Hutchins, 1991; Artman & Garbis, 
1998). Within distributed cognition research, cognitive processes are not viewed solely as internal 
mental processes, but instead are mediated by interactions with physical objects, which serve to 
support and transform cognitive activity (Attfield and Blandford, 2011). Thus, cognition moves from 
taking place ‘in the head’ to ‘in the world’ (Norman, 1993) and becomes a property of the system, 
rather than being contained within a single individual (Artman & Garbis, 1998). This is possible 
because any unit – regardless of size – that is engaged in problem solving can be defined as a 
cognitive entity (Perry, 2003).  
In the context of this research, ‘artefact’ refers to a cognitive artefact – i.e., any object within the 
environment that is designed or adapted to serve an information processing function. In order to 
reduce the load placed upon limited mental resources, individuals often make use of physical objects 
in the environment, for example instrumentation on machinery or handwritten notes. These 
artefacts can serve as external memory cues during complex problem solving, reducing the 
complexity of the task and associated mental workload (Norman, 1993). Unlike traditional 
descriptions of individual cognition, where representations of knowledge are held within the 
individual’s mind, within a distributed cognitive system artefacts themselves act as representations 
of task relevant information and the system arrives at its goal-state by performing transformations 
upon these representations (Flor & Hutchins, 1991; Perry, 2013). The transformation of 
representations is achieved by combining, interpreting and re-presenting information provided by 
both artefacts and individuals in the system – no single person controls this activity (Hutchins, 
1995a; Artman & Garbis, 1998). It is the coordination of work and the flow of information between 
the components of the system that leads to the development of systems-level cognition (Artman & 
Garbis, 1998; Perry, 2003). Consequently, artefacts are viewed as representing the critical 
information within a work domain (Nemeth and Cook, 2004). In order to study the nature of 
cognition at the systems level, researchers therefore focus on the role of observable external 
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representations, the flow of information between components (artefacts and individuals), 
organisational structures and processes governing information exchange and the environment in 
which the system operates (Hutchins, 1995a; Baber et al., 2006; Perry, 2013). As a consequence, the 
distributed cognition approach may reveal cognitive processes that would not be found by research 
methods that examine individual-level processes, such as many studies of decision making, 
teamwork and situation awareness (Flor and Hutchins, 1991). 
2.3.2 An alternative view of distributed cognition: socially shared 
cognition 
The above account of distributed cognition presents the individual cognition view of the phenomena 
and which is the perspective adopted for this thesis. Other approaches originate from different 
theoretical and scientific domains such as social psychology, sociology and anthropology (Hutchins, 
1995a). Proponents of these views assert that cognitive processes are not distributed across agents 
and artefacts; instead arguing that distributed cognition is nothing more than a social process 
whereby a common understanding of the task and shared mental representations are distributed 
across the members of a group (Thompson, Levine and Messick, 1999). This ‘socially shared 
cognition’ interpretation takes the view that external media (artefacts) are only involved in social 
processes to the extent that they are co-opted by the group for communication purposes, to enable 
the sharing of perceptions, beliefs and intentions to create similarity across individuals’ cognitions – 
they do not play any role in information processing (Heylighen, Heath and Van Overwalle, 2004). 
Researchers who take this approach to distributed cognition argue that, due to the highly context-
specific nature of the analysis, developing general recommendations or theories is impossible 
(Sutcliffe, 2005). Finally, these alternative approaches to distributed cognition concentrate their 
attention on communication and coordination processes and avoid examination of group problem 
solving – which is the whole purpose of the group activity (Perry, 2003). While artefacts are clearly 
essential to communication, the distributed cognition perspective described in Section 2.3.1 also 
asserts that they do play a role in information processing. This thesis explores the role of artefacts in 
supporting and transforming the individual and collaborative cognitive activities associated with 
sensemaking within emergency response C2 systems. The distributed cognition perspective adopted 
in this thesis is described in more detail in the following section. 
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2.3.3 Exploring distributed cognition concepts in more detail 
In order to address the question of how a system of agents and artefacts are able to engage in 
distributed cognitive processes, the following subsections explore three concepts from the 
distributed cognition literature in more detail: the role of artefacts as external representations, 
artefacts as resources for action and individually vs. socially distributed cognition. 
Artefacts as external representations 
An important driver behind the distribution of cognitive activity to include elements external to the 
mind is thought to be the potential to reduce the cost (i.e., less effort), improve efficiency (i.e., 
faster, fewer errors) and enhance the effectiveness (i.e., coping with harder problems) of that 
activity (Kirsh, 2013). Wright et al. (1996, 2000) distinguish between abstract information structures 
which act as resources and the artefacts that represent them. Kirsh (2013) identifies seven ways that 
external representations can enhance cognitive functions, stating that they: 
· Provide a structure that can serve as a shareable object of thought; 
· Create persistent (i.e., stable) referents; 
· Facilitate re-representations; 
· Are often a more natural representation of structure than mental representations; 
· Facilitate the computation of more explicit encoding of information; 
· Enable the construction of arbitrarily complex structure; 
· Lower the cost of controlling thought – they help coordinate thought. 
(Kirsh, 2013, page 171) 
Hutchins (1995a) gives an example of the reformulation of a representation into a more transparent 
form, in order to reduce the cognitive effort associated with a complex task – that of maintaining 
aircraft speed within safe parameters during landing. Figure 2.5 is a drawing of a cockpit airspeed 
indicator instrument, taken from Hutchins (1995a); around the edge of the instrument are a number 
of speed ‘bugs’ (pointers) that relate to the required air speed for various flight conditions (e.g. 
different wing configurations). The required speeds are calculated prior to commencing landing, 
based on instrument readings for the gross weight of the aircraft and a set of pre-determined 
speed/weight calculations (Hutchins, 1995a). During landing, the crew refer to the positions of the 
airspeed indicator needle relative to the bugs, in order to confirm that reductions in speed are 
coordinated with the appropriate wing configuration changes. In this way, the complex task of 
ensuring that an aircraft of a given weight maintains the appropriate wing configuration for its 
speed, is translated into a simple visual check of the air speed indicator, which explicitly represents 
the relationship between the current state – needle – and the goal state – bug (Furniss and 
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Blandford, 2006). The cognitive effort in calculating the various speed/wing configuration thresholds 
was carried out during a period of relatively light workload and encoded in a meaningful 
representation, which the aircrew could later draw on during a period of higher workload (Hutchins, 
1995a). 
 
Figure 2.5: Speed bugs on an airspeed indicator (Hutchins, 1995a, page 8)  
Baber, et al. (2006) investigated the role of artefacts in the process of Crime Scene Investigation; 
they made a distinction between informal artefacts (which are used to make sense of a crime scene) 
and formal artefacts (which form part of the final report). Baber et al. (2006) described the 
development from informal sensemaking to formal reporting of the investigation as a process 
involving the construction of different forms of narrative. Similarly, Paul, Reddy and Abraham’s 
(2007) investigation of collaborative sensemaking during emergency medicine differentiated 
between the ‘structured’ (i.e. formal) articulation required for ICT and the use of low-tech artefacts 
(pen and paper, whiteboards) for unstructured (i.e. informal) articulation. ICT was thought to overly 
constrain communications, with the result that during crises, staff would revert to low tech 
alternatives, due to the greater ability to accommodate improvised working practices and 
information requirements (Paul et al., 2007). Similarly, Khalilbeigi et al.’s (2010) study of 
technological support for C2 in large-scale disasters found that users retain an attachment to 
established work practices and low-tech artefacts, such as pen and paper. Kirsh (2013) argues that 
for a representational system to perform a cognitive function it must be “sufficiently manipulable to 
be worked with quickly”, hence the attraction of the spoken and written word (Kirsh, 2013, page 
187). There is therefore a tension between the desires of organisations to use technology to 
enhance emergency response C2 and the preference of many employees for the flexibility afforded 
by less formal alternatives. Whilst Paul et al. (2007) allow for the possibility that artefacts facilitate 
sensemaking, they appear to view artefacts as merely transferring information between actors, 
rather than as an integral component within sensemaking. However, their study used group sessions 
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in order to discuss how personnel would use artefacts in sensemaking activities, rather than direct 
observation, thereby running the risk that what people said they do is not what they actually do. 
Artefacts as resources for action 
In addition to the wide range of ways that even simple artefacts can enhance cognitive functions 
described above (Vallée-Tourangeau and Cowley, 2013), artefacts (and the abstract information 
structures they represent) are thought able to function as resources for action. The argument is that 
the design, appearance or functionality of artefacts may act as prompts for agents to perform 
certain activities, without consciously reflecting on them first (Fields, Wright & Harrison, 1996; Baber 
et al., 2006). This mirrors Klein et al.’s (2007) view of the role of frames in sensemaking: 
“Referred to as frames, or schemas these representations are used as aids which guide 
interaction with the data and influence the ways in which it is understood and accounted for.”  
(Faisal, Attfield and Blandford, 2009, page 1) 
This runs counter to the research tradition that has viewed human interaction with the world as 
being plan-based (e.g. Reason, 1990). Based on her studies of how individuals interacted with 
artefacts in their natural environment, Suchman (1987) argued instead that actions are situated, i.e. 
dependent on the context of the environment and the state of the artefacts with which the person is 
interacting: 
“...actors use the resources that a particular occasion provides – including, but crucially not 
reducible to, formulations such as plans – to construct their action’s developing purpose and 
intelligibility.” (Suchman, 1987, page 3) 
According to this approach, individuals can interact with artefacts and environments without the 
need for a precise action plan, instead responding to environmental cues that relate to their overall 
goal, which may only be partially defined (Wright, Fields and Harrison, 1996). Wright et al. (1996, 
2000)  
In their resources model of distributed cognition, Wright et al. (1996, 2000) identify six different 
types of information structures that can be described independently of how they may be 
represented; these are: plans, goals, possibilities, history, action-effect relations and states (Wright 
et al., 2000)2. Each of these may be represented internally or externally in a number of ways (e.g. 
plans could take the form of memorized procedures, written instructions, or might be incorporated 
into the design of an interface) thereby enabling artefacts to represent and convey the abstract 
                                                          
2 Though they acknowledge that additional types of structures may be identified. 
Chapter Two: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
50 
information structures (Wright et al., 2000; Baber et al., 2006). Wright et al. (2000) view the use of 
representations as a cyclical process, whereby action is informed by the configuration of (both 
internal and external) resources; when an action is taken, this changes the configuration of 
resources, which prompts further consideration and action, and so on. Various states and 
combinations of resources can inform action in a number of ways, which Wright et al. (2000) term 
interaction strategies. They identify the four strategies of plan following (plan, history, state), plan 
construction (goal, possibilities, action-effects, state), goal matching (goal, possibilities, state) and 
history-based elimination (goal, possibilities, history), though they are open to the possibility that 
more exist (Baber et al., 2006). The resources model suggests that choices regarding strategy will 
affect the abstract information structures (and thereby resource) attended to (Baber et al., 2006). At 
the same time, the resources attended to inform the information strategy selected, i.e. artefacts 
function as ‘resources for action’, by cueing particular behaviours and affording specific responses 
(Baber et al., 2006, 2013). 
One of the implications of this perspective is that “...work as prescribed does not always reflect work 
as practised” (Wright, Pocock and Fields, 1998, page 1). Associated with this is Ramduny-Ellis et al.’s 
(2005, page 76) distinction between the artefact as designed and the artefact as used, i.e. how 
people have “appropriated, annotated and located artefacts in their work environment.” 
Baber (2013) describes crime scene examination as a distributed cognition process in which the 
environment and the objects it contains become resources for action for experienced Crime Scene 
Examiners, affording interpretations (such as cueing what evidence to recover) that are not available 
to the uninitiated. Crime scene investigation forms part of a complex investigatory process involving 
many agents collecting, manipulating and disseminating a multitude of artefacts (Baber, 2013). The 
actions afforded by these artefacts will differ, depending on the training and experience of the 
agents within the system. Baber (2013) gives two alternative (‘weak’ and ‘strong’) views of the 
criminal investigation process as distributed cognition. Firstly, the distribution of artefacts, in which 
objects “function as vehicles for the storage or representation of information” and are acted upon 
and altered by individuals within the system (Baber, 2013, page 144). Secondly, Baber posits the 
distribution of tasks, in which agents and artefacts are participating in a collective information 
processing activity, which is not necessarily centrally coordinated and that: 
“…accumulates information to a point at which its interpretation can be tested in Court…The 
action of one individual will form the basis for actions of the next. In this manner, the criminal 
justice process is able to ‘know’ the collected evidence, even though it is unlikely that a single 
individual will have access to all of the information collected during the examination.”  
(Baber, 2013, page 144). 
Chapter Two: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
51 
Interestingly, whilst the Crime Scene Examiners in Baber’s (2013) account may be seen as part of a 
collective activity, the geographic and temporal distribution of the agents within this process may 
preclude meaningful collaboration, thus differentiating this analysis from the concept of socially 
distributed cognition, which is discussed below. 
Individually vs. socially distributed cognition 
A distinction has been made between studies of distributed cognition that view the cognitive system 
to be a single human agent interacting with one or more external representations and those that 
study multiple human agents engaged in collaborative activity. The main difference between the two 
is the level at which cognitive activity is thought to take place. Whilst distributed cognition as 
described in previous sections of this chapter is largely concerned with the way that individuals 
make use of artefacts to support and shape cognitive activity, socially distributed cognition is 
primarily concerned with the properties of wider systems that emerge through the coordination and 
communication of human agents. In other words, socially distributed cognition: 
“…includes phenomena that emerge in social interactions as well as interactions between 
people and structure in their environments.” (Hollan et al., 2000, page 177) 
Hutchins’ (1995b) study of navigation aboard a US navy vessel is seen as the definitive application of 
socially distributed cognition (Perry, 2003). In his account, Hutchins (1995b) describes the task of 
navigation as “an emergent process arising from the coordinated actions of the crew” (Perry, 2003, 
page 197) These coordinated actions are socially, technically and temporally distributed and could 
not be reduced to the cognitive workings of individual crewmembers (Rogers and Ellis, 1994; 
Hemmingsen, 2013). Thus, the study of socially distributed cognition involves a higher level of 
granularity (Perry, 2003): 
“…the entities operating within the functional system are not viewed from the perspective  
of the individual, but as a collective. In the analysis, both people and artefacts are considered 
as representational components of the system, using the same theoretical language to 
 describe their properties.” (Perry, 2003; page 206) 
Information processing at this level therefore requires people to coordinate their activity, in order to 
spread the cognitive load across the group (Perry, 2003). This is achieved through communication 
and language is also seen as a cognitive artefact (Perry, 2003). The term ‘cultural heritage’ is used 
within the socially distributed cognition tradition to refer to the way that the adoption of pre-
existing artefacts, strategies, processes and procedures shapes activity within the workplace 
(Hutchins, 1995b). By describing systems level cognition in terms of the communication, and 
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transformation of representations, it is thought possible to identify problems with the current 
process – such as information bottlenecks and breakdowns in communication – thus providing 
opportunities for improvement (Perry, 2003). 
Landgren (2004; 2005a) undertook a lengthy ethnographic study of Fire and Rescue emergency 
response in Sweden. In describing a study of a small-scale (i.e. ‘routine’) emergency, Landgren 
(2004) confirmed the ambiguous and time-critical nature of incident responses described in Chapter 
One of this thesis. Landgren (2004) described the effect of ambiguous information on incident 
response, leading to the incorrect framing of the incident and – as crews became committed to their 
actions – thereby delaying the response. Landgren (2004) describes a C2 structure where IT systems 
(and consequently information) are centralised at the command centre, yet where responding units 
have the ‘preferential right of interpretation’ of the situation. This leads to a tension, as responding 
crews have no direct access to information (relying on filtered, second-hand information) and are 
unable to validate or find inconsistencies (Landgren, 2004). Landgren (2005a) argues that this raises 
questions over how key information should be captured and shared. Landgren (2005a) states that it 
is ‘knowing where’ (i.e. location, best route) an incident is that is of primary importance and that 
‘knowing what’ it is (i.e. understanding and defining the type of incident) may be considered less 
crucial. However, this finding may not automatically translate from the Fire and Rescue (and 
similarly Ambulance) domain to the Police. Fire and Rescue appliances carry 4-6 crew and an 
extensive array of equipment, enabling them to be able to deal with a wide range of rescue 
operations. The first Fire and Rescue appliance on scene is used to confirm the type of incident and 
may well be fully capable of dealing with it without further support. Whilst Ambulances only have a 
crew of 23, they have a similarly extensive range of equipment and are suitably prepared to deal with 
a range of medical emergencies. In situations where individuals pose a risk to crews, the Police will 
be called in to provide protection and to deal with them, with Fire and Ambulance crews standing 
off until the threat has been dealt with. In contrast, police emergency response vehicles carry 1-2 
Officers and minimal equipment; these Officers are frequently tasked to deal with incidents where 
multiple individuals will actively resist or pose a risk to them or other members of the public. 
Consequently, the type of incident can radically change the level of risk and the scale of the 
necessary response (for example, sending multiple units at once). Similarly, as described in Chapter 
One during major incidents knowing what is going on is a crucial requirement for responding 
appropriately. 
                                                          
3 Single-crewed cars or motorbikes are also used, though these are equipped to deal with a more restricted 
range of emergencies. 
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Landgren (2005a) makes the case for a common representation of perceived incident location in 
order to resolve delays resulting from information ambiguity. By providing richer information (i.e. 
from multiple sources) to responding crews, Landgren (2004) argues collaborative sensemaking 
between dispatchers and responding units would be enabled. Landgren (2005a) warns that changes 
to IT are likely to impact on staff roles and C2 structures and therefore suggests making deliberate 
changes to the dispatcher role, in order to move to more of an information brokerage service. 
Perry (2003) argues that the socially distributed cognition approach is still under development and 
therefore does not have a well-defined set of properties. However, a number of characteristics of 
socially distributed cognition systems have been identified from the literature (Roger and Ellis, 1994; 
Hutchins, 1995b; Perry, 2003; Perry 2013) and are summarised below: 
· Redundancy: in the event that a single component fails other media (artefacts or agents) 
prevent critical system failure; 
· Social organization: tasks must be organized such that they can be divided into components 
that can be performed by individuals, before being reintegrated again; 
· Adaptation: people reorganize the environment within which information processing takes 
place, so social, cultural and historical elements become important components of the 
system; 
· Coordination: Collaborative information processing involves information from several 
sources and different formats; this involves the combining and cross-referencing of different 
forms of representation and requires shared access to information; 
· Common ground: for artefacts to be utilized by a distributed cognitive system, they must 
have a universally understood meaning, derived from common experience, training or 
context. 
These characteristics raise interesting questions for emergency response C2 networks, for example, 
is there any opportunity for adaptation within the formal and prescriptive processes in place during 
emergencies and is this more prevalent during major incidents, where responding organisations are 
dealing with novel situations? 
Perry (2003) also acknowledges that the notion of socially distributed cognition as an emergent 
property of distributed systems is contentious, with one alternative view being that it is merely a 
useful analytical device for describing problem solving activity within work settings. 
Perry (2013) concedes that socially distributed cognition has traditionally only been applied to 
tightly-constrained domains, presenting case studies where there is very low uncertainty concerning 
Chapter Two: Sensemaking and Distributed Cognition 
54 
the nature of the task, the roles and activities to be undertaken and where agents are aware of 
“what the state of the final problem resolution will be” (Perry, 2013, page 147). Distributed cognition 
involves lengthy fieldwork and the examination of complex systems in painstaking detail; this 
renders it more suitable to stable work environments than those that are rapidly evolving. 
Consequently, little is known about its applicability to less well-structured ‘loosely-coupled’ domains, 
where the nature of the problem is not initially understood (Perry, 2013). This observation raises the 
question of how relevant the socially distributed cognition approach is to the study of emergency 
response C2, particularly during multi-agency major incidents, contexts that feature high levels of 
uncertainty across many aspects of the incident. Perry’s (2013) summary of the differences between 
tightly and loosely coupled work systems is shown in Table 2.3. 
Key dimensions Tightly coupled systems Loosely coupled systems 
Access to resources Agents and representational 
artefacts are restricted to a 
predetermined set. 
Agents and representational artefacts 
are unrestricted to a predetermined 
set and may change over time. 
Problem structure Well-structured, identifiable and 
expected problems that are 
recurrent. 
A tendency toward ill-structured 
problems that have a high degree of 
uniqueness 
Organisational 
structure and 
problem dynamics 
Organisation has pre-specified 
modes of operation. Division of 
labour is well understood and 
‘standard operating procedures’ 
underpin much of normal work. 
Organisation’s operation is only 
partially pre-determined; established 
work processes are augmented by ad-
hoc approaches. Divisions of labour are 
informally defined and enforced. 
Cycle duration Relatively short cycle for problem 
solving, coupled tightly to the task. 
Problem-solving cycle tends to be 
variable. 
Table 2.3: Tight and loosely coupled work systems (Perry, 2013, page 162) 
Perry would likely consider emergency response C2 to be a loosely coupled system – especially when 
compared to Hutchins’ (1995b) account of naval navigation – however, the description of routine 
emergency response in Chapter One broadly fits many of the characteristics of tightly coupled 
systems as represented in Table 2.3. Unsurprisingly, major incident response activity bears a closer 
resemblance to the description of loosely coupled systems. Regardless of which label is most 
appropriate, in absolute terms, as large, complex, dynamic and geographically, functionally and 
temporally distributed systems, emergency response C2 represents a significant challenge for 
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distributed cognition research. Perry (2013) recommends that distributed cognition research into 
complex, dynamic systems should concentrate on capturing “the significant actions that [are]…of 
particular importance to the performance of the functional system as a whole” (page 165), rather 
than attempting to record a complete description of the information processing characteristics of 
the entire system. 
2.4 Combining sensemaking and distributed cognition 
Both sensemaking and distributed cognition research are well suited to the study of emergency 
response C2 – a complex task of coordinating action across distributed teams in situations of high 
uncertainty. Sensemaking and distributed cognition theories also complement one another; 
distributed cognition could provide the ‘how’, which is sometimes missing from explanations of 
sensemaking activity, as it holds that schema are not required to reside in a person’s head, but 
instead may be represented by technological artefacts. At the same time, sensemaking provides the 
‘what’, which could help to ensure that distributed cognition research remains focussed and concise. 
Additionally, combining sensemaking and distributed cognition would result in a holistic approach to 
the study of work systems, describing both the collaborative social processes undertaken to achieve 
the system’s goals, the supporting technologies and the interactions between the two.  
This thesis proposes a fourth sensemaking approach – that of sensemaking as distributed cognition. 
This approach argues that cognitive processes involved in sensemaking are mediated through 
interactions with artefacts and other agents. Sense is made through an iterative process of 
combining, interpreting, transforming and sharing verbal, physical and electronic representations of 
task relevant information (i.e. data and frames) and thus becomes a property of the system (Artman 
& Garbis, 1998). Sensemaking is underpinned by the relationship between data and the frameworks 
used to conceptualise the problem; artefacts are able to represent data and frameworks, meaning 
that they can support sensemaking activity and enable collaboration across distributed networks.  
As Perry (2003) notes, distributed cognition systems can be described as being composed of several 
layers of inter-related functional systems and as such “analysis may be carried out at one or more of 
these levels” (Perry, 2003; page 213). The discussion of the various approaches to sensemaking and 
distributed cognition in this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that, rather than representing 
irreconcilably different philosophies, they instead provide different perspectives on the same 
phenomena. These could be summarised as: 
· Making sense with artefacts; 
· Making sense through artefacts; 
· Collaborative sensemaking. 
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Whilst some orthodox researchers may take issue with this approach, it does provide a pragmatic 
solution to the problem of how to investigate emergency response C2 from a number of different 
vantage points and should not be seen as a threat to any one approach to either sensemaking or 
distributed cognition. The three perspectives on sensemaking as distributed cognition form a 
theoretical framework for the study of sensemaking within emergency response C2, with each 
perspective suggesting specific investigatory themes, which elaborate on the research question. This 
approach was achieved by mapping different distributed cognition characteristics to the three 
sensemaking perspectives and is summarised in Table 2.4. Although this approach draws upon 
previous sensemaking perspectives, it does more than merely combine them; instead, it extends 
beyond them to provide a unique approach to sensemaking as a technologically mediated and 
socially distributed cognitive activity.  
Research 
perspective 
Sensemaking 
viewpoint 
Distributed 
cognition 
approach 
Investigatory themes 
Making sense with 
artefacts 
Representation 
construction 
Artefacts as 
external 
representations 
How are artefacts used to represent 
and transform information to 
support sensemaking activity? 
How are formal and informal 
artefacts made use of during 
sensemaking activity? 
Making sense 
through artefacts 
The Data-frame 
model 
Artefacts as 
resources for 
action 
How do artefacts act as resources 
for action during sensemaking?  
Does the use of artefacts follow the 
original design intent, or have 
agents developed their own 
strategies? 
Making sense 
through 
collaboration 
Collaborative 
sensemaking 
Socially distributed 
cognition 
How do groups organize and 
coordinate activity to jointly make 
sense of situations? 
How are artefacts used to facilitate 
coordination? 
How do groups adapt their 
sensemaking practices to take 
account of their circumstances? 
Table 2.4: Sensemaking and distributed cognition themes 
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None of the sensemaking or distributed cognition approaches described in this chapter incorporate 
prescriptive methods for the collection and analysis of data; instead, provided the core features of 
the activity in question are captured, the researcher is able to adopt the most appropriate 
techniques to elicit information from the environment in question (Perry, 2003). The data collection 
and analysis methods applied in this thesis are discussed in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Three: Method 
58 
3. Method 
3.1 The challenges of field studies 
Sensemaking and distributed cognition are both considered naturalistic phenomena; thus, their 
investigation necessitates a field study as “…it is the only way in which phenomena can be studied 
holistically and in situ in those natural contexts that shape them and are shaped by them.” (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1986, page 17). Field studies have the potential to provide the researcher with a wealth of 
detailed information with which to build a rich description of the phenomena and the context within 
which it exists. However, this approach first requires a number of careful considerations, including 
the methodology to adopt, how to gain access to the domain, what data to collect and how to 
ensure that the findings are representative. The concern is to ensure that the field study results in an 
account of the phenomena that other researchers may have confidence in, i.e. that it is trustworthy 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1981, cited in Krefting, 1991). McKinnon (1988) identifies four types of threats 
related to the credibility of field studies: 
1. Observer caused effects (the observer’s presence has an effect on the phenomenon under 
investigation); 
2. Observer bias (the observer’s selective perception and interpretations distort the analysis); 
3. Data access limitations (which result in an unrepresentative account); 
4. The ‘complexities and limitations of the human mind’ (i.e. respondents may mislead, either 
due to natural fallibilities or intentional deception). 
Guba and Lincoln (1981, cited in Krefting, 1991) identify four qualities of trustworthy research, 
namely that it has ‘truth value’, ‘applicability’, ‘consistency’ and ‘neutrality’. Later, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985, cited in Morse et al., 2002) expanded on this approach by pairing these four qualities to four 
features of the research that must be demonstrated: credibility (truth value), transferability 
(applicability), dependability (consistency) and confirmability (neutrality). Krefting (1991) suggests a 
number of strategies and tactics that may be adopted in order to demonstrate trustworthiness; 
several of these strategies have been applied to this thesis and are summarised in Table 3.1. Patton 
(1990) also recognises the credibility of the researcher as affecting the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research, stating that any factors that may be interpreted as having affected data collection or 
analysis (both positive and negative) should be reported: 
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“Because the researcher is the instrument in qualitative inquiry, a qualitative report must include 
information about the researcher. What experience, training, and perspective does the researcher 
bring to the field? What personal connections does the researcher have to the people, program or 
topic studied?” (Patton, 1990, page 472) 
This chapter describes the methodological approach adopted in this research and the steps taken in 
order to generate trustworthy findings and to manage the pitfalls associated with field studies. This 
includes a description of the researcher’s experiences as a volunteer police Officer. 
Feature of research Strategy 
Credibility 
Prolonged and varied field experience 
Time sampling 
Multiple sources 
Interview technique 
Establishing authority of researcher 
Transferability 
Time sampling 
Member checking 
Dense description 
Dependability 
Dense description of research methods 
Multiple sources 
Confirmability 
Reflexivity 
Multiple sources 
Table 3.1: Strategies to increase the worth of field studies (adapted from Krefting 1991) 
3.2 Methodological approach 
This field study of sensemaking during emergency response C2 has been organized through the 
development of two case studies. In this thesis, the use of the term ‘case study’ refers to the 
systematic application of a group of methods onto a specific aspect of the domain, in order to build a 
comprehensive picture of it (Rowley, 2002). Two types of case study are presented: 
 Illustrative case studies provide a detailed description of the typical performance of the 
phenomena in question and the naturalistic context in which it occurs (Davey, 1991; Baxter 
and Jack, 2008). These cases may be aggregates of multiple observations (Gerring, 2007). 
 Critical instance case studies present an in-depth study of a single case, in order to examine 
a situation of unique interest and to shed light on a larger class of cases (Davey, 1991; 
Gerring, 2007). 
The production of these case studies resulted from the application of the process summarised in 
Figure 3.1. The following sections of this chapter will describe the case studies themselves and the 
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approach that has been adopted during data collection and analysis for this thesis, making reference 
to the strategies listed in Table 3.1. Several of the strategies adopted are thought to reduce the 
threats to field study credibility identified by McKinnon (1988) and this will be mentioned in their 
descriptions. 
 
Figure 3.1: The iterative research process adopted in this thesis 
3.3 Gaining access to the emergency services domain 
“According to Skolnick, the police organization is the most secluded part of the criminal justice 
system. The researcher's task then becomes how to circumvent the minefield of defences that protect 
the concealed reality of police work.” (Punch, 1989, page 178) 
Given the sensitive and sometimes hazardous nature of police work, there were concerns that the 
researcher might not be granted a sufficient level of access to enable a comprehensive investigation 
of sensemaking. An approach was made to WMP in 2004 and access was initially granted to observe 
and interview staff within the Force Control Centre. The research approval came from Assistant 
Chief Constable level, which enabled regular access to the control centre and despite the 
researcher’s fears, staff were very happy to be interviewed and observed, seeming pleased to have 
an outsider taking an interest in their work. A good working relationship was established with staff 
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and the researcher was given full access to observe staff at work, listen in to 999 calls, review 
incident logs and study control room procedures. 
Gaining access to the emergency response environment was more difficult. A request to observe 
Officers on patrol was declined by West Midlands Police (WMP), due to the perceived risk to the 
researcher. However, in 2007 the researcher joined neighbouring Warwickshire Police as a Special 
Constable; once working for the force, the researcher approached the Chief Constable and secured 
his permission to collect data both within the control centre and whilst out on patrol. At the time, it 
was made clear that this was only made possible because of the researcher’s status as a Special 
Constable and therefore part of the force. A second approach was then made to WMP – via 
Warwickshire Police Chief Constable’s Office – for the researcher to work on secondment with the 
force and collect data at the same time. This request was accepted, enabling the collection of 
participant observation data from two forces. 
3.3.1 Host organizations 
In order to obtain a more representative view of emergency response work, lengthy periods of data 
collection were conducted with two UK territorial Police forces. The forces in question – West 
Midlands and Warwickshire – border each other, but are very different in terms of size, geographic 
area and populations served. Shorter periods of data collection were also carried out with five other 
agencies, in order to provide information on major incident response activity. These organisations 
and data collection sessions are described below.  
West Midlands Police (WMP) 
Following the reorganisation of local authority boundaries in 1974, seven of the existing Police forces 
were merged to form West Midlands Police (West Midlands Police website). WMP is the second 
largest police force in the country; over 12,000 Officers and support staff serve a population of 
approximately 2.63 million and a largely urban geographical area of 348 sq miles, which is divided 
into 211 Operational Command Units2 (West Midlands Police website).  
A series of 17 data collection sessions were held at the Force Communications Centre and Bournville 
Lane (E1) OCU, both of which are located in Bournville Lane Police Station, Birmingham. These 
sessions took place over an extended period from May 2004 to October 2008. Data collection 
                                                          
1 Following the completion of data collection with WMP, the Chief Constable announced in 2009 his intention 
to reorganise the structure of the force, including moving from 21 Operational Command Units to 10 Local 
Policing Units (West Midlands Police, 2009) 
2 Known as Basic Command Units or BCUs in other forces. 
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methods used included semi-structured interviews with Police Officers and support staff, 
observation, document and incident record analysis.  
Further data collection was then carried out over nine sessions in November and December of 2008 
at Little Park Street (M1) OCU in Coventry; this involved semi-structured interviews, document 
analysis, observation and 55 hours of participant observation with three 999 response teams over six 
shifts. 
Warwickshire Police 
Warwickshire Constabulary was formed in 1857 by the merger of Knightlow and Barlichway police 
forces; it gradually expanded over the next century, merging with other local forces before 
becoming Warwickshire and Coventry Constabulary in 1969 (Warwickshire Police 2007). Coventry, 
Solihull and Sutton Coldfield Divisions were split off and merged with WMP in 1974, creating the 
current force area. With 998.6 (equivalent full time) Police Officers, Warwickshire is the second 
smallest Home Office police force in England and Wales (Warwickshire Police website). Warwickshire 
Police serves a population of approximately 525,000 and contains a number of market towns, but no 
cities. The force covers 764 square miles, which includes large sparsely populated rural areas. 
Warwickshire Police C2 structure consists of a single BCU, split into five districts. 
An extended period of participant observation was undertaken between September 2007 and 
September 2010; the majority of this work was carried out with 999 response teams based at 
Leamington Police Station in Leamington Spa, where semi-structured interviews were also carried 
out with Police Officers of various ranks. Additional participant observation sessions were 
undertaken with Officers from Stratford Station, Greys Mallory Traffic Base and at a variety of 
planned events and operations across the county. 
A series of interviews and observations were also carried out with Police Officers and Support Staff 
during six data collection sessions at the Force Control Centre between July and September 2009. 
The Fire Services College 
The Fire Service College, located in Moreton-In-Marsh (Oxfordshire) is the largest single provider of 
specialist operational fire and rescue training in the UK, running training and career progression 
courses for all levels of seniority. The “Station Management Development Programme” is aimed at 
new Assistant Divisional Officers (ADOs); the programme features a number of group desktop 
exercises, known as Tactical Decision Exercises (TDXs). These simulations of credible emergency 
incidents are designed to develop the attendee’s tactical thinking and decision-making abilities. All of 
the TDXs involve the participants taking the role of an ADO who has just been dispatched to become 
Chapter Three: Method 
63 
Incident Commander (Bronze) at a complex emergency incident. TDXs feature lengthy group 
discussions, concerning the rationale behind the decisions and actions taken in response to both 
complex and major incidents.  
Three TDXs were observed in February, March and September 2004, in order to develop an 
understanding of emergency response coordination and major incident command. These observation 
sessions were supplemented by in-depth interviews with senior Fire College Training staff over the 
same period. 
Gloucestershire Constabulary 
Gloucestershire Constabulary was the lead organisation during the response to the county-wide 
flooding emergency of July 2007 – known as the ‘Water Emergency’ – which included the defence of 
Walham Substation. Gold Command was situated at Gloucestershire Police headquarters, where 
representatives from the other responding agencies took part in the SCG. Gloucestershire 
Constabulary took the decision to formally request military assistance in response to the widespread 
flooding, and though the Police were involved in strategic decisions regarding the response to the 
Walham substation incident, they were not significantly involved in the response at the scene. A 
single data collection session was held at Gloucestershire Constabulary Headquarters and the 
adjoining Tri-Service Emergency Centre in 2009 and which included interviews with senior staff. A 
two-hour interview with the ex-Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary (Platinum 
Commander during the Water Emergency) was conducted in January 2011. 
Avon and Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Services 
Both Avon and Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Services were involved in the defence of Walham 
Substation – Avon Fire and Rescue were providing assistance to Gloucestershire through their 
mutual aid agreement. The fire services were responsible for the incident site, with the Fire Bronze 
commander having overall command of all of the responding agencies. The fire service coordinated 
the activity of the different organisations, controlled access to the site and was responsible for the 
safety of all personnel within the inner cordon.  
An in-depth interview was conducted in October 2007 with a senior Fire Officer, who acted as 
‘Bronze’ Commander during the crucial period when the defences around Walham Substation were 
put in place. A short interview session was also held in October 2007 with the Deputy Chief Fire 
Officer of Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue service, who acted as ‘Gold liaison’ during the incident. 
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Environment Agency 
Two Environment Agency Operations Delivery teams were responsible for emergency flood defence 
work at Walham Substation. The teams provided crucial flood defence equipment and expertise. 
One of the team leaders and a specialist team member were jointly interviewed about the defence 
of the substation in late 2007. 
43 (Wessex) Brigade 
The civil emergency services were unable to cope with the scale of the 2007 Water Emergency and 
so a formal request for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) was made. Several hundred 
personnel from across the armed forces were involved in the response to the flooding and 
associated problems, such as loss of drinking water. Military activity was coordinated by 43 (Wessex) 
Brigade. Two Officers attached to the Brigade were interviewed in late 2007 regarding their roles as 
Gold and Bronze liaison Officers during the Water Emergency and specifically in relation to the 
defence of Walham Substation. 
3.4 Multiple perspectives 
A key consideration for the credibility of field studies is the convergence of multiple perspectives to 
confirm findings and develop a comprehensive description of the phenomenon under investigation 
(Knafl and Breitmayer 1989, cited in Krefting, 1991). Tindall (1994) identifies four key themes: 
 Levels Undertaking different levels of analysis in order to develop a more complete 
description of the object of study; 
 Method The use of multiple methods to overcome the limitations of individual 
approaches and derive greater confidence in the findings; 
 Data The collection of data from different participants and multiple roles, at different 
stages in the activity, from different sites and over an extended time period; 
 Investigator Using multiple researchers to overcome individual biases. 
Whilst the solitary nature of the doctoral thesis precludes the use of multiple investigators, it has 
been possible to employ the other three strategies, as is described below. 
3.4.1 Levels of analysis: the case studies 
Two case studies are presented in Chapters Four and Five of the thesis, each of which focuses on a 
different component of emergency response C2. Research for these case studies involved the 
collection and analysis of data from across the emergency response C2 system, from control rooms, 
where emergency calls are answered and resources dispatched, to the Officers that are first on 
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scene, to the operational command of major incidents. Thus, these case studies provide a broad 
ranging account of sensemaking in emergency response C2. The case studies presented in this thesis 
are summarised below. 
Chapter Four: Sensemaking during ‘routine emergencies’  
This illustrative case study is based on data collection with Warwickshire and WMP forces and 
seeks to describe the sensemaking process routinely used when responding to 999 (emergency) 
calls. The aim is to understand where frames come from, when reframing takes place and how 
artefacts are used to help with problem framing. 
Chapter Five: Sensemaking during multi-agency major incidents 
A critical instance case study of a major incident explores the organisational sensemaking 
demands placed on emergency services C2 during multi-agency operations. The case study is the 
defence of Walham electricity substation – part of the wider ‘Water emergency’ in 
Gloucestershire in 2007. It is predominantly based on retrospective interviews with personnel 
involved in the incident. The aim of this case study is to investigate the challenges facing the 
emergency services when trying to make sense of multi-agency major incidents and the role of 
distributed cognition processes in supporting this activity. 
3.4.2 Methods of data collection 
As this thesis involved the study of distributed cognition and sensemaking across the breadth of 
emergency response C2, different methods of data collection were deemed suitable for each aspect 
of the system under consideration. Table 3.2 below summarises the methods applied to each aspect 
of emergency services C2. 
The focus of these various data collection methods was on developing an understanding of the 
context, processes and procedures, work environment and technologies that are involved in the 
processing of information and sensemaking during incident responses. Within each method, 
attempts were made to ensure that there was sufficient variation in the sources, locations and times 
of data collection to provide confidence in the trustworthiness of the findings. The data collection 
methods used are discussed over the following pages. 
Chapter Three: Method 
66 
 
Level / area Approach 
 
Multi-agency major incidents 
SME Interviews 
Analysis of publicly available incident reports 
Fire and Rescue TDX observations 
Observations at strategic coordination centres 
Document review (policy and procedures) 
Routine emergency response coordination 
SME Interviews 
Observation 
Participant observation (including training) 
Document review (incident logs; training 
material; local and national policy and 
procedures) 
 
Emergency incident response ‘on the ground’ 
Table 3.2: Areas of emergency response work and the associated approaches adopted for this thesis 
3.4.2.1 Participant observation 
Participant observation is the process of actively taking part in the daily life of the organization being 
studied (Becker, 1958). Punch (1989) judges participant observation to be the most appropriate 
method for “…breaking through [police] culture and for cracking the code of policing” and in this 
instance it enabled access to aspects of emergency response policing that were not otherwise 
available. Many accounts of ‘participant observation’ do not involve truly active participation, as the 
researcher is not part of the process under investigation or a member of the organization, taking 
instead a passive, outsider role. McKinnon (1988) reflects this in the ‘participant observer 
continuum’ (Table 3.3), which describes six levels of researcher engagement against the four types 
of threats related to the credibility of field studies. McKinnon (1988) cautions against use of the 
extreme positions, due to the potential for misinterpretation (level 1) and ethical and practical 
considerations (level 6). McKinnon (1988) notes that in most field studies, the researcher will use a 
number of forms of participant observation, moving among them at various points in the research. 
This was the case during data collection for this thesis where, depending on the situation, the 
researcher was involved as everything from point 3 ‘limited interaction’ to point 6 ‘participant with 
hidden identity’, providing a range of vantage points from which to study sensemaking and helping 
to overcome some of the risks associated with field studies. 
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 Observer-
caused 
effects 
Observer 
bias 
Data access 
limitations 
‘Complexities 
and limitations 
of the human 
mind’ 
1. Watching from the outside + – – – 
2. Passive presence – – – – 
3. Limited interaction + + + + 
4. Active control + + + + 
5. Observer as participant + – –  
6. Participant with hidden identity + – –  
Table 3.3: Participant observer continuum (McKinnon, 1988, page 47). The table indicates the 
favourable (+) and unfavourable (-) implications of each point for each threat to the credibility of 
field studies. 
From September 2007 to September 2010, the researcher collected data whilst working as a Special 
Constable with Warwickshire Police. The rank of Special Constable is an unpaid voluntary position, 
which confers all of the powers of a regular (paid) Police Officer. Special Constables wear full Police 
uniform3 and perform the same duties and activities as regular Officers (Figure 3.2). During this time, 
the researcher accrued approximately 890 hours of police activity, 620 of which were spent in front 
line operational policing duties and a further 180 hours in completing police training (see Table 3.4). 
The majority of front line policing hours (over 400) were spent as one-half of a two-officer ‘reactive’ 
patrol crew (alongside a regular Police Officer) and deployed in a marked police vehicle. Whilst the 
researcher crewed with 40 Police Officers from a range of operational units, most of the duties were 
completed with five response teams, based at Leamington Police Station in Warwick District. 
Approximately 55 hours were also spent working six shifts across three different response teams 
based at Little Park Street Station (M1 OCU) in Coventry – part of WMP. This was a temporary 
secondment, which was authorised by both forces to enable the researcher to gain experience of 
working with this force. As much as was practically possible, a variety of day and night, week day and 
weekend shifts were worked, in order to gain a balanced picture of response policing. The duration 
of shifts ranged from four to over 15 hours, with an average duty length of approximately nine 
hours. In the course of these duties, both ‘priority’ (response within 30 minutes) and ‘immediate’ 
                                                          
3 The only difference is the addition of a crown and the letters ‘SC’ above the Officer’s number on their 
epaulettes. 
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(i.e. urgent response4) incidents were dealt with; the nature of immediate incidents varied widely 
and involved a range of types of incidents, including: 
 Alcohol related violence and public disorder; 
 Bomb threat; 
 Burglaries in progress; 
 Criminal damage; 
 Domestic violence; 
 High risk missing persons; 
 Kidnapping / false imprisonment; 
 Medical emergencies (including self-harm and acute mental health problems); 
 Retail thefts; 
 Road Traffic Collisions; 
 Serious assaults; 
 Street robberies; 
 Threats and violence involving the use of weapons; 
 Vehicle crime (including theft from, theft of and driving offences, such as drink driving and 
driving whilst disqualified); 
 Violent detainees in the custody suite; 
 Welfare concerns (e.g. elderly and disabled persons collapsed in their homes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Local newspaper articles on Policing showing the researcher in uniform  
(Leamington Courier, June 2008; Kenilworth Weekly News, October 2008) 
                                                          
4 Response within 10 minutes for urban areas and 20 minutes for rural areas. 
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Whilst the exact number of immediate incidents attended by the researcher was not recorded5, the 
majority of the 70 reactive shifts worked involved responding to multiple ‘immediates’, with busier 
shifts (typically Friday and Saturday nights) often seeing 5-10 emergencies being dealt with by each 
unit. Responding to these and other types of incidents involved the researcher in all of the basic 
activities associated with response and investigatory work, including: locating, arresting, 
interviewing and processing suspects; taking statements from victims and witnesses; preserving and 
collecting evidence; conducting searches for people and property; guarding crime scenes; carrying 
out checks on police databases; providing first aid; conducting house to house enquiries; closing 
roads, establishing cordons and directing traffic; liaising with other emergency services, seizing 
property and vehicles; completing paperwork and compiling crime files. 
The list of incident types above closely matches the list of important call types identified in Branagan 
et al.’s (2010) study of information requirements for police response sensemaking, with prostitution 
the only incident type not encountered by the researcher. 
Activity Hours 
Reactive (incident response) 409 * 
Planned operations (road safety, drugs, airport duties) 34 * 
Major operations (large festivals, ANPR operations) 92 * 
Other uniformed duties (Front Office, Custody, Neighbourhood policing, foot patrols) 89 * 
Training (Officer safety, driving, law, evidence, first aid, etc.) 182 
Administration (Event resourcing, training portfolio, statement writing, etc.) 87 
 Total: 893 
Table 3.4: Summary of hours and activities undertaken whilst working as a Special Constable 
(* indicates front line policing activities, which total 624 hours) 
No video or audio recordings were made during participant observations, due to the sensitive nature 
of the activities and the fact that any such footage would be restricted and therefore difficult to 
store and handle. Still photography was used during participant observation sessions and a number 
of pictures taken by the researcher are used in the thesis.  
                                                          
5 This is difficult to establish, as not all incidents required a pocket notebook entry and force electronic records 
contain inaccuracies, listing some incidents that the researcher did not attend and omitting some that he did.  
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Observations and notes were made in a similar manner to that of Borglund and Nuldén (2008) in 
their study of sensemaking in police work: informal conversational interviews were conducted with 
crewmates6 during patrols and observations of face-to-face and radio-based conversations between 
Police Officers and with Controllers were recorded. Notes were taken during patrols whenever 
possible7; research notes were often made in parallel to police notes during the shift and were 
supplemented with reference to electronic incident logs for timings and other details. Additionally, 
reflective notes were compiled in a field diary after each shift. This process enabled the activities of 
front-line Police Officers and the wider C2 system to be experienced directly and then considered, 
prior to the next observation session. Data collection was initially unstructured and was intended to 
develop the researcher’s understanding of the domain; this was later followed up by more 
structured data collection that focussed on specific aspects of emergency response work, for 
example looking at the nature of radio communications and the role these play in sensemaking. 
Notes were never made whilst dealing directly with members of the public or detained persons, 
however pocket notebook entries were made during these times in the course of normal duties and 
were subsequently used to supplement data collection. Notes were structured in such a manner as 
to maintain a clear distinction between observations and the researcher’s reflections, in order to 
reduce the risk of bias and to ensure that interpretation followed from observation (McKinnon, 
1988). 
3.4.2.2 Interviews and observations 
In addition to the informal interviews with crewmates during participant observation, formal and 
semi-structured interviews and observations were undertaken with a range of emergency response 
personnel. 76 individuals were interviewed and/or observed – these are summarised in Table 3.5, 
below. The broad range of interviewees was primarily sought to lend credibility to the findings, but it 
also enabled an iterative approach to be applied to the research (cf. Figure 3.1). This supported the 
gradual development and validation of a detailed understanding of the various processes and the 
role of artefacts in emergency response C2. The manner in which interviews are conducted can also 
enhance the credibility of the findings, for example, through repeating, reframing and expanding on 
questions over multiple occasions (May, 1989, cited in Krefting, 1991). Probing questions were also 
used – both during interview settings and informal conversations whilst on patrol – to clarify the 
views of respondents, thus resolving any gaps in the researchers understanding and helping to 
address issues of researcher bias and any fallibilities and idiosyncrasies of individual respondents 
                                                          
6 All crewmates had at least 2 years’ experience and were out of their probationary/student officer periods. 
7 As a ‘basic’ police driver, the researcher would be the passenger in the response vehicle, with the advanced 
or pursuit trained Officer as the driver; this allowed the researcher to spend more time observing and taking 
notes. 
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(McKinnon, 1988). McKinnon (1988) distinguishes between informant and respondent interviewing; 
informants can provide general background information on the organisation and the typical process 
of events involved in routine activity, whilst respondents are able to discuss their role, functions, 
experiences and interactions with others (McKinnon, 1988). Many of the interviewees listed in Table 
3.5 acted as both informants and respondents, depending on the questions posed. Protocol 
questions (Lubbe, 2003) were used to structure the approach to interviews and observations and 
provide prompts to the researcher concerning the objectives for each session. Semi-structured 
interviews would start on a specific topic from the protocol and this was probed until the topic was 
exhausted, at which point a new one was selected (Stanton and Young, 1999). Interviewees were 
asked to respond in relation to particular examples, as well as hypothetical situations, in order to 
separate general principles from specific circumstances. Several of the interviewees were spoken to 
on repeated occasions, allowing the researcher to probe issues further and validate his 
understanding, lending depth as well as breadth to the research. 
Questioning during observation (for example, Call Handlers and Controllers were interviewed at 
their desks between calls/radio transmissions) was far less structured than with those interviewees 
who were not being observed. Interviews during observation were done on an opportunistic basis – 
with questions restricted to periods of down time and frequently tailored to clarify the activities that 
had just been observed. These combined interview/observation sessions allowed the researcher to 
make comparisons between what the interviewees said they did and what they actually did, 
revealing interesting discrepancies. Observations of an individual typically lasted not less than an 
hour, with 4-5 hours of interview/observation per data collection session. During these interview 
and observation sessions, data capture was limited to note taking, which ranged from detailed 
descriptions of activities being undertaken and the use of artefacts, to verbatim recording of 
interactions between individuals or responses to questions, to more summarised accounts of 
responses. No video or audio recordings were made during observations with emergency response 
personnel, again due to the sensitive nature of the activities and associated restrictions on the 
storing and handling of footage. Following data collection, notes were transcribed and any 
immediate reflections were recorded. An audio recording was made of the interview with the retired 
Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Constabulary, as this interview dealt solely with an incident that 
was already described at length in the public domain. Photography was used extensively during 
observation sessions and pictures are used to support descriptions of the emergency response 
environment. Procedural documentation was made available by several organisations and a number 
of incident logs (including logs of observed incidents) were printed out to enable subsequent 
detailed analysis of response activity. 
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Position Organisation Case study Subjects / application 
Data 
collection 
No. 
Chief Constable 
(Retired) 
Gloucestershire 
Constabulary 
Major incidents 
Gold Command and the major incident response process. Used to 
corroborate major incident C2 description in Chapter One. 
Gloucestershire ‘water emergency’. Used to corroborate description 
of the incident in Chapter Five. 
Interview 1 
Deputy Chief Fire 
Officer 
Gloucestershire Fire 
and Rescue Service 
Major incidents Participant in Walham Electricity Substation defence (‘Gold Liaison’) Interview 1 
Superintendent WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Major incidents 
Gold Control operations. Used in the description of major incidents 
in Chapter One. 
Military aid to civil authorities. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding. 
The implementation of Airwave digital radio system. Used to assist 
the researcher’s understanding. 
Interview 2 
Chief Inspector 
Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies  
Major incidents 
Force Control Centre operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding and corroborate the descriptions in Chapter Four. 
Gold Control operations. Used in the description of major incidents 
in Chapter One. 
Gloucestershire ‘water emergency’. Used to corroborate description 
of the incident in Chapter Five. 
Interview 4 
Fire and Rescue 
Incident 
Commander / 
Trainer 
Fire Services College, 
Avon Fire and Rescue 
Service 
Major incidents 
Participant in Walham Electricity Substation defence (Fire Bronze 
Commander) 
Interview 1 
Major incident Bronze Command. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding (preparation for major incident interviews). 
Interview, 
Observation 
(exercises) 
3 
Table 3.5: A summary of the roles encountered, their relevance to the research and the data collection method(s) applied 
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Role / Position Organisation Case study Subjects / application 
Data 
collection 
No. 
Inspector 
Gloucestershire 
Constabulary, 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP  
Routine 
emergencies  
Major incidents 
Bronze and Silver command during Major incidents. Used to assist 
researcher’s understanding and to corroborate description in 
Chapter One. 
Basic Command Unit operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of routine emergency response organisation. 
Force Control Centre operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding (preparation for observations) and to corroborate 
findings in Chapter Four. 
Interview 9 
Emergency response process. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of the Bronze Inspector’s role in routine emergency 
responses. 
Planned incident Bronze Command. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of the Bronze Inspector’s role during planned major 
incidents. 
Participant 
Observation 
3 
Sergeant 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Basic Command Unit operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of routine emergency response organisation and to 
corroborate the description presented in Chapter Four. 
Emergency response process. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of the Sergeant’s role in routine emergency 
responses. 
Interview 4 
Interview, 
Participant 
observation 
3 
Participant 
observation 
3 
Gold Tactical 
advisor 
WMP Major incidents 
Gold Control operations. Used to assist the researcher’s 
understanding and in the description of major incidents in Chapter 
One. 
Interview 1 
Table 3.5 (cont.): A summary of the roles encountered, their relevance to the research and the data collection method(s) applied 
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Role / Position Organisation Case study Subjects / application 
Data 
collection 
No. 
Communications 
Room Supervisor 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Force Control Centre operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding (preparation for observations) and to corroborate 
findings in Chapter Four. 
Observation 4 
Constable 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Emergency response process. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding of routine emergency response organisation and to 
contribute to / corroborate the findings presented in Chapter Four. 
Participant 
observation 
408 
Controller 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Observation 189 
Call Handler 
Warwickshire Police 
and WMP 
Routine 
emergencies 
Observation 15 
Intelligence 
Analyst 
Warwickshire Police 
Routine 
emergencies 
Force Control Centre operations. Used to assist researcher’s 
understanding (preparation for observations) and to corroborate 
findings in Chapter Four. 
Observation 1 
Environment 
Agency Response 
Team 
Environment Agency Major incidents 
Participant in Walham Electricity Substation defence (Fire Bronze 
Commander) 
Interview 2 
CIMIC liaison 
Officer 
43 (Wessex) Brigade Major incidents 
Participant in Walham Electricity Substation defence (Fire Bronze 
Commander) 
Interview 2 
Table 3.5 (cont.): A summary of the roles encountered, their relevance to the research and the data collection method(s) applied 
                                                          
8 Only includes crewmates and 9 only includes Controllers that were directly observed. Other Officers and Controllers encountered during shifts (e.g. heard over the radio) 
were not counted, though observations of them have also contributed to the research. 
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3.4.5 Major incident case study 
Major incidents are, by definition, unpredictable and therefore difficult to observe first hand. Whilst 
nearly all aspects of incident response C2 activity were directly observed, the limits of this approach 
were reached when attempting to gather data on responses to major incidents. Despite numerous 
trips to Gold and Silver Command establishments (including observations during a planned initiation 
of WMP Gold Command centre for the 2005 general election), as well as over 600 operational hours 
with the Police, it was not possible to directly observe any part of a spontaneous major incident 
response. This is unsurprising, as major incidents occur only very infrequently in relation to the 
numbers of ‘routine’ emergency incidents that are dealt with. Additionally, given the scale of major 
incident responses, it would be extremely difficult for a single researcher to be able to make 
representative observations of such a complex event. Instead, alternative sources were used to 
develop an understanding of the management of major incidents; this included visits to command 
centres, observations of command training exercises and interviews with Police and Fire and Rescue 
Gold, Silver and Bronze level command staff. The 92 hours of participant observation spent working 
at planned multi-agency major incidents also enabled data collection at the operational level of large 
incidents. In this thesis, major incident response activity is discussed in relation to a critical instance 
case study of the combined military and civilian defence of Walham electricity substation from rising 
floodwater in July 2007. 
Walham Electricity Substation defence, July 2007 
On 22nd July, a multi-agency operation was launched to prevent rising floodwater from 
overwhelming Walham electricity substation – a site of critical national importance. The response 
involved hundreds of personnel from a number of organisations, including the Fire and Rescue 
services, Environment Agency and several military units; despite the very short notice and a range of 
practical challenges, the various agencies were able to coordinate an effective response and prevent 
the floodwater from forcing the shutdown of the substation. 
The analysis of this scenario primarily examines the consolidation phase of the incident and is mainly 
concerned with the coordination at the Bronze (operational) level of command at Walham 
substation. Whilst a large number of organisations were actively involved in the response to the 
flooding of Walham substation, this analysis concentrates on the main agencies involved in the 
construction of the flood defences and removal of water from the site. Discussions and in-depth 
interviews (totalling over seven hours) were held with six people from the agencies that were 
directly involved in the Walham substation incident, namely Avon Fire and Rescue Service (Bronze 
Commander), Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service (Deputy Chief Fire Officer – ‘Gold Liaison’), 43 
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(Wessex) Brigade (Joint Regional Liaison and Site Liaison Officers), Environment Agency (Team 
Leader and Specialist Team Member). These interviews featured the use of the revised Critical 
Decision Method (CDM) probes (O’Hare et al., 1998) to assist in the elaboration of the incident 
frames held by key personnel from the different agencies, in terms of their goals, the key features of 
the incident, their conceptual models, the management of uncertainty and available information. 
During the incident, the interviewees were the on-scene commanders for their respective agencies 
and were able to provide detailed descriptions of events, command structures, multi-agency 
cooperation and the problems experienced during the defence of the substation. 
A one-off visit to Gloucestershire Constabulary Gold Command and the Gloucestershire Tri-Service 
Emergency Centre (GTEC) and an interview with the retired Chief Constable of Gloucestershire 
Constabulary were conducted in 2009 and 2011 respectively. These were beneficial, both in terms of 
providing additional background information to the defence of Walham substation and the wider 
water emergency, but also to validate the researcher’s understanding of major incidents gained 
from WMP. 
3.5 Analysis and presentation of findings 
3.5.1 Overview 
In order to achieve the aims of the research, this thesis provides a detailed description of the goals, 
processes, environment, agents and artefacts involved in emergency response C2 activity and 
describes their impact on sensemaking within the system. This description is interspersed with 
vignettes, photographs, diagrams and quotes, in order to illustrate the points being made. Before 
describing the data analysis process, it is first necessary to briefly consider what would constitute 
evidence for this research. 
3.5.2 The nature of evidence 
Whilst the adoption of Krefting’s (1991) strategies to increase the worth of field studies (described 
earlier in Table 3.1) may be considered to lend credence to research findings, for Miller and 
Fredericks (2003) the fundamental question of ‘what constitutes evidence?’ remains. Fisher (1977, 
cited in Lincoln, 2002) and Miller and Fredericks (2003) distinguish between data and evidence, 
stating that data only becomes evidence when viewed from some theoretical or paradigmatic 
perspective and then applied to a specific question; thus, evidence is data to which layers of 
interpretation have been applied (Lincoln, 2002): 
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“The metaphysical paradigm with which one begins implies a preordinate sense of what “evidence” 
is, of where it might be obtained, of how it might be collected, and a set of implicit and explicit rules 
for judging how good (rigorous, thorough, “grounded”) those evidences might be (Fisher, 1977).” 
(Lincoln, 2002, page 4). 
Carlson (1994; cited in Lincoln, 2002) provides three criteria for determining whether something 
constitutes evidence: 
1. Whether it is appropriate within the chosen paradigm; 
2. Whether it is relevant to the argument being made; 
3. Whether the researcher has made use of the best available data. 
For this thesis, appropriate evidence is therefore interpreted as that which: 
1. Fits with the theoretical perspectives and research traditions of sensemaking and distributed 
cognition; 
2. Lends confidence to the arguments that are put forward to address the research question; 
3. As far as possible provides a description of emergency response C2 which is representative 
of ‘routine activity’. 
Both sensemaking and distributed cognition are concerned with communications and the flow of 
information between individuals, and between individuals and artefacts. As a result, the question of 
‘what constitutes evidence?’ in the context of sensemaking for emergency response is addressed by 
‘any observable instance of the communication of information in order to make sense of the 
unfolding incident’. Findings are discussed through narrative descriptions of the process of 
sensemaking during incident responses; these are illustrated with photographs of artefacts, 
workstations and environments, process and network diagrams and short vignettes based on 
observations, interviewee responses, incident logs and procedural documentation.  
3.5.3 Analysis of interview, observation and participant observation data 
A process of analysis is required in order for the data that has been collected to become evidence 
(Lincoln, 2002). As Figure 3.1 indicated earlier, data collection and analysis were undertaken in 
conjunction, which is standard practice within field study research (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Each 
iteration of data collection, analysis and reflection guided subsequent data collection. Becker (1958) 
identifies three stages of analysis that are conducted in the field (i.e. whilst the researcher is still 
gathering data), followed by a fourth: 
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1. Selection and definition of problems, concepts and indices; 
2. Check on the frequency and distribution of phenomena; 
3. Incorporation of individual findings into a model of the organization under study; 
4. Presentation of evidence and proof. 
Whilst Becker (1958) was describing sociological participant observation, this approach is broadly 
applicable to Human Factors research and was adopted for this thesis. The analytical stages are now 
briefly discussed in turn. 
1. Selection and definition of problems, concepts and indices 
This research was undertaken with the intention of adopting sensemaking and distributed cognition 
as theoretical lenses through which to guide data collection and interpretation. As a result, the 
broad themes to be investigated were identified a priori, from the features of sensemaking and 
distributed cognition. These were summarised in Table 2.4 in Chapter 2.  
Conducting sensemaking research from a distributed cognition perspective provides an approach to 
the problem of what data to collect, as distributed cognition researchers attempt to describe a range 
of system features in order to uncover cognitive processes. These can include system goals, 
organisational structures, individuals’ interactions with one another and with artefacts, the process 
of representation transformation and the role of the work environment (Rogers and Ellis, 1994). 
Provisional data collection was therefore carried out to begin to develop an understanding of the 
goals, organisation, artefacts and procedures of emergency response work and to establish whether 
the high-level themes were applicable to the domain. It was then necessary to identify the lines of 
enquiry to take during data collection in order to address the research questions. Focussing on the 
research questions helps to avoid the pitfall of being distracted by the mounds of interesting but 
superfluous data (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Preliminary data collection identified specific aspects for 
further investigation – for example, the roles of the notepad and the incident management system 
in supporting sensemaking during 999 calls. This stage also featured the development and 
implementation of a strategy for investigating the different areas of the emergency response C2 
structure in order to develop appropriate case studies to investigate them. 
2. Check on the frequency and distribution of phenomena 
Becker (1958) describes this stage of analysis as a process of identifying the representativeness and 
pervasiveness of the concepts identified in stage 1. Lubbe (2003) notes that:  
“…the case study methodology is not designed to measure the frequency of occurrence of events but 
rather to support or reject theoretical propositions.” (Lubbe, 2003, page 14) 
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As such, this involved comparing and contrasting findings to published literature in order to situate 
the study into the wider body of research (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The multiple perspectives 
approach to data collection also enabled corroboration of findings, to ascertain their 
representativeness.  
Routine emergency case study corroboration 
Where a feature of sensemaking during routine emergency responses was identified using one 
method, it was verified through other sources or data collection methods. For example, multiple Call 
Handlers in different Control rooms and police forces were observed using ‘active listening’ 
questioning techniques; these observations were then validated through interviews with call 
handlers and supervisors, as well as through a review of Call Handling training material. Similarly, the 
widespread and consistent uses of notepaper and notepads observed in police control rooms in 
different forces throughout the data collection period supported the conclusion that this was an 
established phenomenon, rather than a short-lived or local idiosyncrasy. Interviews with Call 
Handlers and supervisors supported these observations. 
Points of divergence between data collection methods and sources are to be expected and may 
indicate areas worthy of further investigation (Bryman, 1988). However, careful investigation is 
necessary to establish what is actually happening, as well as the reasons for the divergence. For 
example, the Controllers spoken to stated that they allocate incidents to specific units, rather than 
asking for ‘any unit’ to attend; this was supported by a review of training materials and comments 
from supervisors, both of which stated what Controllers should do. However, over the course of 
control room observations, the researcher observed Controllers repeatedly radioing ‘any unit’. Later, 
during participant observation sessions with both Police forces, ‘any unit’ requests were regularly 
heard and the implication that this was a common occurrence was corroborated by interviews with 
Police Officers and Sergeants. Having made this observation and following a period of reflection, 
subsequent control room and participant observation sessions sought to establish why Controllers 
might feel the need to ask for ‘any unit’, through a review of the demands of their role and the 
information and resources available to them. 
Major incident case study corroboration 
Interviews with staff from the main response agencies provided the principal source of information 
on the sensemaking processes involved during the emergency response. The interviews were 
analysed in parallel, to identify points of commonality and divergence; participants were then 
contacted again (by telephone or email) in order to clarify points and to check for accuracy. These 
points of divergence were reflected on not only in light of sensemaking theory, but also following 
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interviews and observations with senior staff from The Fire Services College and WMP. Publicly 
available documentation on the incident was used to verify the accounts provided. Observations of 
tactical decision exercises and interviews with senior commanders at the Fire Services College, along 
with a review of Fire Service doctrine (e.g. HM Government, 2008) provided background knowledge 
regarding Fire and Rescue major incident practices, as well as validation of the account provided by 
the respondents involved in this major incident. The later visit to Gloucestershire Constabulary 
Headquarters and interviews with senior staff, along with the in-depth interview with the retired 
Chief Constable provided further background information on major incident practices and the 
countywide ‘water emergency’, as well as corroboration of the timeline of events provided by the 
case study interviewees. 
Checking with practitioners 
Patton (1990) suggests a further method of corroboration, which is to have members of the domain 
in question review the study findings. In line with this approach, checking with practitioners was 
used during interviews as a means for evaluating whether earlier observations represented typical 
events, although responses were treated with caution, as some discrepancies were noted between 
interviewees verbal accounts (what they would do) and observed events (what they did).  
Checking with practitioners also enabled the researcher’s understanding to be reviewed, in order to 
give confidence regarding the trustworthiness of the developing analysis. Drafts of research reports 
and conference papers based on this research (cf. page xi) were submitted to successive WMP Force 
Communications Centre Commanders and senior Warwickshire Police Officers for comment. 
Additionally, the researcher prepared two reports (totalling 8,000 words) for Warwickshire Police on 
preliminary findings from the Communications Centre observations and the secondment with WMP; 
these were submitted to senior Officers for comment. As Krefting (1991) suggests, checking with 
practitioners became progressively less valuable towards the latter stages of the research process, 
as interpretations and higher conceptual analysis became the prominent consideration over 
descriptive data. 
3. Incorporation of individual findings into a model of the organization under study 
Rather than dealing with different data elements separately, building case studies involves 
combining data from multiple sources, with each element contributing to the researcher’s 
understanding of the whole phenomenon (Baxter and Jack, 2008). This convergence is seen not only 
as a strength, but as a defining feature of the of the case study approach, as the purpose is to 
understand the overall case, rather than its constituent parts (Baxter and Jack, 2008). In this thesis, 
the process of building the case studies involved two main visualisation tools: 
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Vignettes 
Specific examples of sensemaking activity are presented as short narratives or excerpts from 
dialogue. Collectively, the vignettes describe the range of sensemaking activities involved in each 
case study. Each of the vignettes presented in Chapter Four is taken from a single incident or event – 
based on the researcher’s contemporaneous notes, or on an incident log. Where a vignette includes 
quotes or dialogue, these are verbatim transcripts. None of the transcribed comments are those of 
the researcher and the findings presented do not include any actions by the researcher. Vignettes 
have also been presented to describe noteworthy exceptions from routine activity and where this is 
the case, it is highlighted in the accompanying text.  
As in Chapter Four, vignettes are used in Chapter Five to illustrate the sensemaking activities under 
discussion, however for this case study, they are not based on direct observation, coming instead 
from interviews. As Chapter Five is a critical instance case study, the emphasis for credibility is less 
on demonstrating that these vignettes are representative and instead that they portray the events 
that they describe accurately. This becomes difficult with vignettes based solely on interviewee 
comments, particularly where they are describing their personal impressions, rather than objective 
facts. However, given that the interviewees played central roles in the command of the incident 
response and that these points of divergence illustrate the challenges of major incident 
sensemaking, it was felt justified to include vignettes based on their comments. 
Diagrams 
Process-tracing analyses were used to explore the roles of agents and artefacts in the representation 
and transformation of information within emergency response C2. The resulting process flow 
diagrams were then annotated with a graphical notation system, in order to summarise the 
distributed cognition features being described9. These process flow diagrams represent the 
distillation and interpretation of multiple observations and thus are general descriptions of the 
sensemaking activities being described.  
These two visualisation tools complement one another, with the vignettes helping the reader to 
view the diagrams, which in turn provide a framework within which the activity described in the 
vignettes takes place. 
                                                          
9 This novel method for the description of distributed cognition processes was developed specifically for this 
thesis and was subsequently published in McMaster and Baber (2005a). 
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4. Presentation of evidence and proof 
Becker’s (1958) final stage of analysis involves rechecking the descriptive models, evaluating the 
accuracy of statements and the supporting data and then planning how to present the findings. 
Chapters Four and Five present the two case studies, each of which is separated into activity 
descriptions, followed by the researcher’s inferences (Baxter and Jack, 2008). The activity 
descriptions are a synthesis of observations, interviews and reviews of guidance documents, 
resulting in accounts of the principal elements of the process undertaken in each stage of the 
emergency response. The interpretations draw on specific instances to explain the sensemaking 
processes that are believed to be essential to the activity. 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
During data collection, steps were taken to ensure that no harm would be caused to any persons 
involved and that their privacy was respected. Particular ethical issues relating to this research are 
summarised below. 
3.6.1 Consent 
Organisations 
The research described within this thesis was conducted with the full knowledge and consent of all 
of the organisations concerned and information on the purpose of the research and the data 
collection methods was provided to senior staff in advance. As was mentioned in Section 3.5, 
feedback was provided on several occasions and comments were sought prior to the publication of 
reports, conference presentations or journal articles based on this work. 
Interviews and observation 
The purpose of the research, the intended uses of data from interviews and observations and 
anonymity of interviewees were discussed with the organisations prior to data collection. All 
interviews and observations were conducted on a voluntary basis and verbal consent was sought 
from and given by all personnel. Most interviewees and staff observed were interested in the nature 
of the research and any questions or concerns they had were answered. 
Participant observation 
Whilst the nature of the research was not concealed, informed consent was not sought during 
participant observation sessions. The occupation of the researcher was brought up in conversation 
with the majority of crewmates at least once (during the obligatory “What’s your day job?” 
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conversation) and the thesis subject matter was then only discussed in very general terms, if at all. 
Consent was not sought from members of the public encountered during participant observation 
sessions and the role of the researcher and nature of the research were never discussed with any 
member of the public. Other Police staff observed during participant observation sessions were not 
made aware that research was being undertaken. 
Photographs 
All individuals whose faces are shown in photographs taken by the researcher gave their verbal 
consent for the images to be used for this research. Where images containing faces have been 
reproduced from other sources (e.g. HM Government) then it was assumed that consent was 
obtained by the original image owner at the time of capture. 
3.6.2 Anonymity 
Agencies 
The identities of the various forces and services involved in this research are given, as are the names 
of Police Stations visited and worked at during interviews and participant observation sessions. All 
organisations were aware of the nature of the research and consented to it and none of the 
organisations stipulated anonymity as a condition of their involvement. It was therefore not felt 
necessary by the researcher to withhold the identities of the organisations in this thesis. 
Individuals 
Apart from a number of senior staff who have been thanked in the acknowledgements at the start of 
the thesis, no individual officer or civilian staff member encountered during the research has been 
named. All incidents or examples of emergency services activity discussed within the thesis have – as 
far as possible – been anonymized, through the removal of identifying features, such as names, 
collar numbers, dates, times, locations, etc. Additionally, the names of response teams involved in 
specific incidents and extracts from Police activity logs have been removed. No members of the 
public encountered during data collection have been named or could be identified from the incident 
descriptions given here. Observations were carried out from a number of locations, with two 
different forces and over an extended period, providing a further level of anonymity. In addition to 
the requirement to comply with research ethical guidelines, the anonymization of police incident 
details and associated individuals was necessary as this information is Restricted and so disclosure 
would constitute a serious offence. 
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3.6.3 Other ethical considerations 
Covert research 
Whilst those being interviewed or observed performing their roles in Control rooms (such as Call 
Handlers and Controllers) were aware of the research and gave consent verbally, during participant 
observation, consent from colleagues or members of the public was not sought. There are a number 
of reasons why it was felt that this was justified: 
 This enabled the researcher to observe how people across the C2 system actually performed 
their roles, which might have been affected if they had known that they were being 
observed;  
 It would not have been practical to have sought informed consent from all those being 
observed during a shift, which may have included 10-20 Officers, one or two Sergeants, 
several Controllers, Inspectors, specialist units and other civilian staff. Additionally, as it was 
the interactions between people that were being studied, rather than the actions of any 
particular individual, it was not felt to be unethical not to seek informed consent; 
 The researcher was not engaging in any deception or dishonestly by ‘acting like a Police 
Officer’, but rather had taken on the role of a Police Officer; the position of Special 
Constable enables outsiders (i.e. non-professionals) access to the domain and the nature of 
the researcher’s ‘day job’ as an academic researcher who studied emergency response 
command and control systems was widely known to regular Officers; 
 The majority of data collected was ‘public’ within the Policing organisation (i.e. it related to 
communications and interactions between agents and artefacts within the C2 system), or it 
occurred in a public place, such as the Station ready room. When informal conversations 
were held one to one with an Officer, it was their perceptions and experiences of aspects of 
emergency response work that were of interest, not their attitudes or personal opinions on 
other matters;  
 Members of the public were not told research was taking place as they were not the primary 
focus of the study and as it was crucial not to undermine the role of the researcher as a 
Police Officer whilst responding to incidents. 
Notes were taken throughout tours on folded sheets of A4 paper inserted into the researcher’s 
pocket notebook, so it would not have been obvious to other Officers when notes were being made. 
For example, extensive notes and verbatim transcripts of conversations were made during 
Sergeant’s briefings on a number of occasions; as Officers regularly make notes during these 
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meetings, this never attracted attention and enabled the recording of comments which some 
Officers would have been unlikely to have made in other circumstances (for example when 
Controller’s or force policies were criticised). 
It was possible to prevent the covert nature of the research from causing any harm to colleagues and 
members of the public by ensuring that the data collected was anonymized and also by restricting 
the nature of the research to inter-personal interactions and not the conduct or attitudes of any 
single individual. 
Safety / risk of harm 
Given that Police emergency response work involves risks, both to Officers and members of the 
public, it was necessary to ensure that data collection did not interfere with Police duties or increase 
the level of risk to any party involved. During the interviews and observations of control room staff, 
the researcher was mindful not to interrupt Controllers or Call Handlers, but to ask questions 
between calls. During participant observation, risks to the researcher, other Officers and members 
of the public were minimised, by ensuring that data collection activities were subordinate to Police 
duties and that notes were only made when it was safe to do so (for example, at the resolution of an 
incident or when listening to an incident taking place elsewhere over the radio). In terms of the 
inherent risks associated with Police work, the researcher completed safety training to the same 
standard as regular officers and this was re-validated every 6 months. 
Prevention of bias and ‘Going native’ 
Two potentially significant problems with the methodology used are bias and ‘going native’. Bias is a 
particular risk for qualitative research - particularly where there is only one researcher involved in 
data collection and analysis. Attempts were made to minimise this by adopting a multi-method 
approach that combined subjective participant observation with subject matter expert interviews, 
observations and analysis of procedural documents and publicly available reports. The iterative 
nature of data collection and analysis meant that the researcher’s understanding was regularly 
validated with subject matter experts. Also, the extended period of data collection and reflection 
reduced the likelihood that the significance of observed events would be over or under reported. 
The desire of researchers engaged in qualitative field studies to directly experience the domain of 
interest and fully engage with it means they risk ‘going native’, i.e. losing their research perspective 
and instead fully identifying as a member of the group in question. Given that the researcher 
underwent selection, the initial training programme, was sworn in and then worked as a Police 
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Officer for three years10, a high level of identification with the police domain and Warwickshire 
Police in particular is to be expected. However, during the data collection period the researcher was 
also working full-time in academic research and only worked an average of 25 hours a month with 
the Police, thus enabling a healthy balance to be struck between the two roles and enabling periods 
of academic reflection between participant observation sessions. The two domains – Police work 
and academic research – share some similarities at a high level, both being evidence led and legally 
or ethically minded and so they are not so dissimilar as to require contradictory behaviours or 
thought processes. Further, at no point during the period of participant observation did any 
occurrence (either ethical or legal) within either the Police or research domain lead to a conflict of 
interests for the researcher. Finally, because this research was not ethnographic (i.e. the police sub-
culture was not within the scope of the study) it was not felt that identification with the organisation 
or police sub-culture would have any significant negative impact on the ability to assess objectively 
the systems-level phenomena that were the primary focus of the research. 
3.7 Limitations to approach 
There are a number of limitations with each of the methods used during this research: 
 The use of interviews relies on interviewees to honestly and accurately report on what they 
do in practice, rather than on what they think they are supposed to say they do. 
Additionally, where an interview related to a specific incident, the delay between incident 
and interview provided the opportunity for errors to creep in to their recollection or for 
them to have formed their own assessments concerning the events that transpired. This was 
mitigated through the use of observations alongside semi-structured interviews for a 
number of the roles in question and by interviewing several individuals from different 
organisations for most of the roles in question. Participant observation also provided the 
opportunity to indirectly observe roles and to verify that their behaviour was consistent with 
their interview responses and more overt observations. 
 Participant observation through enrolment as a volunteer does not provide the full 
experience of the domain in question that would be gained by working full time. It was also 
not possible to work in all of the various roles within the C2 system, due to time and training 
limitations, though these other aspects of the C2 system were investigated through 
interviews and observations. 
                                                          
10 The researcher continued to work as a Special Constable until 2012. 
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 It is likely that another researcher undertaking a qualitative study of the domain would not 
identify exactly the same points of interest as are discussed in this thesis. This is partly due 
to the biases and subjectivity inherent within qualitative research, but also due to the size 
and complexity of the domain in question, which is far greater than could be studied or 
reported in a single thesis.  
 The sensitive nature of Police work precludes the provision of a detailed description of all 
aspects of the incident response process, or of artefacts – such as PNC or the Airwave radio 
system. However, as the focus of the research was the process of sensemaking, it is felt that 
this limitation does not adversely impact upon the aims of the thesis. 
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4. Routine emergencies 
4.1 Introduction 
The response to routine emergencies begins with an often-fragmentary and inaccurate account from 
a distressed member of the public. The task for police Officers and staff is to match this account to a 
recognisable policing framework, identify the appropriate response and most suitable resources and 
then verify or reframe the incident in order to resolve the situation.  
A number of artefacts have been developed to support the capture, arrangement and sharing of 
information during the emergency response process, such as pocket notebooks, electronic incident 
management systems (IMSs) and digital radio communications. However, people are known to 
modify their use of artefacts, or improvise new ones, in order to better support their activities 
(Norman, 1993).  
The chapter is structured around the sensemaking activities associated with each high-level 
emergency response task and seeks to explore how the process of framing the problem is achieved 
during routine emergency responses, with a view to understanding where frames come from, when 
reframing takes place and how artefacts are used to help with problem framing. In each sub-section, 
the activity is described and then interpreted. The activity description is a synthesis of observations, 
interviews and reviews of guidance documents, resulting in an account of the principal elements of 
the process undertaken in each stage of the emergency response. The interpretation draws on 
specific instances to explain the sensemaking processes that are believed to be essential to the 
activity. 
Chapter One described how ‘routine emergencies’ are regularly encountered and staff are familiar 
with dealing with them, following standard procedures and generally with minimal direct command 
involvement. Consequently, in conducting this research the expectation was that during routine 
emergency response sensemaking activities, the police C2 network would be revealed to function as 
a community of practice, that is as an established organization of individuals operating within a well-
defined domain and that “…share a common set of patterns of interpretation, implicit assumptions, 
and beliefs…” (Burnett et al., 2004, page 12). The purpose of this investigation was therefore to 
verify whether this was the case and then to establish how sensemaking as distributed cognition 
takes place within this C2 system, specifically in relation to the novel research perspectives and 
investigatory themes identified in Chapter Two and repeated in Table 4.1, below. 
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Research perspective Investigatory themes 
Making sense with 
artefacts 
How are artefacts used to represent and transform information to 
support sensemaking activity? 
How are formal and informal artefacts made use of during sensemaking 
activity? 
Making sense through 
artefacts 
How do artefacts act as resources for action during sensemaking?  
Does the use of artefacts follow the original design intent, or have agents 
developed their own strategies? 
Making sense through 
collaboration 
How do groups organize and coordinate activity to jointly make sense of 
situations? 
How are artefacts used to facilitate coordination? 
How do groups adapt their sensemaking practices to take account of 
their circumstances? 
Table 4.1: Sensemaking as distributed cognition: research perspectives and investigatory themes 
4.2 Findings 
4.2.1 Making sense of the emergency call 
4.2.1.1 Activity description 
999 calls are first answered by an operator who will ask the caller to specify an emergency service; 
once a service has been selected, the call is then passed on to a Call Handler within the geographic 
area where the call originated. The Call Handler’s role is to gather details from the caller and 
establish the nature and severity of the incident. Incident details are entered into an electronic log, 
which is then passed to a dispatcher (generally known as Controllers, or ‘Control’), who are either in 
the same control centre, or distributed across local control rooms, depending on the structure of the 
force. 
When a call comes in, the Call Handler uses the call handling software (labelled ‘1’ on Figure 4.1) to 
answer the call. Answering a 999 call causes the IMS to automatically open a new log (2) and 
populate some of the log fields with information, such as the calling number and address (this 
depends on the telecommunications company handling the call). The Call Handler will greet the 
caller with a phrase such as “Police Emergency?” prompting the caller to state the reason for their 
call. As the caller is speaking, the Call Handler may check that a log has not already been created for 
the incident (3) before noting down key details of the incident on their notepad (4). 
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Figure 4.1: A Call Handler’s workstation (Warwickshire Police Communications Centre, July 2008) 
Once the Call Handler has clarified the nature and urgency of the incident, they will restructure key 
details from the caller into a clear and concise summary of the emergency, which is then entered 
into the IMS log. The incident log requires that the Call Handler grades the priority of the call (e.g. 
‘Immediate’, ‘Early’, ‘Scheduled Response’) and selects from a defined set of incident types that are 
used to classify the nature of the emergency. 
Call Handlers are trained to use a variety of question styles in order to direct the conversation and to 
establish the important facts quickly, including open, closed, alternative and leading questions 
(Warwickshire Police, 2005). Open questions are often used to encourage callers to elaborate and 
are known as the 5WH – who, what, when, where, why and how. Figure 4.2 gives an example of this 
process of directing the caller; the caller reports that they have just been mugged, prompting the 
Call Handler to try to gather further relevant details using all four question styles. 
 
Figure 4.2: Caller as a resource for action  
[Incident: street robbery; Source: observation (Warwickshire Police Control Room, September 2008); 
Corroboration: documentation (Warwickshire Police Call Handler Training Documentation), 
observations (WMP Control Room, 2004-2008), SME interviews (WMP, 2004-2008)] 
Call Handler: “Have you been injured?” 
Call Handler: “Where did they go?” 
Call Handler: “Was it a male?” 
Call Handler: “…and he got into a car?” 
Call Handler: “Do you know if he was white, black or asian?” 
Call Handler: “What sort of age?” 
Call Handler: “Lime green top…anything else?” 
Call Handler: “Did you see the driver?” 
Call Handler: “What sort of car?” 
Call Handler: “What was in the bag?” 
Call Handler: “What does the bag look like?” 
Call Handler: “How large is it…what sort of material…?” 
Call Handler: “Wait where you are, Officers are on their way” 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
4 
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The language used in the account may change, as call details are converted from plain English into 
abbreviations and standardised Police jargon. For instance, the description of an offender may 
change from “white lad” to “IC1 male”, which is the relevant UK Police National Computer Ethnicity 
Classification. Abbreviations and acronyms are also employed, for example “My car has been stolen” 
is formalised within the Police as “Theft of Motor Vehicle”, which is written as “TOMV”.  
Figure 4.3 summarises the process of taking a 999 call using a simple robbery incident as an 
example. The boxes on the right-hand side of the figure show the information that is recorded in the 
notepad and incident log at various points, showing how the incident log gradually develops during 
the course of the call. The figure also illustrates how the log structures the incident details and 
mediates indirect communications between the Call Handler and the Controller (the Call Handler can 
see that the Controller has dispatched a unit to the incident and is able to tell the caller that the 
Police will be with them soon).   
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Answer 
call from 
member of 
public
Establish reason 
for call
Prioritise Log 
as ‘Immediate 
Response’ 
and send to 
OCU / 
Controller Controller 
accepts log
Summarise 
incident 
developments 
in Log
[Updates 
automatically 
passed to all 
other users]
Caller dials 999, 
specifies ‘Police’ 
and is put through 
to FCC
[Automatically opens 
new Incident Log and 
populates some fields, 
eg phone number]
Collect incident 
and caller details 
[IMS log and 
notepad]
Incident 1234 999 Call
Telephone Number: xxxxx xxxxx Caller: Miss X
Location: X Road
Description: BOYFRIENDS PHONE JUST BEEN STOLEN...TWO 
OFFENDERS MADE OFF TOWARDS X SCHOOL…
Incident 1234 999 Call Immediate Response
Telephone Number: xxxxx xxxxx Caller: Miss X
Location: X Road
Description: BOYFRIENDS PHONE JUST BEEN STOLEN...TWO 
OFFENDERS MADE OFF TOWARDS X SCHOOL…
Incident Transfer Accepted by terminal D2R1
Incident 1234 999 Call Immediate Response
Telephone Number: xxxxx xxxxx Caller: Miss X
Location: X Road
Description: BOYFRIENDS PHONE JUST BEEN STOLEN...TWO 
OFFENDERS MADE OFF TOWARDS X SCHOOL…
Incident Transfer Accepted by terminal D2R1
MOBILE STOLEN WAS A NOKIA 1101
1. IC4 MALE...WEARING RED TOP… 2. IC1 MALE, GREY 
HOODIE…
D2R1: DM20 Despatched
Notepad
…mobile...X Road...
Incident 1234 999 Call
Telephone Number: xxxxx xxxxx Caller: 
Location:
Description: 
IMS log
Verify incident 
details with caller
Summarise 
incident  in 
OASIS log
End Call
Figure 4.3: Annotated process flow for ‘Take 999 call’ 
[Incident: robbery; Source: IMS log (WMP FCC, 2008); Corroboration: IMS log review (WMP, 2008), observations 
(WMP Control Room, 2004-2008; Warwickshire Police Control Room, July-September, 2009)] 
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4.2.1.2 Interpretation 
Members of the public who call the emergency services are often in a highly agitated state and 
rarely impart information in a logical manner, repeating themselves or giving less significant details 
first. It is imperative to not only handle the call efficiently, but also to verify that it is a genuine 
emergency and the specific nature of the incident. As the caller gives their initial account, the Call 
Handler is able to quickly note key details of the incident on their notepad, such as location, type of 
emergency and persons involved. The Call Handler will then take control of the conversation, using 
the information on the notepad firstly to cue further questions to and clarification from the caller 
and secondly to check their understanding by verbally summarising the incident back to the caller. 
This is an iterative process, with the Call Handler’s notes and the caller’s responses cueing further 
questions from the Call Handler, until they are clear as to the nature and severity of the incident. 
The type of incident then defines the information that the Call handler is required to collect. In the 
vignette in Figure 4.4, once the Call Handler realises that they are dealing with a violent domestic 
incident that involves children, they ask a series of questions tailored to this type of incident. The 
caller’s responses to the questions establish the level of violence and ongoing risk (i.e. offender 
present, injuries, weapons, offender name) and also provide details required for the IMS domestic 
abuse risk assessment form (i.e. number of children, ages). The vignette presented in Figure 4.2 
provides an example of this process flow; the caller reports that they have just been mugged, 
prompting the Call Handler to try to gather further relevant details. The caller’s response to each of 
the questions (not shown) prompts a further question, until all relevant information has been 
gathered. This process is taught to Call Handlers as ‘active listening’, i.e. “…receiving information, 
clarifying, summarising and checking the message in order to reach proper understanding.” 
(Warwickshire Police, 2005, page 19).  
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Figure 4.4: Incident type as a resource for action 
[Incident: domestic violence; Source: observation (WMP FCC, May 2008); Corroboration: 
observations (Warwickshire Police Control Room, July-September, 2009)] 
Given the emergency nature of the incident and the fact that the call may end at any point, the 
important consideration is to quickly gather the fundamental information required to initiate the 
response – i.e. the location and an approximate description of the incident. As soon as the Call 
Handler has entered this information, they will send the log to the Controller and then continue to 
talk to the caller and add details to the log. ‘Published’ entries cannot be amended or deleted; if any 
corrections are required, they must be added to subsequent lines of the log. Consequently, Call 
Handlers try to form a coherent incident summary before they begin to type and to enter 
information in concise, standalone statements Figure 4.5 gives an example of log entries made by a 
Call Handler during a vehicle break-in, demonstrating how the separate updates gradually build a 
picture of the events taking place. 
A woman calls 999 to report that her husband has just assaulted her. 
Call Handler: “Police emergency?” 
Caller:  “[GIVES ADDRESS]” 
Call Handler: “[CONFIRMS ADDRESS]” 
Call Handler: “What has happened?” 
Caller:  “My boyfriend has just hit me in front of my children.” 
Call Handler: “Is he still in the house?” 
Caller:  “Yes.” 
Call Handler: “How many children do you have?” 
Caller:  “[NUMBER]” 
Call Handler: “Do you need an ambulance?” 
Caller:  “No.” 
Call Handler: “What are their ages?” 
Caller:  “[GIVES DETAILS]” 
Call Handler: “Did he use any weapons?” 
Caller:  “No.” 
Call Handler: “What is his name?” 
Caller:  “[NAME]” 
Call Handler: “Stay in a different room, the police will get there as quick as they can.” 
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Figure 4.5: Call Handler’s IMS log entries during a vehicle break-in  
[Incident: vehicle break-in; Source: IMS log (WMP FCC, 2005); Corroboration: observations 
(Warwickshire Police Control Room, July-September, 2009)] 
New information from the caller can trigger a reassessment of the incident. In Figure 4.6, an update 
from the Call Handler makes it apparent that violence has been used and the incident is still in 
progress, prompting the Controller (who is reviewing the log) to upgrade the incident to an 
Immediate (emergency). The vignette demonstrates the frequently disjointed manner in which 
distressed callers provide information. 
Figure 4.7 gives an alternative view of the call handling process as a sensemaking activity. Showing 
similarities to both Pirolli and Card’s (2005) and Klein et al.’s (2006a) descriptions of sensemaking, 
the figure describes the parallel iterative sensemaking processes that take place during the call and 
the important role that artefacts play in supporting this activity. The Call Handler’s notepad acts as a 
private cognitive artefact that assists the Call Handler to engage in frame seeking activity. It does this 
by functioning as a shoebox for the temporary capture of potentially relevant details during the 
initial questioning and verification process with the caller. During creation of an incident log, the IMS 
acts as a resource for action, as it requires the Call Handler to grade the call and select from a 
defined set of formal incident types to classify the nature of the emergency. Determining the most 
appropriate incident type is not a matter of choosing from a list, instead the Call Handler comes to 
recognise the type of incident that the emergency represents during the question and answer 
session. Once identified, the incident type then acts as a frame that cues further data collection from 
the caller, by tailoring the Call Handler’s questions; for example, the different question sets used for 
a street robbery versus domestic violence (Figures 4.2 and 4.4). In this way, once the appropriate 
frame has been identified, the decision of how to manage the call becomes a self-fulfilling one. 
Call Handler:  “THERE ARE 3 LADS TRYING TO BREAK INTO CARS I AM WATCHING THEM 
ON CAMERA.” 
Call Handler: “CAR BEING BROKEN INTO NOW” 
Call Handler: “THERE ARE 3 IC1 YOUTHS WEARING DARK CAPS TROUSERS AND 
JACKETS - ONE HAS WHITE STRIPES DOWN TROUSERS AND WHITE 
TRAINERS” 
Call Handler: “CALLER SAID THAT THEY ARRIVED IN A CAR BUT HE DOESNT KNOW 
WHAT TYPE - CALLER IS LOOKING FOR IT ON HIS CAMERA” 
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Figure 4.6: An incident is reprioritised as new information comes to light 
[Incident: assault; Source: observation (WMP FCC, May 2008); Corroboration: observations (WMP 
Control Room, 2004-2008), SME interviews (WMP, 2004-2008)] 
This process of recognition primed decision making can be seen in Figure 4.6, where new 
information from the caller concerning her husband’s violent actions prompts the Controller to 
reject the current frame (non-violent domestic: Early response) and upgrade the incident to the new 
frame (ongoing assault: Immediate response). This change of frame also prompts the Call Handler to 
alter their questioning strategy, from non-urgent form filling (taking the caller’s details), to urgently 
establishing the level of violence and associated risk (i.e. the nature of the attack, whether it is 
ongoing and the location of the caller). 
The use of formalised language in log entries helps to clearly and unambiguously summarise the 
incident to the controller. At the same time, the inability to edit entries encourages Call Handlers to 
be clear on the nature of the incident before they begin to type. This may serve the function of the 
incident log as an auditable record of the incident response, but it does not support the iterative 
nature of the sensemaking process and along with the inflexibility of the log structure, is likely to be 
a driving force behind the requirement for a paper notebook ‘shoebox’ to support the initial 
problem framing process. 
An extremely distressed female rings 999, but is initially too upset to speak, requiring the 
Call Handler to guide her through what has happened, entering the details into the IMS 
log. 
Call Hander: “Police emergency?” 
Caller:  [CRYING INCOHERENTLY] 
Call Handler: “What’s the problem?” 
Caller:  “[HUSBAND HAS BEEN SHOUTING AT HER]” 
Call Handler: [Takes caller through what has happened, checking understanding]  
“So then he became angry?” 
  [Grades call in IMS log as requiring an ‘Early’ response] 
Call Handler: “What’s your name?” 
Caller:  “[NAME]” [There is shouting in the background] 
Call Handler: “Who is he shouting at now?” 
Caller:  “He’s attacked our neighbour… ” 
Call Handler: “What has he done to your neighbour?” 
Caller:  “Hit him and wrestled with him.” 
Call Handler: [Enters updates into the log] 
Controller: [Upgrades incident from ‘Early’ to ‘Immediate’] 
Call Handler: “Is the confrontation still going on?” 
Caller:  “Yes.” 
Call Handler: “Where are you now?” 
Chapter Four: Routine emergencies 
97 
Caller
Call 
Handler
Mobile 
Phone
“BOYFRIENDS PHONE JUST BEEN 
STOLEN...TWO OFFENDERS MADE OFF 
TOWARDS X SCHOOL…”
“Robbery, [Street]”
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describe the 
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One was 
wearing a 
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Figure 4.7: Representation of the Call Handler’s sensemaking process 
In this manner, the artefacts help the Call Handler to construct a succinct narrative to make sense of 
the incident, which they use to translate details from the unstructured account (caller) to a formal 
record (IMS) via an informal temporary store (notepad). Whilst the use of the notepad leads to a 
small amount of duplication of activity (i.e. capture of information twice), it arguably saves time 
overall, through the production of a clear, concise summary of the emergency.  
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4.2.2 Allocating resources to incidents 
4.2.2.1 Activity description 
The role of initiating the Police response to a new incident is performed by the Controller, who 
assesses the nature and priority of the incident, selects appropriate resources to respond and then 
provides support to them during the course of the incident. Figure 4.8 shows the Controller using 
the IMS open incidents list (1) and a copy of the duty sheet (2) to manage the resourcing of new 
incidents as they come in. The right-hand screen is for the radio touch-screen software (3), whilst 
the left-hand screen (4) is shared between the GIS1 (shown), the PNC application, email and 
intelligence systems. The Controller also has some notepaper (5). 
 
Figure 4.8: Controller’s workstation (WMP – Little Park Street Station, November 2008) 
Controllers are responsible for managing the allocation of not only the immediate response 
incidents, but all open incidents in their area. Figure 4.9 shows part of an open incident list from 
Warwickshire Police. Each incident is given a unique reference number, the last 4 digits of which will 
reset at midnight; from Figure 4.9 it can be seen that Warwickshire Police dealt with over 650 
incidents in a single day (across all five districts). There are only a limited number of resources 
available to deal with the large number of incidents, meaning that it is common for all units to be 
                                                          
1 Geographic Information System 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
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allocated to incidents at any one time, raising problems for the Controller in allocating new 
emergency incidents. The right-hand column in Figure 4.9 shows the resources that are currently 
listed as dealing with an incident and indicates that several logs are not currently allocated.  
 
Figure 4.9: Screenshot of Controller’s open incident list (Warwickshire Police IMS) 
New incident logs are added to the incident list and the Controller is able to see the location, call 
type and priority even before they select the log. Opening a log automatically creates an entry (e.g. 
“Incident Transfer Accepted by terminal D2R1”) and transfers ownership of that incident to the 
Controller. This update to the log is then visible to anyone else who has the log open, so the Call 
Handler is made aware that the Controller now has ownership of the log. The Controller will first 
review the incident summary, before beginning the process of allocating resources to it. 
When a new emergency incident comes in, Controllers should allocate the nearest available unit to 
it, referring to either the electronic (Warwickshire Police) or paper (WMP) duty list. However, during 
busy periods Controllers often struggle to keep track of the location and status of units. Officers will 
generally radio the controller when arriving at an incident, but only notify them of their location and 
status infrequently. This is because regular location updates are impractical over a busy radio 
network and Officers often visit multiple locations to make enquiries, or return to the station to 
complete paperwork. 
Whilst the GIS provides Controllers with a map that shows the position of response units, it is 
infrequently used during emergency management and is not drawn on when resourcing incidents. 
Because of not knowing the location or availability of units, Controllers frequently make the radio 
announcement “Any unit available for an immediate?” Busy Officers will wait to hear if anyone else 
is able to attend before volunteering. Figure 4.10 gives a typical example of a Controller requesting 
‘any unit’. 
Chapter Four: Routine emergencies 
100 
 
Figure 4.10: Requesting “any unit” to attend an immediate incident 
[Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, February 2009, Shift 44, Crewmate: Officer 1, 
Callsign: “Whiskey 1”); Corroboration: observations (WMP Control Room, 2004-2008), participant 
observation (WMP, November-December 2008)] 
4.2.2.2 Interpretation 
Whilst the GIS system shows the locations of Officers and incidents, it updates slowly and requires 
multiple page refreshes to zoom from a county-wide view, down to detailed views of towns and 
streets. This renders it unsuitable for quickly checking unit locations prior to allocating incidents. This 
is especially true for rural forces (such as Warwickshire), where some units are spread out across 
large areas, whilst others are densely concentrated in towns, requiring frequent changes to map 
scale in order to visualise the status of resources. Controllers therefore rely on the IMS open incident 
list as the primary resource management tool, with the GIS often hidden behind other, more 
frequently used applications – such as the Police National Computer (PNC). 
In order to utilise the IMS open incident list to manage multiple incidents, many controllers 
customise their use of the system. In Figure 4.9, the Controller has modified the ‘Att. Time/Task 
Desc.’ (attendance time / task description) column to enable them to plan activity during the course 
of the shift. Glancing at this Column helps them keep track of what is happening and what actions 
they should take next: the entry of a call sign (e.g. “A02”) indicates that an incident has already been 
allocated to a unit to deal with later. The Controller has made a number of entries to prompt 
themselves to allocate incidents at certain times – for example “B4 16:00” and “After 18:30” (which 
relate to the availability of the caller); they have also indicated those incidents that have not been 
allocated (with “………”) and the unallocated “Priority” firearms incident is given stars, to indicate its 
importance (i.e. “*……..*”). Once an incident has been resolved and the corresponding log has been 
closed, it disappears from the open incident list. Thus, the IMS open incident list resembles a ‘to do’ 
list, both in form and function. 
Whilst the IMS gives the address for an incident, this is in text, rather than map form and Officer 
location information is absent. For controllers to be able to frame the incident management 
problem in spatio-temporal terms (i.e. “which is the most appropriate unit to allocate this incident 
to?”), they would also need to make reference to the GIS or radio units for status and location 
Control: “Any unit available for an immediate...? There is a fight at [LOCATION]...” 
  [No response] 
Control: “[GIVES FURTHER DETAILS].” 
  [No response] 
W3: “Whiskey 3: we can divert from this arrest if there is nobody else available?” 
Control: “Whiskey 3: Yes, I think you’ll have to, as all other units are committed.” 
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updates. With large numbers of incidents to allocate and a high volume of radio traffic to respond 
to, Controllers instead concentrate on rapid allocation (“Any unit available…?”) over efficient 
allocation (i.e. closest available unit). Therefore, whilst the IMS interface design enables Controllers 
to manage the resourcing of both urgent and non-emergency incidents, its use appears to encourage 
them to frame the problem of resource management in an overly simplistic manner. This 
assessment is supported by the observation that Controllers making ‘any unit’ requests frequently 
omit to give the location. This makes it hard for Officers to determine whether they are close enough 
to be able to respond in a timely manner. Often, it is only once a unit has volunteered to attend that 
the Controller divulges the location, at which point it may become apparent to another unit that 
they are closer to the incident, as shown in Figure 4.11. The high volume of (to them irrelevant) 
radio traffic means that individual Officers only selectively attend to radio broadcasts, particularly 
when actively dealing with an incident. Additionally, Officers do not have access to IMS or GIS whilst 
out on patrol. Consequently, Officers are largely ignorant of each other’s locations and status and so 
are unsure who is available or closest to a particular incident. They are also unaware of the list of 
unallocated incidents, limiting their ability to make sense of and coordinate their response to the 
wider workload problem. 
 
Figure 4.11: Nearest unit volunteers for an incident 
[Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, August 2008, Shift 31, Crewmate: Officer 2, 
Callsign: “Oscar Sierra 4”); Corroboration: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, 2007-2010), 
participant observation (WMP, November-December 2008)] 
The lack of data access for mobile Officers, combined with the reliance of Controllers on a) the IMS 
to frame the resource management problem and b) Officers to volunteer for incidents means that 
neither are in a position to address the question of how best to allocate resources to incidents. 
  
Control: “Sierra 3, can you go to [LOCATION]?” 
S3: “Yes.” 
S2: “Sierra 2 here, we are closer, so we can make.” 
Control: “OK, Sierra 2 please attend, Sierra 3 stand down.” 
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4.2.3 Supporting responding units  
4.2.3.1 Activity description 
As they make their way to the incident location, Officers begin to make sense of and plan their 
response to the situation. As the Conflict Management Model (Figure 1.2, Chapter One) suggests, 
this includes considerations of risk (threat assessment), powers and policy and tactics. Although the 
Officers will have received some initial details from the Controller, these are often only the bare 
minimum, such as an approximate location and a statement of the nature of the incident, for 
example "male being assaulted by two males". The first indication of the level of risk associated with 
the incident (both to members of the public and the responding Officers) and consequently the 
appropriate response, will come from the type of incident. Officers will try to gather further 
information through supplementary questions to the Controller. Where an offender is named by the 
Caller, Officers will often ask the Controller to run a check through the Police National Computer; if 
the person is known to the police, this will provide a summary of any previous arrests or convictions, 
as well as warning markers (i.e., drugs, violence, weapons or self-harm) associated with those 
individuals. 
If the Call Handler adds updates to the log (e.g. description of an offender, their direction of travel, 
vehicle, etc.), these will be visible to the Controller, who passes them to the Officers. On receiving 
further updates from the caller, the responding units may change their tactics, for example, if the 
offender has left the scene Officers may decide to perform a search of the area before speaking to 
the victim, in the hope of quickly catching them.  
WMP frequently have two Controllers working together in OCU Control Rooms, due to the high 
workload (Figure 4.12). When two local Controllers are working, they support the response to 
incidents through very close cooperation. Figure 4.13 gives excerpts from a more complex incident 
(a violent robbery), which demonstrates how the two local Controllers dynamically share both the 
radio talk group and the IMS log. Whilst one Controller notionally takes a support role, both will 
broadcast over the radio and each provides support to the other at various times. 
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Figure 4.12: Controllers working together (WMP – Bournville Lane Station, June 2008) 
 
Figure 4.13: IMS log record of Controllers working together during an incident response  
[Incident: violent robbery; Source: IMS log (WMP, July 2004); Corroboration: observations and SME 
interviews (WMP Control Room, 2004-2008), participant observation (Warwickshire Police, 2007-
2010)] 
05:19 Controller 1: “[Officer] WITH 2 WITNESSES 1 OFFENDER IC1 MALE GREEN T” 
05:51 Controller 1: “SHIRT THE OTHER IS IC1 MALE WHITE SHIRT AND TIE” 
05:57 Controller 1: “BOTH MALES APPROX 20-25YRS” 
06:09 Controller 1: “THE OFFENDERS HAVE MADE OFF WITH HANDBAG AND METAL” 
06:17 Controller 1: “TIN WITH LARGE AMOUNT OF CASH” 
06:24 Controller 1: “LAST SEEN TOWARDS [ROAD]” 
   … 
14:20 Controller 1: “THE IP HAS BEEN STRUCK AND FELL TO THE FLOOR” 
14:27 Controller 1: “OFFICERS CHECKING TO ASCERTAIN IF AMBO REQUIRED.” 
14:58 Controller 2: “LADY HAS BEEN KNOCKED OVER AT DOOR WHEN OFFENDERS” 
15:00 Controller 2: “GAINED ENTRY” 
15:15 Controller 1: “CAN SOCO ATTEND ASAP PLSE” 
  [Incident Switched for SOCO tasking] 
15:30 Controller 1: “FROM OFFICERS THE FEMALE IP DOES NOT REQUIRE AMBO AS” 
15:32 Controller 2: “PLS GET SOCO FOR THIS” 
  [Incident Switched for SOCO tasking] 
15:39 Controller 1: “IP STATES HAS NO INJURIES” 
16:06 Controller 2: “ASKING FOR AMBO ELDERLY FEEMAL BADLY SHAKEN APPROX” 
16:07 Controller 2: “86 YRS” 
16:23 Controller 3: Incident Switch Accepted  
17:36 Controller 1: “THE OFFICERS NOW ASKING FOR AMBO AS THE IP 86YRS OLD” 
17:51 Controller 1: “IS EXTREMELY DISTRESSED-UPSET” 
17:54 Controller 2: “AMBO LOG [Number]” 
18:34 Controller 3: “SOCO INFORMED.” 
18:40 Controller 3: This incident added to SOCO list for section [Number] 
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The local radio talk group is used to support urgent transmissions (Officer emergency assistance, 
emergency dispatch, immediate response coordination) as well as non-urgent communications 
(general announcements, Officer-initiated database enquiries). Figure 4.14 gives an example of this, 
where three different overlapping discussion ‘threads’ took place between Officers and Controllers 
(labelled ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’) in rapid succession. Figure 4.14 provides another demonstration of the close 
cooperation between the Controllers, who dynamically swap roles as they process Officer enquiries, 
update the IMS and review and dispatch units to new incidents.  
 
Figure 4.14: Multiple incident ‘threads’ on a WMP local talk group 
[Incident: Multiple simultaneous radio discussions, Source: observations (WMP Control Room, 
November 2008); Corroboration: participant observation (Warwickshire Police 2007-2010); 
participant observation (WMP November – December 2008)] 
Figure 4.15 shows part of the ‘Coordinate Response’ process for a break-in in progress incident, 
illustrating the role of the IMS and GIS in supporting response coordination, with the IMS enabling 
direct communications between the geographically separate local and Traffic Controllers2. 
                                                          
2 This is the case for WMP; Warwickshire Police Controllers are all based in the same control room. 
A Mike 1: [Requests person check, gives details.] 
Controller 1: “Not known” 
Mike 1: [Gives address] 
Controller 2: “Not listed.” 
Mike 1: [Gives a different name] 
B Officer: [Incident update: close, no crime] 
Controller 2: “Received.” [Updates and closes log] 
Controller 1: “No exact match PNC – give me his postcode.” 
Mike 1 [Gives postcode] 
C Controller 2: “Any unit available for an 
immediate: reports of a male 
hitting a female at [LOCATION]?” 
Mike 6: “Mike 6: en route.” 
Controller 1: “Mike 1: safe to speak?” 
Mike 1: “Go ahead.” 
Controller 1: “He is wanted for [OFFENCE].” 
Mike 1: “One in custody.” 
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Controller: [UNIT] Despatched
Controller: [UNIT] Redeployed from Incident 0250 12-04-06
Controller: Incident Switch to Terminal YMT1-YMT2-YMT3
Controller: YM...ANY DOG PLEASE
TRAFFIC: Incident Switch accepted by YMT1
TRAFFIC: NO DOGTraffic section
Open new 
incident log
Review incident 
type, location and 
priority
Request Unit 
Attendance
[Several Officers confirm their Availability]
Support 
responding Units
Controller: Incident Transfer Accepted by terminal xxxx
IMS log
Incident: XXXX        999 Call         Immediate Response
Telephone Number: xxxxx xxxxx    Caller: Miss X
Location: X Road 
Description: SOMEONE IS INSIDE THE HOUSE...
Request additional 
resources
Update Incident 
log (automatically 
updates Officer 
Status)
Support 
Responding units
GIS
Where abouts is 
that?
Support 
responding Units
Off [ROAD], 
heading out of 
town...
 
Figure 4.15: Annotated process flow for ‘Support responding units’ 
[Incident: burglary in progress; Source: IMS log (WMP FCC, 2008); Corroboration: IMS log review 
(WMP, 2008), observations (WMP Control Room, 2004-2008; Warwickshire Police Control Room, 
July-September, 2009)] 
4.2.3.2 Interpretation 
In a similar manner to the process of ‘active listening’ used by Call Handlers, responding Officers will 
use what is known about an incident to cue frame-defined data collection; via a series of questions 
to the Controller. For example, if there is a specific location for the incident (such as a residential 
building) Officers may ask the Controller to check IMS for: previous emergency calls to that location, 
details of any persons associated with that location and any previous convictions or warning markers 
(e.g. for violence or weapons) associated with those individuals. The artefacts available to the 
Controller assist with this process, cueing Controllers to provide updates to responding Officers, 
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which then cues further questions. For example, the IMS will indicate if previous 999 calls have been 
made from a number, or if any persons named in a log are associated with previous incidents. 
The lack of mobile data access also means that Officers will often rely on Controllers to remind them 
of incident details that they have forgotten – such as house numbers, names or vehicle registration 
numbers – radioing the Controller as they near the scene to request that that information is 
repeated. Figure 4.16 gives an example of an Officer firstly asking for some clarification of where the 
incident location was, and then asking for the name of the company to be repeated. The Controller 
has pro-actively checked the location using the GIS system and unprompted provides some 
information to clarify where the incident location is. 
 
Figure 4.16: Relying on the Controller for information previously given 
[Controller as resource for action; Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, December 
2008, Shift 40, Crewmate: Officer 3, Callsign: “Whiskey 3”); Corroboration: observation (WMP 
Control Room 2004-2008), participant observation (WMP November – December 2008)] 
During participant observation sessions it became apparent that the support Controllers are able to 
provide is limited in nature and is highly dependent on the other demands on their time. In the 
vignette in Figure 4.17, Officers responding to an incident have to prompt the Controller for each 
piece of information. Figure 4.17 also provides an example of how the open nature of talk group 
communications allows other Officers to monitor and contribute relevant information. 
When other Officers have knowledge that is relevant to an incident, they are often better placed to 
provide information than the Controller, as is shown in Figure 4.18. In this example, an Officer who is 
not involved in the response but who is monitoring the talk group casts doubt on the current frame 
(incident type) and suggests an alternative based on experience, prompting the Controller to search 
for corroborating information. This information influences how the attending Officers will deal with 
the incident, as is indicated by their update of “…we’ll go and have a chat”, rather than “Conducting 
search of the garden.” Figure 4.19 provides a further example of how Officers within a Talk Group 
are able to monitor radio transmissions and contribute to the sensemaking process. In this example, 
Whiskey 1 is able to provide local knowledge to guide Whiskey 4 and hasten the incident response, 
whilst Whiskey 2’s contribution forewarns the responding Officers regarding the household, which 
may affect the actions they take.  
Whiskey 4: “Where abouts is that?” 
Control: “Off [Road name].” 
[Officers travel to the incident scene] 
Whiskey 4: “TA. What is the company again?” 
Control: “[Name]...looks like it is the first building on the right” [From GIS] 
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In reality, the high levels of talk group traffic mean that other Officers contribute to incidents in this 
way only infrequently. Consequently, Figures 4.18 and 4.19 represent examples of unusual radio 
activity, rather than the norm. 
 
Figure 4.17: Responding Officer prompting the Controller for information 
[Incident: domestic; Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, October 2009, Shift 58, 
Crewmate: Officer 4, Callsign: “Whiskey 10”); Corroboration: participant observation (Warwickshire 
Police 2007-2010), participant observation (WMP November – December 2008)] 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Use of talk group to question the incident frame 
[Incident: domestic; Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, July 2010, Shift 66, 
Crewmate: Officer 5, Callsign: “Whiskey 1”); Corroboration: participant observation (Warwickshire 
Police 2007-2010), participant observation (WMP November – December 2008)] 
 
A woman dials 999 to report that a prowler in her garden has shone a torch in her window. 
Whiskey 2 and Whiskey 3-5 are dispatched as an Immediate response. 
Officer A: “Be aware: [NAME] lives there and calls the police every time a light goes on 
outside.” 
Control: [Checks IMS for previous calls] 
Control: “On STORM [IMS] there are 56 previous calls from [NAME]...well spotted.” 
Whiskey 2: “Whiskey 2 – TA” [Arrived] 
 [Whiskey 3-5 stands-down] 
Control: “Be aware: I believe this female put a complaint in about how her last call was 
dealt with.” [from IMS checks] 
Whiskey 2: “Yes, she’s stood in her doorway, we’ll go and have a chat.” 
... 
Whiskey 2: “W2; the house is secure, it would appear they’ve seen someone shine a torch 
through the window. All in order. TL.” [Leaving] 
Control: “Any unit for an immediate at [ADDRESS A]...Domestic?” 
W2: “Whiskey 2.” 
W1: “Whiskey 1...who lives there?” 
Control: “Call was made by [NAME A] at [ADDRESS B].” 
W1: “I want to know who lives at this address.” 
Control: “I haven’t the faintest idea.” 
W1: “Can you give us a clue?” 
Control: “Wait one.” [Starts to run checks on the address] 
Sergeant: “Whiskey 3-5: I believe it may be [NAME B].” 
Control: “Yes, [NAME B] and [NAME C]...have also had calls from that address by  
[NAME D].” 
Control: “It may not be a domestic as previously thought...informant can also hear kids 
outside...” [from an update added by the Call Handler] 
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Figure 4.19: Use of talk group to share prior knowledge and experience 
[Incident: domestic; Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, December 2008, Shift 40, 
Crewmate: Officer 3, “Callsign: Whiskey 3”); Corroboration: Control Room observations and SME 
interviews (WMP 2004-2008), Control Room observations and SME interviews (Warwickshire Police 
July-September 2009)] 
Control Room observations revealed that collaboration between co-located Controllers is not reliant 
on explicit communication, but is based on reciprocal monitoring and a shared deep understanding 
of the task at hand. Figure 4.13 displays a number of interesting features about the use of the IMS as 
a collaborative C2 tool: 
 The IMS is sometimes used for explicit as well as implicit communications (e.g. making 
specific resource requests to the Traffic Controllers); 
 Whilst the Controllers are working together, they are not always aware of the information 
that the other has added (e.g. duplicate requests for SOCO and ambulance); 
 Entries are highly compact and the IMS is used to rapidly impart information between 
colleagues who share common ground, rather than to present a highly polished account of 
events to outsiders; 
 The narrative of what has happened is gradually built up and refined over time (e.g. from 
injured person having been ‘struck’ to having ‘fallen over’). This narrative continues for 
several pages and can be difficult to follow, even before it is fragmented by numerous 
automatic IMS event entries (e.g. when officers are dispatched, when they arrive, when a log 
is switched to a different user, when that user accepts the log, etc.); 
 The IMSs used by the different emergency services are completely separate, so when 
Controller 2 rings the Ambulance service to request their attendance, they exchange 
incident numbers with the Ambulance Call Hander, so that the incident log can be identified 
if further calls are necessary.  
The Controller sends Whiskey 4 to a domestic abuse incident. By running checks in IMS for 
previous incidents at that address, the Controller reveals that a male residing there has 
previously been arrested for assaulting a female and that he has warning markers for violence 
towards the Police. Whiskey 2 is not involved in the response, but has been listening. 
Whiskey 2: “There are two small children at that address – they will become involved if 
either of their parents are arrested. By ‘involved’, I mean they will physically 
attack Officers.” 
Whiskey 4: “Whiskey 4: We’re still trying to find this address...” 
Control: “I am not sure where it is. I think that is on the new estate...-” [Address not 
showing on GIS] 
Whiskey 1: “Can I interrupt? I’ll point-to-point Whiskey 4 – I know where it is.” 
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4.2.4 Sensemaking at the scene 
4.2.4.1 Activity description 
As they arrive at the scene, responding Officers notify the Controller (who updates the incident log); 
the Officers may be confronted by an ongoing emergency, or they may find that the immediate 
threat from the incident has stopped. Either way, in order to achieve the goals of restoring order, 
preserving life and property and the detection of offences and offenders (HM Government, 2002), 
their response to the incident is concerned with two interrelated high-level tasks: i) controlling and 
resolving the situation and ii) performing an initial investigation of the events surrounding it.  
Where more than one Officer is deployed to an incident, they may decide to separate and divide 
tasks between them (e.g. conducting searches, separating belligerent parties, speaking to 
witnesses), using their radios in point to point mode (i.e. direct one to one) to coordinate their 
activities without taking up airtime on the talk group.  
Police Officers are issued with a pocket notebook; this provides somewhere to record information 
when dealing with incidents, such as witness accounts, details of evidence and the Officer’s narrative 
description of events. Whilst the pocket notebook is principally for an Officer’s own use, the 
information recorded here will form the basis of subsequent investigatory paperwork. It may also be 
referred to by the Officer when giving evidence in court (potentially years later) and therefore may 
be examined by lawyers or court officials. Consequently, there are strict rules governing when and 
how the notebook is used, in order to support the reliability and accuracy of entries.  
Officer enquiries are supported by the Controller, who is able to verify details through police 
databases (e.g. vehicle registrations, names, addresses), check Officer welfare, allocate additional 
units, contact other services, record updates in the IMS and circulate information to other Officers 
(e.g. descriptions of suspects). 
4.2.4.2 Interpretation 
Responding to emergency incidents is complicated by the fact that many of the incident details may 
well be inaccurate, including the caller’s account of events, the names or descriptions of parties 
involved and very often the nature of the incident itself (i.e. the frame selected by the Call Handler 
during the initial call). For example, in Figure 4.20, the situation Officers encounter at the scene is at 
variance to the summary they have been given, causing them to question the sensemaking 
framework for the incident. This in turn cues activity from the Controllers and Call Handler, who 
communicate with each other via the IMS. 
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Figure 4.20: The situation on the ground causes Officers to question the incident frame 
[Incident: break-in in progress; Source: IMS log (WMP, July 2004); Corroboration: Control Room 
observations and SME interviews (WMP July-September 2009), participant observation 
(Warwickshire Police 2007-2010)] 
The Pocket notebook and digital radio appear to function as cognitive artefacts that support Officers 
in making sense of the incidents they encounter. Over the course of the participant-observation 
period of this research, it gradually became apparent that many Officers had modified their use of 
the notebook, employing the back pages to make unstructured notes in a similar fashion to the Call 
Handler’s notepad described earlier. As details of an incident become known during an Officer’s 
enquiries they are often recorded in the back of the notebook; these details are used to cue further 
information gathering from witnesses, as well as the Officer’s actions, such as searching the area and 
questioning individuals that match the offender’s description.  
With support from the Controller, Officers often use their notebooks to their advantage whilst 
making sense at the scene of an incident. Figure 4.21 summarises the sensemaking process involved 
in verifying the identity of an individual. As with the Call Handler’s notepad described earlier, the 
back of the pocket notebook also functions as a private cognitive artefact that supports frame 
seeking, by capturing key information divulged when questioning an individual. The person’s details 
Multiple units respond to reports of a break-in in progress at night; Officers are on the 
scene within 3 minutes, however on their arrival, the property and surrounding houses 
appear to be secure and undisturbed, casting doubt on the nature of the incident. The 
Controller switches the incident log back to the Call Hander (in a different Control Room) 
to double check the address. 
12:46 Controller A: “CAN YOU CONFIRM x RD OR x ST” 
13:00 Call Handler: “STANDBY” 
13:23 Call Handler: “I HAVE LISTEND TO TAPE AGAIN IT IS x STREET” 
13:28 Call Handler: “NOT ROAD - MY APOLOGIES” 
13:28 Controller A: [Receives no reply from caller’s mobile phone.] 
14:10 Controller B: [Updates caller details to x Street] 
14:16 Controller A: [Updates incident location to x Street] 
15:20 Controller B: [Notes that the house numbers in x Street only go up to 12 - the 
caller had reported living at number 15] 
15:50 Controller B: [Performs searches for the caller on the voters database] 
17:20 Call Handler: “I HAVE LISTEND TO ALL THE TAPE AND WHEN I CONFIRM” 
17:34 Call Handler: “THE NUMBER OF THE ADDRESS CALLER STATES x ROAD” 
17:44 Call Handler: “I REPEATED IT TO HIM AND HE SAID YES x ROAD” 
17:54 Call Handler: “AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TAPE HE STATES x” 
18:06 Call Handler: “STREET” 
21:50 Controller B: [Notes that Officers have checked the front and rear of both 12 x 
St and 12 x Rd and spoken to resident at 12 x St – all in order.] 
24:50 Controller B: [All units are leaving the scene. The log is closed, having been 
redefined as a false call.] 
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(i.e. name, date of birth, home address) are recorded in the back of the notebook and checked on 
Police databases (via the Controller over the radio). If these checks are negative, this cues the Officer 
to question the frame and potentially provides an alternative one (e.g. this person is engaging in 
deception, possibly to conceal an offense), prompting further enquiries with the individual. The 
Officer may ask the individual to repeat their details and provide further information, such as other 
persons living at an address (who would be listed on the electoral register). The pocket notebook 
supports this reframing of the incident, providing a record of the earlier responses from the suspect 
and revealing any inconsistencies. By repeating this process of information gathering and database 
checks, the individual’s deception becomes apparent and Officers will then take appropriate action. 
At the same time, the Officer and Controller are also able to take steps to establish the individual’s 
true identity. Individuals trying to hide their identity must rapidly improvise fictitious details in order 
to answer simple questions about themselves. Typically3 , this means they tend to change their 
details only slightly (e.g. different spelling of surname, different year of birth, or house number). 
Consequently, their actual personal details are frequently listed in search results as a possible match. 
For persons known to the police, PNC will list physical characteristics and distinguishing features, 
such as scars and tattoos, which the Officer can then check to confirm their identity.  
In a similar fashion, the Pocket notebook and radio network also support collaboration between 
Officers at the scene who have split up to conduct enquiries separately. The use of the radio as a 
private shared cognitive artefact (point to point) allows Officers to engage in a similar iterative 
sensemaking process, comparing accounts (based on their notes) and identifying inconsistencies. In 
addition to reducing the volume of radio traffic on the talk group, this enables the Officers to have 
the space to engage in frame seeking, and testing/validation without having to physically meet or 
publicise their early hypotheses on the radio network and in the incident log. Once they have 
identified the correct frame, the Officers are able to take immediate action (e.g. making an arrest) 
without having to reconvene. Combined with the use of radio earpieces, this can enable them to 
catch suspects unaware and reduce the risk of injuries to Officers. 
                                                          
3 This was observed by the Researcher on several occasions and was corroborated in SME interviews. 
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Parallel sensemaking processes:
Frame-defined data collectionFrame-seeking
Radio
Controller
Officer(s)
“[NAME], [ADDRESS]”
11. Notepad 
(front)
10. Build narrative
[Who, what, when, where, why, how?]
6. Police databases
4. Notepad 
(back)
2. Search for 
information
3. Extract, filter and 
record key details
1. Suspect
5 & 9. Cue further frame-
seeking and frame-
defined data collection
What is 
your 
name?
Can you run 
a check on a 
‘Mr A’…?
No trace for Mr A, 
but there is a Mr B...
Can you confirm 
your date of birth?
Who else lives 
there with you?
7. Schema 
(suspect is Mr B)
Identifying 
marks?
Tattoo on 
shoulder...
Mr B is 
wanted...
One in 
custody.
12. Presentation
9. Cue further frame-
defined data collection
11. Frame testing
(Search for supporting 
information / negative 
evidence)
Mr A...
 
Figure 4.21: The sensemaking process involved in establishing the identity of a suspect 
In more exceptional circumstances, the talk group becomes an open forum for a group of 
responding Officers to collaboratively make sense of an incident. Figure 4.22 shows part of the radio 
communications during the response to a ‘break-in in progress’ (burglary), where several Officers 
were already at the scene, searching for the offender and other resources were en route. As can be 
seen, Officers are using the talk group to directly communicate in order to coordinate their 
response, with the Controller playing an ancillary, rather than leading role. Interestingly, although 
the Sergeant involved in Figure 4.22 provides some leadership to the other units – for example 
directing units during the search – none of the units involved in the example is demonstrably ‘in 
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charge’ of coordinating the response. Instead, the units involved jointly make sense of and 
determine the response to the emergency, based on the working hypothesis (break-in in progress) 
and the situation as they find it. Figure 4.22 also shows that the Controller has to repeat the incident 
details several times, either because a new unit has become involved (Dog Handler), or because 
details have been forgotten (Whiskey 2). 
 
Figure 4.22: Officers coordinate the response to a break in progress 
[Incident: break-in in progress; Source: participant observation (Warwickshire Police, March 2009, 
Shift 46, Crewmate: Officer 5, Callsign: “Whiskey 1-0”); Corroboration: Control Room participant 
observation (Warwickshire Police, 2007-2010), participant observation (WMP November-December 
2008)] 
  
W3-5 [Sergeant]: “[OFFICER A]: you’re on the wrong side….Unit looking at me, go down 
there.” 
Dog Handler: “You were calling me?” 
Control: “Possible Break in progress...” [Gives details] 
Dog Handler: “Can you confirm I’m required?” 
Whiskey 3-5: “Yes – confirmed break-in.” 
Golf 3: “Golf 3: TA.” 
Control: “TA.” 
Whiskey 2: “Whiskey 2: What’s the address again?” 
Control: “[ADDRESS]” 
[Confusion ensues over the location of the road and property] 
Control: “On mapping, you have got [ROAD]...” 
Officer A: “I’m by [LOCATION], is that right?” 
Officer B: “No, it’s further round, near the church....do a left there.” 
Officer C: “[OFFICER C] to 3-5.” 
Whiskey 3-5: “Go on.” 
Officer C: “Can you speak to the IP and see if a laptop’s been stolen?” 
Whiskey 3-5: “Confirmed.” 
Officer C: “I’ve found a laptop cable...” 
Whiskey 3-5: “Does that give a direction of travel?” 
Officer C: “It goes to a dead end...” 
Whiskey 1: “Whiskey 1 to Control?” 
Control: “Go ahead.” 
Whiskey 1: “Another property is open, [OFFENDER] may still be inside.” 
Whiskey 3-5: “[Requests location of this address]” 
Whiskey 1  “...outside IP’s address, go back...2nd right...” 
Golf 3: [Talks to Control, should the dog be cancelled, as lots of Officers have 
been running around the alleyways to the back of the property.] 
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4.2.5 Closing the incident 
4.2.5.1 Activity description 
Once the incident has been resolved, the Officer will radio the Controller with a final update that 
summarises their assessment of the incident and the actions taken. This narrative could be as short 
as “One under arrest for drunk and disorderly – transporting to Custody”, but may be more lengthy 
for complex incidents. The Controller will add this final update to the incident log, which is then 
closed. As soon as is practicable – which may be several hours later, if an arrest has been made – the 
Officer will update the front of their pocket notebook with their formal account of the incident. This 
account may go on to form the basis of several items of crime file paperwork, as well as supporting 
the Officer’s recollection of the incident during any future court appearances. 
4.2.5.2 Interpretation 
Now that the incident has been resolved, the Officer is able to formulate their impressions regarding 
the events and can re-order the fragments of information from the back of their notebook into a 
narrative of the incident in the front. This narrative coherently relates what they saw, the decisions 
and actions they took and the outcome. Their entry in the front of their notebook is therefore not 
merely the relaying of a series of events, but also involves a retrospective interpretation of the 
meaning of those events, i.e. sensemaking. The re-presentation of incident information from the 
back of the notebook to the front should not cause concerns regarding evidential accuracy, as no 
information has been lost; however, it does reveal that the notebook serves an additional 
sensemaking function, beyond merely being a personal record of events. The Officer’s retrospective 
narrative of the incident is the bridge between the disjointed ‘raw’ information (captured informally 
in the back of the notebook) and the formal sequential record of events in the front. In this way, 
Officers’ pocket notebooks perform a similar role to the Call Handler’s notepad and IMS. However, 
the pocket notebook has a much lower potential to support collaborative sensemaking during the 
incident, as unlike the IMS their contents are not readily accessible by other agents.  
4.2.6 Improvised artefacts 
4.2.6.1 Interpretation 
Officers occasionally find themselves in situations where no suitable artefact exists, in which case 
they will improvise new ones. When an arrest is made, the prisoner is transported to the station, 
where the arresting Officer will need to give an account to the Custody Sergeant, who will decide 
whether to approve the prisoner’s detention. This account needs to include certain details, such as 
the time and location of the arrest, as well as the time of arrival at the police station. However, 
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during busy periods (and particularly in large rural forces), it can often be over an hour from the time 
of arrest to speaking to the Sergeant, during which there may be limited opportunity to make a 
pocket notebook entry. Officers regularly wear disposable gloves during searches and arrests, and in 
a similar manner to emergency medical practitioners (O’Connor, 2010), they will often write on the 
back of the glove in situations where it is not practicable to make an entry in their pocket notebook. 
A second example is shown in Figure 4.23 – a Traffic Officer has used a china graph pencil to convert 
their Police motorbike petrol tank into an artefact. The Officer has recorded a summary of various 
pieces of information required for their intercept role during a large traffic operation, including 
geographic locations (motorway junctions), individuals and roles (names and call signs) and 
communications (radio talk groups). This operation involved a high level of coordination between 
Traffic Officers, as vehicles of interest to the Police were identified and stopped. The notation on the 
fuel tank means that by glancing down, the Officer is able to remind themselves of any of these 
details whilst riding on the motorway, without having to pull over to check their pocket notebooks 
or radio the Controller. This practice is common amongst motorbike Traffic Officers, but it is not 
formally taught. 
 
Figure 4.23: Notes made on a police motorbike fuel tank during an ANPR traffic operation 
(Warwickshire Police, May 2009) 
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4.3 Summary 
4.3.1 Overview 
The case study presented in this chapter describes the sensemaking processes involved in the 
various stages of responding to routine police emergencies. This description supports the argument 
that within this environment, sensemaking is a distributed cognitive activity involving multiple 
agents from across the C2 system, supported by several key artefacts. The roles of these artefacts as 
sensemaking tools are summarised in Table 4.2. A number of vignettes have been used to illustrate 
the sensemaking as distributed cognition argument being put forward in this chapter – the different 
types of sensemaking activities described by the vignettes are summarised in Table 4.3 at the end of 
the chapter, which links each vignette to one of the three research perspectives that have been 
applied in this thesis. The following sections discuss the chapter findings in terms of the research 
perspectives. 
4.3.2 Making sense with artefacts 
In making sense of the emergency call, the Call Handler is supported by their notepad and the IMS 
log, which act as external representations. These artefacts perform many of the roles identified in 
Pirolli and Card’s (2005) representation construction process as the Call Handler captures fragments 
of information from the caller, reinterprets these into a recognisable incident type and presents 
them as a coherent narrative summary which can be passed along the emergency response process 
and dealt with (Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.5). A similar process is in evidence at the scene of an incident, 
where Officers make use of the back of their pocket notebooks, along with the IMS log and police 
databases (via the Controller) in order to support the process of making enquiries. Once an incident 
has been resolved, the Officers involved will (as soon as practicable) write up their account of the 
incident in the front of their notebook; this account may subsequently be ‘presented’ as evidence 
within crime file paperwork or during court proceedings (Figure 4.21).  
These two iterative processes initially feature the use of informal, private cognitive artefacts 
(notepad, back of notebook), prior to the transition to formal, public ones (IMS, front of notebook). 
The reason for this appears to be that the unregulated nature of informal artefacts affords the 
flexibility to support frame-seeking, by allowing for rapid, unstructured capture and manipulation of 
information, which may go on to form part of the formal record or equally play no further part in the 
response (cf. Kirsh, 2013). This echoes Baber et al. (2006) and Paul et al.’s (2007) differentiation 
between the formal and informal artefacts used in sensemaking and reporting. Baber et al. (2006) 
describe how narratives are constructed to develop the crime scene investigation from informal 
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sensemaking to formal reporting. In a similar manner, after an incident is closed, two narratives 
constitute the formal record of events. Firstly, the IMS log, which begins with a formalised account 
of the incident transformed from the caller’s unstructured account, before giving an ‘in the moment’ 
account of the incident response as a series of time-stamped event updates which reflect the twists 
and turns of the ongoing sensemaking process that took place during the incident. The second 
narrative is in the front of the pocket notebook, and comprises the Officer’s retrospective account of 
their thoughts and actions in relation to the emergency and thereby comprises their ultimate frame 
for that incident (cf. Klein et al., 2006a). Both of these narratives fit the events of the incident into an 
established emergency response framework that is recognised across the C2 network and wider 
judicial process, allowing them to be acted upon both during (IMS log) and long after (pocket 
notebook) the incident. 
Artefact Formal Purpose Sensemaking role Evaluation for sensemaking 
Call 
Handler’s 
Notepad 
A temporary, 
unstructured 
record of key 
call details 
A private resource for 
action, cueing of frame 
seeking activities 
(‘shoebox’) 
Pro:  Flexible - supports unstructured 
data capture 
Con: Required to re-enter 
information 
Low distribution potential. 
IMS log The sharing of 
emergency 
incident details. 
Response 
initiation and 
risk analysis. 
A permanent 
record of 
actions taken. 
A shared resource for 
action, a prompt for frame-
defined data collection. 
Capture and sharing of the 
formalised incident 
narrative. 
Pro:  Enables rapid capture and 
dissemination of key incident 
information  
Con:  Lack of access for response 
Officers can create an information 
bottleneck 
Inflexible structure appears not to 
support frame seeking. 
Digital 
radio 
Enable incident 
response 
communications 
Provides main means of 
communication between 
Controllers and Officers 
Enables Officers’ frame-
defined data collection (via 
Controller) 
Pro:  Supports collaborative 
sensemaking 
Enables mutual monitoring within 
talk group 
Con: Use of point-to-point excludes 
other users and limits information 
exchange 
Pocket 
Notebook 
An Officer’s 
formal record of 
the incident and 
their actions. 
A private resource, cueing 
frame-defined data 
collection and reframing of 
the incident. 
Capture of formalised 
retrospective incident 
narrative. 
Pro:  Supports unstructured data 
capture 
Con: Required to re-enter 
information 
Con: Duplication of existing 
information (within IMS log and 
databases) 
Table 4.2: The main artefacts involved in Police emergency response sensemaking  
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4.3.3 Making sense through artefacts 
Sensemaking during routine emergency responses is concerned with framing the problem; once an 
incident has been defined in terms of a recognisable ‘type’, SOPs can be applied in order to guide the 
process of resolving it. The process of framing the problem is distributed across the individuals 
within the C2 system and again they are supported in this by the artefacts available to them. 
However, it appears that when dealing with emergencies, the various agents within the system 
interpret the sensemaking problem facing them differently, depending on their role.  
As they make sense of emergency calls, Call Handlers appear to interpret the problem in terms of 
identifying the correct call ‘type’, which could be rephrased as the question “how can this incident be 
formalised within defined emergency response parameters?” Interestingly, the caller appears to act 
as a resource for action that supports frame seeking, as each response from the caller prompts the 
Call Handler to ask a further question / seek clarification, until they have established the nature of 
the incident (Figure 4.2). Once an appropriate incident type has been identified, this cues the Call 
Handler to engage in frame-defined data collection, further tailoring the questions asked of the 
caller to gather relevant details (Figure 4.4). 
Controllers appear to view incident logs as multiple competing tasks to be allocated to response 
units, i.e. “How does this incident fit within the wider service demand?” Controllers lack suitable 
artefacts to assist them in the task of identifying the most suitable resource to respond, which 
frequently results in their request for ‘any unit’ to attend (Figure 4.10).  
Responding units initially frame the incident in terms of assessing and preparing for anticipated risks, 
i.e. “What do I expect to encounter at the scene?” They are assisted in this by the IMS log – via the 
Controller – though the Controller’s ability to support responding Officers (and thereby act as a 
resource for action) is often limited (Figure 4.18). The fact that Controllers rarely offer 
supplementary incident information without it being requested by an Officer also suggests that it is 
of no relevance to the Controller’s own sensemaking requirements as a ‘resource allocator’ (Figure 
4.17). 
Once Officers are on-scene and have the situation under control, the sensemaking activity becomes 
one of establishing what has happened and what response is necessary, i.e. “How do I resolve this 
incident?” Response Officers are supported in this task by the individuals encountered, the scene 
itself, the Controller (and their databases) and their own notebook – all of which act as resources for 
action, cueing Officers to perform specific data gathering and frame-related activities (e.g. seeking, 
questioning and re-framing the incident - Figure 4.21). 
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Baber (2013) makes the point that the actions afforded by artefacts will differ, depending on the 
training and experience of the agents within the system. The above description suggests that the 
goals of the agents also promote or inhibit affordances, for example busy Controllers are less 
concerned about incident details than in getting them allocated to response units, whilst Officers en 
route to an incident are keen to find out as much background information as possible (c.f. Figures 
4.17 and 4.18). However, the current centralised organisational structure and limited technological 
application have resulted in an information bottleneck that limits their ability to exploit this 
information. 
Whilst the description of making sense with artefacts in Section 4.3.2 matched Baber’s (2013) ‘weak’ 
view of distributed cognition as the distribution of artefacts, this description of making sense 
through artefacts appears to match Baber’s (2013) ‘strong’ view of distributed cognition as the 
distribution of tasks. Although the individuals within the C2 network appear to be performing their 
own sensemaking activities, they are engaged in a collective information processing activity (making 
sense of the incident), with one agent’s actions forming the basis for the actions of the next, drawing 
on a common artefact – the IMS log (albeit indirectly accessible for response Officers). 
The description of the emergency response process presented in this chapter suggests that 
sensemaking is partially defined by the situation and partly by the tools available to support 
sensemaking. This case study gives several instances of the introduction of new artefacts, or 
adaptations to existing ones that differ from the original design intent. For example, the use of 
notepaper by Call Handlers and the back of the pocket notebook by Officers to support unstructured 
data capture and the adaptation of the IMS open incident list to improve its utility as an incident 
allocation and planning tool. In addition, whilst the GIS is intended to support Controllers in tracking 
units (and thereby resource allocation), in practice it is not suitable for this. Combined with the role 
of the IMS open incidents page as a ‘to do list’, this likely contributes to the Controllers view of their 
role as the allocation of incidents, rather coordinating responses. 
4.3.4 Making sense through collaboration 
Section 4.3.3 summarised the sensemaking actions of individuals within the C2 system as they frame 
the problem in relation to their own goals (e.g. formalising the incident, resource management, 
anticipated risks, establishing events, incident resolution). During any of these stages, new 
information could prompt agents to question the frame and subsequently preserve, compare, re-
frame or begin frame seeking again. Whilst these various re-evaluative sensemaking strategies can 
be undertaken by individuals (Figure 4.6), it appears that collaboration plays an important role in the 
identification, investigation and resolution of inconsistent data and violated expectations. In the 
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vignette in Figure 4.20, two controllers, a Call Handler and multiple Officers at the scene engage in a 
collaborative process of ‘bridging the gap’ during an incident response. This begins when Officers 
responding to a “Break-in in progress on X Road” have their expectancies violated, cueing them to 
question elements of the frame with the Controllers (via the radio). This prompts one of the 
Controllers to engage in re-framing, first trying to ring the caller back (from IMS log details), then via 
the Call Handler (reviews call recording, changes location to “X Street”). Further information from 
the second Controller calls the alternative frame into question (invalid house number on IMS log) 
and the two frames are compared by the responding Officers (attend both locations, check 
properties and speak to residents). One of the Controllers then engages in frame seeking (checks for 
the caller’s details on voters database – negative result); the combined results of these 
investigations (no signs of break-in at either location, caller’s details appear to be false) leads to the 
identification of a new frame of “False call” and the response is abandoned. This description 
indicates the socially distributed nature of emergency response sensemaking, with multiple agents 
working closely together to achieve a shared sensemaking aim. Interestingly, this is at variance to 
one of Perry’s (2003) characteristics of socially distributed cognition – the notion that tasks must be 
organised such that they can be divided into components that can be performed by individuals, 
before being reintegrated again. There are no clear dividing lines between the actions of the various 
individuals in Figure 4.20, particularly as all of the activities contribute to the final frame used to 
describe the incident. Additionally, this activity has taken place on an ad hoc basis, with no single 
person in charge of coordinating the tasks to make sense of the incident. This sensemaking activity is 
supported by the artefacts used to mediate communications (IMS and radio) and others which act as 
resources for action, with the IMS log and police databases cueing frame questioning and frame 
seeking activity from the Controllers.  
The use of shared radio talk groups also enables agents within the C2 system not directly involved in 
an incident response to monitor events and (free airtime permitting) contribute to the sensemaking 
process. This enables the responding Officers to benefit from one another’s diverse experiences, 
which are not readily available through the formal incident records available in IMS and which 
Controllers are frequently too busy to interrogate (Figure 4.19). More infrequently, when complex 
emergencies involving multiple units take place, the responding units take control of the talk group 
and use it as an open forum for collaboratively making sense of the situation. For example, in Figure 
4.22, Officers at the scene communicate directly with one another in order to elaborate the “Break-
in in progress” frame. However, the high levels of radio traffic preclude these forms of collaborative 
sensemaking from becoming a more frequent occurrence.  
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Within the Control Room environment, local Controllers appear to engage in reciprocal monitoring, 
supported by their body of practice (Heath and Luff, 2000) which enables them to closely coordinate 
their support activities and shared use of artefacts without the requirement for explicit 
communications (Figures 4.13 and 4.14).  
Two important factors which dictate how emergency response C2 performs as a collaborative entity 
are the social and organisational characteristics of the system. Organisational structures are 
designed with the purpose of the system in mind; social processes on the other hand evolve 
organically over time as people reorganise the information processing environment (Perry, 2003), 
are influenced by the organisation’s cultural heritage and are highly resistant to interference 
(Hutchins, 1995b). The design of the emergency response C2 structure is intended to facilitate the 
efficient handling of emergency calls and coordination of resources to resolve multiple simultaneous 
incidents. This has been achieved through the specification of roles and functions within the network 
and provision of technology to support the exchange of information – including the IMS log and 
digital radio network. Within this designed system, the focal point of sensemaking ‘product’ from 
both Call Handlers and responding Officers – the ‘centre’ of the system – is the Controller. Yet, as 
this chapter describes, Controllers are not in a position to coordinate responses, due to a lack of 
suitable artefacts and competing demands from their high workload. The lack of data access for 
mobile Officers, combined with the reliance of Controllers on a) the IMS to frame the resource 
management problem and b) Officers to volunteer for incidents, means that neither are in a position 
to address the question of how best to allocate resources to incidents. Thus, there is a discrepancy 
between the centralised nature of the C2 network and the distributed nature of sensemaking 
activity, with the supporting technologies set up to facilitate the former (formal) arrangement, 
rather than the latter (evolved) reality. This is reminiscent of Landgren’s (2004) description of the 
tension between centralised emergency response C2 and the responding units ‘preferential right of 
interpretation’ of the situation, i.e. they are the only ones who have ‘eyes on’ the situation and who 
are able to definitively determine what is going on. Landgren (2004) describes how this lack of direct 
access to information prevents responding units from being able to interrogate it and find 
inconsistencies – something which appears to be a key requirement for questioning and 
reinterpreting the frame used to respond to an incident. 
In terms of the social processes involved in collaborative sensemaking, unsurprisingly routine 
emergency response C2 does appear to function as a Community of Practice, that is as an 
established organization of individuals operating within a well-defined domain and that “…share a 
common set of patterns of interpretation, implicit assumptions, and beliefs…” (Burnett et al., 2004, 
page 12). In addition to the stability of team membership, common training and experience and 
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shared language, it also appears that artefacts play an important role in supporting the effective 
realization of this community across a distributed network during fast-paced emergencies. Equally, it 
is likely that the artefacts in use are only able to act as frames in the way described in this chapter 
because of the community of practice, i.e. the highly compact, formalised nature of communications 
used in the IMS logs and radio transmissions frequently require the recipient to be in possession of 
detailed knowledge of the domain in order to be able to understand them. Where questioning of a 
frame does occur, any further comparison, reframing or new frame seeking is still defined in terms 
of the established language and procedures, i.e. routine emergency sensemaking is a culturally 
defined activity (Weick, 1995).  
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Vignette Sensemaking activity Description 
#4.2: Caller as 
resource for action 
Making sense with artefacts 
Artefact supported frame-seeking 
The Call Handler uses ‘active listening’ techniques to establish from the caller what 
has happened; each response from the caller prompts a further question until all 
relevant information has been gathered. This process is supported by the use of the 
notepad to capture key details during frame-seeking. 
#4.4: Incident type as 
a resource for action 
Making sense through artefacts 
Frame-defined data collection 
The incident type acts as a frame that cues the Call Handler’s data collection activity. 
#4.5: Call Handler’s 
IMS log entries during 
a vehicle break in 
Making sense with artefacts 
Narrative construction 
The Call Handler enters information into the IMS in concise, standalone statements, 
which are first verified with the caller. In this way, the caller’s unstructured account 
is transformed into a formalised narrative.  
#4.6: Controller 
reprioritises the 
incident log 
Making sense through artefacts 
Artefacts as resources for action 
New incident information in the IMS (from the caller, via the Call Handler) directly 
contradicts the current frame, prompting the Controller to raise the priority of the 
incident and the Call Handler to alter their questioning strategy. 
#4.10: Requesting 
‘any unit’ 
Making sense through collaboration 
Breakdown in communication 
The Controller is forced to radio for ‘any unit’ to attend an incident, as they are 
unable to track the resources on the ground or to monitor their status. 
#4.11: Volunteering 
for incidents 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring, social 
organization / coordination 
Officers are largely ignorant of each other’s locations and status and so are unsure 
who is available or closest to a particular incident If it becomes clear to Officers that 
they are best placed to respond, then they will often volunteer to attend. 
#4.13 Controllers 
working together 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring, shared use of 
artefacts, common ground 
Two Controllers coordinate their shared use of the radio and IMS through reciprocal 
monitoring and common ground. IMS is used for explicit, as well as implicit 
communications between distributed agents. 
#4.14: Multiple 
simultaneous radio 
discussions 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring, shared use of 
artefacts 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Communication bottleneck 
During busy periods, the talk group is in constant use, with urgent dispatch 
messages and routine enquiries occurring simultaneously. WMP Controllers 
coordinate their shared use of both the radio and the IMS through reciprocal 
monitoring. 
Table 4.3: The different types of sensemaking activity described by the vignettes presented in Chapter Four 
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Vignette Sensemaking activity Description 
#4.16: Relying on the 
Controller for 
information 
previously given 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination 
Responding Officers rely on the Controller to repeat incident information; the 
Controller provides additional support to help them find the location. 
#4.17: Support to 
responding units 
Making sense with artefacts 
Artefact supported frame-seeking 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination, 
communication bottleneck 
The Controller’s workload limits their ability to pro-actively support responding 
units, often only supplying information in response to specific questions. Shared 
radio talk groups enable Officers to reciprocally monitor events and offer any 
knowledge that might help. 
#4.18: Monitoring 
events on the talk 
group 
Making sense through artefacts 
Questioning the frame 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring 
An Officer monitoring the talk group provides information which questions the 
current frame and subsequently leads to reframing the incident. 
#4.19: Sharing prior 
experience via the talk 
group 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring, social 
organization / coordination 
Officers monitoring the talk group assist their colleague in finding the address and in 
anticipating the situation they will encounter. 
#4.20: Questioning 
the frame / Officers as 
a resource for action 
Making sense through artefacts 
Questioning the frame 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination 
The situation Officers encounter at the scene causes them to question the 
framework of the incident, triggering further investigation by the Controller and Call 
Handler, supported by the IMS. 
#4.22 Talk group as 
open forum 
Making sense through collaboration 
Reciprocal monitoring, social 
organization / coordination 
 
Making sense through artefacts 
Agents as resources for action 
In exceptional circumstances, the talk group becomes an open forum for multiple 
units to directly coordinate their response to an ongoing incident, with the 
Controller taking a supporting role. 
Table 4.3 (Cont.): The different types of sensemaking activity described by the vignettes presented in Chapter Four 
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5. Major Incidents 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four investigated sensemaking during single service ‘routine’ emergency responses; Chapter 
Five is concerned with the challenges facing the emergency services when trying to make sense of 
multi-agency major incidents and the role of distributed cognition processes in supporting this 
activity. Major incidents can be separated into four main phases: initial response, consolidation, 
recovery and restoration of normality. Each phase involves a different set of activities and 
consequently is associated with different sensemaking requirements across the various levels of 
command. This chapter concentrates on the consolidation phase, where the emergency services 
have resources at the scene and are striving to understand what is going on, to identify their goals 
and devise the most appropriate joint response to achieve these goals. 
This chapter presents a case study of the defence of Walham Electricity Substation from floodwater 
during the 2007 ‘Water emergency’ in Gloucestershire. Despite challenging circumstances, this was a 
successful operation, mounted at short notice. However, it illustrates the difficulties faced in making 
sense of and responding to large, complex multi-agency emergencies. The chapter focuses on the 
three multi-agency emergency response research themes identified from previous multi-agency 
emergency response studies in Chapter One and repeated in Table 5.1. In each sub-section, the 
activity is described and then interpreted. The activity description is based on the SME interviews, 
publicly available media and official reports of the incident. The interpretation draws on specific 
examples of the challenges faced by the emergency services as they tried to make sense of the 
incident. As in Chapter Four, the findings are discussed in relation to the three perspectives of 
sensemaking as distributed cognition defined in Chapter Two (making sense with artefacts, making 
sense through artefacts and making sense through collaboration). 
Chapter Four described how Police routine emergency sensemaking appears to take place within a 
collaborative community of practice, where – despite often initially high levels of uncertainty around 
the nature an incident – established procedures can be applied by a stable network of agents who 
possess extensive common ground. In contrast, the characteristics of major incidents described in 
Chapter One (i.e. rare, complex and unique situations that require a large-scale combined response) 
would seem better suited to an exploration network. Therefore, the expectation of this research was 
that sensemaking during the multi-agency major incident response in the case study would take the 
form of an exploration network, i.e. one that formed on an ad hoc basis, where there was little 
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common ground and where the goal was to develop new frameworks for interpreting the situation 
and guiding the incident response (Burnett et al., 2004). 
Issues identified from previous multi-agency emergency 
response studies 
Research theme 
Response systems overwhelmed by the scale of the 
emergency 
C2 structures 
Poorly defined chains of command 
Slow mobilization of response; 
Failure to share information between agencies; 
Inter-agency communications 
Lack of awareness of the presence and activity of other 
agencies in the area; 
Failure to communicate warnings and other information; 
Lack of coordination between agencies; 
Common ground 
Competitive practices; 
Lack of trust between agencies and disagreement over who 
is in charge; 
Interoperability failures; 
Failure to fully integrate other agencies into the response. 
Table 5.1: Deriving multi-agency emergency response C2 research themes 
5.1.1 Background: The defence of Walham electricity substation 
Figure 5.1 summarises the activities undertaken at the scene to prevent the Walham electricity 
substation from flooding. This incident took place during the wider ‘water emergency’ that affected 
Gloucestershire in July 2007, which included widespread flooding, as well as the loss of drinking 
water supplies to much of the county. This 10-day crisis stretched the emergency services to the 
limit, forcing them to request assistance from the military. The emergency at Walham represented a 
major incident in its own right and was a critical part of the countywide flood response. This case 
study is concerned with sensemaking at the Bronze Command level (i.e. at the scene) and between 
Bronze and higher command levels during the consolidation phase at Walham electricity substation. 
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Figure 5.1: The defence of Walham substation 
[Source: interviewees Corroboration: media and official reports] 
5.2 Findings 
5.2.1 Command and control structures 
5.2.1.1 Description 
As was mentioned in Chapter One the Gold, Silver, Bronze command structure ensures continuity 
between strategic intent, tactical plans and operational application. During the operation to save 
Walham substation, a number of alterations were made to the standard Fire and Rescue command 
structure in order to cope with unique features of the situation. These included drawing on 
resources from Avon Fire and Rescue service under the ‘Mutual Aid’ scheme. One such resource was 
the Incident Bronze Commander, who was therefore not directly part of the Gloucestershire major 
incident command structure. In response to this, the Deputy Chief Fire Officer (DCFO) from 
Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue service was also deployed on-site, to act as ‘Gold Liaison’ – a non-
standard role created for this situation. The DCFO had been identified during the Sunday morning 
Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) meeting as the best person to oversee the defence of Walham, 
having been told: “…you go and save Walham, that’s your job, get who you need to do it – we’ll help 
you” (Gloucestershire Chief Constable). The DCFO was ‘hands off’, i.e. did not play an active part in 
the command of the response, but provided input to Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Gold 
During the Gloucestershire floods in July 2007, Walham electricity substation was at risk of being 
inundated with water as river levels rose. Walham substation forms part of the critical national 
infrastructure, supplying electricity to over 500,000 homes (an estimated 2,000,000 people) in 
England and Wales (Snow and Manning, 2007). If the site had flooded, then it was estimated that 
the electricity supply would be interrupted for up to 3 weeks (Gloucestershire Constabulary, 
2007). 
On Sunday 22nd July, a multi-agency operation was launched to prevent rising floodwater from 
overwhelming Walham substation during the high tide expected during the night (the section of 
the River Severn near to Walham is tidal). The response involved hundreds of personnel from a 
number of organisations, including multiple Fire and Rescue services, the Environment Agency 
and initially personnel from several Royal Air Force (RAF) bases. The plan of action was to 
construct a series of flood defences around the critical substation switching room; this included 
the use of sandbag reinforcements, a one kilometre ring of the Environment Agency’s modular 
flood barrier and deployment of specialist Fire and Rescue high volume pumps to drain the site. 
Despite the short notice and difficult working conditions, the various agencies were able to 
coordinate an effective response and prevented the floodwater from forcing the shutdown of the 
substation, buying time to construct semi-permanent flood defences around the site. In 
comparison, floodwater forced the nearby Castlemead substation to shut down, cutting power to 
around 50,000 homes (Environment Agency, 2007). 
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Command on the progress of the response, acting as “eyes and ears” for the SCG. The DCFO also 
provided advice and support to the Bronze Commander when he experienced problems due to 
working in an unfamiliar county.  
Changes were also made at Silver Command level. In response to the protracted nature of the 
countywide emergency and numbers of resources involved, the refuelling of Fire and Rescue 
appliances became a priority concern. Consequently, Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue modified their 
command structure, by creating the role of ‘Pseudo Silver’ – a command function dedicated solely to 
coordinating the refuelling operation. The overall Fire and Rescue Command structure in relation to 
the defence of Walham substation is shown in Figure 5.2, with lines of communication shown by the 
arrows.  
Avon Fire 
Control
Personnel
Gold Fire 
Group
Avon Fire & 
Rescue Service
Gold
Silver
Pseudo Silver
Gloucs. Fire 
Control
Gloucestershire Fire & 
Rescue Service
Bronze
DCFO 
(Gold Liaison)
At the scene
 
Figure 5.2: Bronze Commander’s view of the adapted Fire and Rescue C2 structure (dashed lines 
indicate probable lines of communication not observed by the Incident Commander). 
[Source: Bronze Commander Corroboration: DCFO] 
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During a major incident, the Fire Bronze Commander would normally be supported in their role by 
the deployment of an Incident Command Unit (ICU) – a mobile command centre that provides 
command support staff, IT infrastructure and briefing aides, such as maps and whiteboards (Figure 
5.3). Command Support staff perform control duties, coordinating the actions of Fire and Rescue 
personnel on-site, but also liaising closely with the other agencies responding to an incident. An ICU 
was not deployed to Walham during the initial response phase and by the time the Avon Fire and 
Rescue Bronze Commander took charge, there was no room on-site to deploy one. As a result, the 
level of command support available was severely limited, forcing the Commander to run the incident 
with pen and paper as the only artefact support. 
Figure 5.3: Interior of a Fire and Rescue Incident Command Unit (HM Government, 2008) 
The Bronze Commander reported that the lack of an ICU increased his workload, in terms of the 
inability to use support staff and equipment to collect and represent the various elements of the 
situation and the response plan (such as floodwater depths). The Bronze Commander stated that he 
was gathering information, collating and assessing it and then formulating the response plan 
apparently almost entirely in his head (although this claim is debated in Section 5.2.1.2); thus, it was 
not possible for others to appraise themselves of the state of the incident and the response plan, as 
they would normally be able to do from the status boards mounted on the ICU. Because of this 
difficulty in sharing information and delegating ‘control’ tasks, the Bronze Commander was kept 
busy making decisions and giving orders to Fire service personnel. This caused a C2 bottleneck that 
contributed to the communications difficulties with the Environment Agency, who described trying 
to get to speak to the Bronze Commander as “Like waiting in school queue” (EA Team Leader). 
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5.2.1.2 Interpretation 
It is clear that circumstances required the Fire and Rescue service to modify their organisational 
structures away from the standard major incident arrangement (shown in Figure 1.7 in Chapter 
One), however this led to problems in maintaining a consistent understanding across the command 
network. The critical role of Walham substation was recognised at both Gold and Bronze Command 
levels, the Bronze Commander having been told “We have got to save this if we possibly can”. 
However, at the Silver Command level, this view seems to have been somewhat hidden amongst 
other competing priorities – at least in terms of the prioritisation of refuelling requirements by 
Pseudo Silver. From Figure 5.4, it would appear that Pseudo Silver Command considered Walham to 
be ‘one of many incidents’, rather than ‘the top priority incident’. This is likely due to a combination 
of: 
i) The command ‘short circuit’ created by having a direct link from the incident site to Gold 
Command (in the form of the DCFO); 
ii) The parallel major incident command structures of Gloucestershire and Avon Fire and 
Rescue services; 
iii) The over-specialisation of Pseudo Silver – concentrating on one aspect of the tactical 
picture. 
 
Figure 5.4: Requests for diesel  
[Source: Bronze Commander Corroboration: DCFO] 
At the scene, the number of responding agencies, combined with communications problems (cf. 
Section 5.2.2) and a lack of on-site command support meant that the scale and pace of events began 
to overwhelm the ‘control’ aspect of the Bronze C2 capability. There were problems with tracking 
the progress of activities, with the result that some lower priority tasks “fell off the radar” (Bronze 
Commander) and were not dealt with, including clearing the non-essential vehicles parked on the 
approach road, which was to contribute to subsequent access difficulties experienced by the 
Environment Agency vehicles (cf. Section 5.2.2). 
The Incident Commander on the scene at Walham reported that when he made 
requests for fuel to be sent to the site (in order to protect ‘critical national 
infrastructure’) he was told that other incidents took priority and was not given an 
estimated time of arrival for the fuel. A lack of diesel for the pump generators had the 
potential to lead to the substation flooding, which would cause wide scale and 
prolonged loss of power. To prevent this, the Bronze Commander was forced to request 
that the Deputy Chief Fire Officer (acting as ‘Gold Liaison’) contact Pseudo Silver and 
use his authority within Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue service in order to ensure that 
fuel would be delivered in time. 
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The Fire and Rescue service were responsible for the welfare of all personnel working on-site at 
Walham. They would normally manage site safety by manually logging everyone entering the 
‘hazard zone’ and where/what they are working on, for example by using an Entry Control Board 
(Figure 5.5). However, at Walham there were too many people (over 100) moving on and off the site 
for them to be able to do this; instead, they were forced to look at overall site safety.  
Figure 5.5: An annotated Fire and Rescue Entry Control Board (© Newswire, via Flickr.com) 
Figure 5.6 describes the processes that were put in place to manage the risk to workers on the site. 
This example demonstrates another improvised workaround to the technological and contextual 
limitations. 
 
Figure 5.6: Emergency evacuation improvisation  
[Source: Bronze Commander Corroboration: military and Environment Agency] 
The inability to monitor individual safety meant that safety was instead managed 
at the site level. The RNLI boat crews were used to monitor water levels, as well as 
the welfare of personnel on-site and compliance with PPE (where it was available). 
Due to the lack of compatible communications between the different services, it 
was not possible to rely on radios to transmit the evacuation signal in the event 
that the risk from the floodwater became too great. Additionally, the whistles 
normally used by fire fighters would not be heard over the noise of the pumps.  
An improvised evacuation signal was developed; an emergency services vehicle 
that was parked in a prominent position was nominated and personnel were told 
that the evacuation signal was the use of the lights and siren on that vehicle. 
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Whilst the Bronze Commander stated that he managed the incident from a response plan in his head 
(5.2.1.1), this raises the question of just how was he able to do this, as it would not only involve 
constructing a mental map of the scene, but also a timeline of key events (including critical 
dependencies and key decision points) and a list of the available resources, their locations and 
activities. This notion also goes against the concept of a distributed cognition system. Rather than 
remembering everything at once, it is more likely that he was cycling through a process of 
information gathering, assessment, planning and execution, i.e. the Incident Command Model 
(Figure 1.3, in Chapter One). This is likely, as it was the Bronze Commander that brought the model 
to the researcher’s attention and supplied Figure 1.3. Further, whilst there was a lack of standard 
command support artefacts, the Bronze Commander still had a number of resources for action 
available to support sensemaking activity. The concept of cognitive artefacts does not merely 
constitute ‘writing on things’; artefacts do not need to be designed or specially modified in order to 
act as representations – objects in the world can be used to represent information just because 
people decide they do, for example a knotted handkerchief (Vygotsky, 1978; Norman, 1993). 
Equally, people within the environment may be used to represent information and cue action 
(Hutchins, 1995b). This was demonstrated in Chapter Four, which described how statements from 
the caller prompt the Call Handler to gather further information through supplementary questions 
(Figure 4.2, in Chapter Four), as well as the monitoring processes used by distributed (response 
Officers) and physically proximal (Controllers) agents within the system to support collaborative 
sensemaking. 
Thus, whilst it may have felt to the Bronze Commander as though everything was in his head, it is the 
researcher’s assertion that the Bronze Commander was able to draw on the environment and other 
people to act as resources for action to support sensemaking activity.  
In support of this process, the Bronze Commander walked round the site throughout the incident 
and (it is argued) during this was drawing on the environment in front of him as a representation to 
support his sensemaking framework, by attributing meaning to people and the environment. Thus, 
rather than trying to remember data (e.g. quantities of diesel, barrier construction progress), the 
commander would instead be able to remember the person that knows this information, or the 
physical location that represents the information and would then be periodically prompted to gather 
this information during his rounds of the site. Figure 5.6 provides an example of this; the Bronze 
Commander maintained close contact with an RNLI representative, enabling him to delegate the 
responsibility for monitoring water levels, welfare and PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) 
compliance; the Bronze Commander then only needed to remember that these tasks had been 
delegated and would be prompted to check by the presence of the RNLI representative, rather than 
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trying to remember water depths or other data. Another example is provided by the need to 
monitor diesel levels for the high volume pumps (Figure 5.4); the Bronze Commander designated a 
Fire and Rescue Sector Commander specifically for the high volume pumps, who kept him informed 
as to the rate of diesel consumption, ensuring that this remained a high priority activity. 
This interpretation suggests that it would be harder to remember to keep track of issues that were 
not represented within the Bronze Commander’s environment – either by physical objects or 
people. One such issue was the management of traffic outside the electricity substation, which was 
outside the Bronze Commander’s environment and (arguably) was not represented by any physical 
objects or people. Consequently, the parked vehicles mentioned earlier were not cleared, causing 
knock-on problems for the Environment Agency (cf. Section 5.2.2). 
5.2.2 Inter-agency communications 
5.2.2.1 Description 
The flooding incident at Walham substation featured multiple agencies working on a shared task at 
the same location (i.e., the construction of flood defences and the drainage of floodwater from the 
site). By the consolidation phase of an incident, the responding agencies would (in theory) normally 
be involved in distinct tasks (cf. Figure 1.11 in Chapter One). During the defence of Walham there 
was therefore a requirement for agencies to closely coordinate their activities to prevent them from 
working at cross-purposes. 
The different agencies operated their own communications equipment: the Environment Agency 
and Fire and Rescue Services had incompatible radio systems, whilst the military did not have any 
communications equipment of their own and were forced to rely on the Fire and Rescue service to 
pass messages across the site for them. As a result, inter-agency cooperation at the Bronze 
command level required physical proximity; this was not easy to achieve, given that the various 
agencies were spread around the site and movement was restricted by floodwater, electrical 
hazards, construction activity and movement of heavy machinery. 
5.2.2.2 Interpretation 
Coordination between the responding agencies appears to have been variable, with examples of 
both effective coordination and points of difficulty. The Bronze Commander was primarily concerned 
with the safety of personnel working in the substation; he therefore closely liaised with National 
Grid and RNLI personnel (which required physical proximity), who helped to contribute to the risk 
assessment by setting safe working parameters and monitoring hazards (Figure 5.7). This 
collaborative process would likely have been made harder by the lack of artefacts and staff to 
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support the Bronze Commander, combined with the associated high workload due to the 
requirement to monitor delegated ‘control’ tasks. The difficulties associated with involving other 
agencies in the risk assessment process would have limited their ability to develop a full 
understanding of events and meant they were unable to challenge the frame that had been used to 
make sense of the situation. For example, there was a delay whilst the Fire and Rescue Service found 
suitable vehicles to transport the military personnel onto the site through “…100 metres of thigh 
deep, fast flowing water between the control point and the substation” (military LO). The 
Environment Agency teams (who at this time were not closely liaising with the Fire and Rescue 
service) were surprised to see this, as their own assessment was that the water was safe to walk 
through: “The water was running over the road, but it was not deep or dangerous. The road was 
tarmacked and level and the water was only knee deep. The military probably thought it was deeper 
than it was” (EA team leader). This vignette therefore demonstrates not only why different agencies 
are involved in major incidents, but also why they need to collaborate to fully understand what is 
going on, which in turn requires the means to represent and share their interpretations across 
geographically distributed networks. 
 
Figure 5.7: Multi-agency collaborative risk assessment  
[Source: Bronze Commander Corroboration: military and Environment Agency] 
Figure 5.8 describes how the Fire and Rescue Service and Environment Agency’s lack of mutual 
awareness of each other’s roles, methods, processes and requirements generated logistical 
difficulties that delayed the response. This initial lack of awareness stems from the fact that these 
In order to determine whether it was safe for personnel to work on-site, 
information on a number of factors was collected and combined to produce an 
overall risk assessment for the site. The National Grid established safe working 
practices for personnel operating in ‘live’ areas and defined a maximum depth for 
floodwater to reach before it would become too dangerous to remain on site. RNLI 
crews monitored water depths around the site and assessed floodwater risk to 
personnel, as well as reporting on compliance with Personal Protective Equipment 
use by personnel on site. The Fire and Rescue Service took information from all 
sources, and from this the Bronze Commander assessed the overall risk to 
personnel working on the site.  
Risk factors were regularly checked and the assessment of the level of risk to 
personnel working on the site was regularly reviewed. Near high tide, there was a 
concern that a breach in the flood defences could allow floodwater to suddenly 
overwhelm the substation, thereby causing an accident involving many people. 
This changed the perceived level of risk to personnel working on the site and so the 
Bronze Commander took the decision to pull all but a few essential personnel out 
of the site. 
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agencies would never normally work together and so were largely unknown to one another. The 
Environment Agency reported that their teams do not train with any other agencies; as a result, they 
were not used to having to collaborate and were unfamiliar with major incident protocols. In this 
instance, the apparent simplicity of the problem (cf. Section 5.2.3), physical barriers to 
communication and high workload demands on the Bronze Commander (cf. Section 5.2.4) appear to 
have discouraged the type of collaborative inter-agency discussions that might otherwise be 
expected during a major incident. After the difficulties described in Figure 5.8, the Bronze 
Commander and Environment Agency team leader realised that they needed to cooperate more 
closely and endeavoured to do so. The Bronze Commander commented that the Fire Service would 
normally seek to discuss the situation with partner organisations and seek consensus, prior to 
initiating the incident response. However, in this situation he felt that there simply was not time to 
do this and the constant requirement for command decisions meant that briefings and situation 
updates to other organisations were limited. 
 
Figure 5.8: Inter-agency coordination of activity  
[Source: Environment Agency and Bronze Commander] 
National Grid safety personnel advised the responding agencies at Walham on safe 
working practices; these restricted the use of lifting equipment in parts of the site, 
meaning that sections of the Environment Agency flood barrier would have to be 
moved into place by hand. It became clear to the Environment Agency team that they 
did not have enough personnel to complete the construction of their barrier in the 
time available. The military teams sent to the site were tasked with moving barrier 
components into place and assisting the Environment Agency with construction work. 
The Incident Commander kept Liaison Officers from the military and RNLI close by, as 
he needed to maintain constant contact with these organisations. The Fire 
Commander initially thought that the Environment Agency were happy to be left to 
get on with their tasks, leaving him to focus on other aspects of the response.  
The substation was surrounded by floodwater and there was only one single-track 
road in to the site. The large articulated vehicles bringing in Environment Agency 
equipment had been held up in the queue of traffic outside the incident cordon and 
notification of their arrival was not passed to the Environment Agency team. 
Once the Environment Agency Team Leader realised what had happened, he tried to 
get the lorries into the queue of traffic entering the site, but this was initially refused, 
as their size meant that all other traffic would have to be stopped to let them in and 
out. This delay put the completion of the barrier before high tide at risk. The 
Environment Agency Team Leader then approached the Fire Commander and they 
discussed the problem, agreeing that the priority was the construction of the barrier. 
All other work and site traffic was stopped to allow the Environment Agency lorries 
into the site to be unloaded. 
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The military involvement in the Gloucestershire floods featured the use of Liaison Officers (LOs), 
including one on-site at Walham substation for the duration of the incident. The role of the LOs was 
to function as an interface, bridging the gap between C2 networks, as well as the different 
languages, practices and perspectives on an incident. The purpose of this was to understand the 
requirement that the military were there to support, to provide the necessary assistance and to send 
updates back through their military command network. For example, on Friday 20th July the Joint 
Regional Liaison Officer from 43 (Wessex) Brigade – having heard about the flooding problems in 
Gloucestershire and use of military search and rescue1 – decided to travel to Gold Control ‘to fight 
for information’, to establish whether there was any likelihood that large-scale military involvement 
might be required. Consequently, by the time that military assistance was formally requested on 
Sunday 22nd July, the mobilization of 43 Brigade was well underway, having begun in anticipation of 
the request. 
The military LO for Walham described how he stuck to the Bronze Commander ‘like a leech’, in order 
to keep abreast of incident developments. The LO briefed each new team of military personnel 
before they entered the site and provided situation reports back to the military contingent in Gold 
Command every 15 minutes. The value of LOs was demonstrated by their widespread and effective 
use by the military and the number of ad hoc liaison roles that were created within other 
organisations (cf. Figure 5.2), in order to address the particular needs of the incident and to ensure 
continuity of purpose across organisations and levels of command. 
5.2.3 Common ground 
5.2.3.1 Description 
On the face of it, all agencies shared the same overall goal i.e., to prevent the substation from 
flooding. They were also clear on what needed to be done; the incident was regarded as simple by 
both the Fire and Rescue service and Environment Agency, with the Bronze Commander describing it 
as a ‘no brainer’. However, the responses to the Critical Decision Method (CDM) probes listed in 
Table 5.2 show that the responding organisations were actually working to different goals. Table 5.2 
then goes through each agency’s understanding of the risks involved in the incident response and 
the information they used to make sense of the situation. Their answers again indicate that they had 
very different conceptual frameworks for the incident, likely due to their different roles, 
responsibilities and experience causing them to focus on specific aspects of the incident.  
  
                                                          
1 Military assistance for search and rescue is covered by a different legislative provision that allows for short-
term urgent assistance of a limited scale. 
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CDM question Fire and Rescue Environment Agency Military 
Goal specification 
What was your 
overall goal? 
1. Maintain safety of 
personnel working 
on site. 
2. Prevent the 
substation from 
flooding (through 
sandbagging, the 
EA barrier and 
pumps). 
Construction of the 
flood barrier before 
high tide. 
Provide maximum 
support to the Bronze 
Commander. 
Cue identification 
What features were 
you looking at when 
you formulated your 
decision (site safety)? 
Predicted time and 
height of floodwater at 
high tide. 
Hazard conditions 
(advice from RNLI, 
National Grid, reports 
from fire fighters). 
Control measures. 
Improvised evacuation 
signals. 
Dynamic risk 
assessment – deemed 
safe to work on site.  
National Grid 
guidelines on safe 
working practices.  
Evacuation signal 
from Fire and Rescue. 
The risk assessment of 
the Fire and Rescue 
Service. 
State of floodwater 
across approach road 
– determined this 
necessitated vehicular 
transport on and off 
site. 
Conceptual model 
Are there any 
situations in which 
your decision would 
have turned out 
differently? Describe 
the nature of these 
situations. 
Evacuated all non-
essential personnel 
near high tide, as risk 
of water 
overwhelming the 
defences rose. 
Fire Brigade were 
worried they would 
not be able to control 
the water level; they 
evacuated everyone 
before high tide. 
Continuous review of 
decision by all parties, 
under the 
chairmanship of 
Bronze Commander. 
Influence of 
uncertainty 
At any stage, were 
you uncertain about 
the appropriateness 
of the decision? 
Constant review of 
decision; risk to 
personnel set against 
priority of goal; 
measures taken to 
manage risks. 
Staff familiar with the 
task and experienced 
in working in water 
hazard, had 
constructed the 
barrier several times 
that year. 
Trusted the National 
Grid as they are 
experts. 
Could see Bronze 
Commander was 
hesitant about 
military commitment 
to an unpleasant task  
Situation awareness 
What information did 
you have available to 
you at the time of 
the decision? 
Hazard assessment 
from National Grid: 
maximum safe flood 
water level.  
Water depth and 
hazard assessment 
from RNLI and Fire and 
Rescue personnel.  
Compliance with PPE.  
Time of high tide. 
Safe working practices 
from National Grid, 
experience of EA 
personnel. 
The risk assessment of 
the Fire and Rescue 
Service. 
Table 5.2: Responses to CDM questions from the various organisations, in relation to the risk 
assessment of having staff working inside the electricity substation. 
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For example, the Fire and Rescue Bronze Commander had responsibility for the inner (hazardous) 
cordon of a major incident site; as a result, he was concerned to assess all risks to personnel within 
that area. In contrast, the Environment Agency deal with water hazards regularly and assess risk on 
an individual basis; they saw the only other hazard as being the overhead electrical equipment, but 
were happy to work within the restrictions of the National Grid and to evacuate the site if required 
to do so by the Fire and Rescue service. Similarly, the two agencies understood the necessary 
response actions very differently. The Environment Agency viewed the solution as simply the 
deployment of their barrier, which would prevent the floodwater level from rising within the site at 
high tide. The Fire and Rescue perception was that they needed to stop not only the high tide, but 
also to deal with rising groundwater (which was entering the site inside the barrier). Thus, the Fire 
and Rescue response also included sandbagging the main switch room (the most critical point), as 
well as the use of specialist high volume pumps to reduce the water level inside the barrier. 
5.2.3.2 Interpretation 
Under the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004 the Fire and Rescue Service and Environment Agency are 
Category 1 responders (HM Government, 2005a) and both are used to being ‘in charge’ of their own 
operations. Whilst the Environment Agency recognised that the Fire and Rescue Service were in 
control of the site and that they were concerned with the safety of personnel working there, some 
of their comments indicate that they were not comfortable with the command situation and suggest 
that they may not have recognised the ‘primacy’ of the Fire and Rescue Service. For example, they 
described how the Fire Service “took control of the site” (EA team leader) and that the Environment 
Agency were “outnumbered 50:1” (EA team member). 
The Fire and Rescue specialist high volume pumps used at Walham were considered one of the key 
elements of the incident response by the Fire and Rescue service. These pumps came from across 
the country; each one was brought onto the site by its own support vehicle, which then left the site 
and were parked up along the verge of the access road. This subsequently limited the ability of the 
larger Environment Agency lorries to deliver their equipment. As the Environment Agency teams 
viewed this Fire and Rescue equipment as unnecessary and merely an obstruction to their own 
activities (“It was us that did it.” – EA team member), they constructed another explanation for why 
fire crews from all over the country had been brought in, seeing this as “an opportunity to dust off 
their gear” (EA team leader). There was considerable media interest in the defence of Walham 
Substation, with numerous television crews attending the incident site to make live broadcasts. This 
was interpreted by the Environment Agency teams as the reason for the actions of the Fire and 
Rescue Service, which to them appeared to be driven by the public relations possibilities of a high 
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profile incident. They interpreted the movement of fire crews and equipment within the site not as 
the placement of critical equipment, but as merely a tactic to raise their profile with the media 
“…[the] press loved fire brigade flashing lights…units seemed to be moved around just to be high 
profile…” (EA team member). At the same time, they felt that the role of the Environment Agency 
was being played down, as they were told to move their own vehicles “out of the way” (EA team 
member). The contrasting perceptions of the incident are summarised in Figure 5.9, which indicates 
that the Environment Agency were not aware of factors of the incident which the Bronze 
Commander considered critical. 
It is clear that in the absence of any common ground between the agencies and where there was 
only limited collaboration (at least at the start) and understanding of one another’s activities, the 
Environment Agency team searched around for a plausible explanation for what they deemed to be 
unnecessary and disruptive activity. They appear to have generated the frame of “PR exercise” (EA 
team leader) from the key data anchors they inferred from the situation, as described in the 
preceding paragraph (i.e. heavy media presence, unnecessary Fire and Rescue equipment from 
multiple services, equipment movements intended to raise Fire and Rescue profile, marginalisation 
of Environment Agency). The Environment Agency personnel interviewed still maintained this view 
several months after the incident had taken place, showing considerable resentment towards the 
Fire and Rescue Service for the way they felt they had been treated, which at the time would not 
have helped motivate them to collaborate during the incident response. However, it is important to 
note that it is not possible to know if this account represents the Environment Agency personnel’s 
assessment at the time, or if this was developed in the intervening period (approximately 4 months) 
between the incident and the interview. 
The physical challenges (floodwater and size of site), the lack of command support (discussed in 
Section 5.2.4), the tight deadline and the apparent simplicity of the incident, all precluded in-depth 
discussion of the incident. It was not until there was a problem that threatened the success of the 
response that the two organisations began to discuss the incident in detail. However, the very 
different interpretations – both of the problem and the roles of the respective agencies in the 
solution – indicate the requirement for agencies to jointly engage in framing the incident, especially 
where they have limited common ground. At the same time, establishing a common framework for 
multiple agencies to apply to an incident is likely to take time and effort, something which is not 
readily available during an emergency.  
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Figure 5.9: Contrasting perceptions of the incident  
[Source: Environment Agency and Bronze Commander] 
Table 5.2 provides further support for the view that the Bronze Commander was drawing on other 
agencies as resources for action, by delegating activities to them and then using them as cues to 
prompt his own sensemaking activity, supported by the Incident Command Model as a heuristic. 
However, if the Bronze Commander was seeking to distribute ‘command’, ‘control’ and cognition 
across the site, then it would have been preferable for this to have featured in the incident planning 
from the start. Instead, as is often the case what seems to have happened is that the response was 
improvised in order to fit the constraints of the situation– such as the lack of ICU – and the most 
appropriate command structure was therefore only arrived at towards the end of the incident. 
The Environment Agency team had a specialist role in the response, namely the 
deployment of their flood barrier equipment; this was a task that they were 
familiar with, having already used the barrier several times that year. From their 
perspective, the incident was straightforward and they knew what had to be done. 
However, they felt that the Fire and Rescue service were slow to adapt to the pace 
and nature of the incident. The Environment Agency considered that the Fire and 
Rescue Service were ‘in the way’ during the early stages, delaying the arrival of 
their equipment. The fire service brought in a number of appliances to deal with 
the incident; in the opinion of the Environment Agency, this seemed to be far more 
equipment than was required, as they felt that barrier defences were already 
dealing with the incident appropriately. To them, the Fire and Rescue response 
appeared to be driven by public relations opportunities, rather than saving the site. 
The Environment Agency personnel spoken to asserted that it was their equipment, 
personnel and knowledge that had been crucial in the defence of Walham; they 
felt that this went unrecognised, both by the Fire and Rescue service and in media 
reports of the incident. 
The Fire and Rescue Bronze Commander was the overall Incident Commander and 
therefore had responsibility for the coordination of the whole multi-agency 
response, as well as the safety of all personnel working on the site. Therefore, from 
the Fire and Rescue Commander’s perspective whilst the problem was simple, the 
management of the incident was much more complex, with many factors to 
consider, including numerous hazards. The Incident Commander identified a 
number of equally critical aspects to the flood defences, of which the Environment 
Agency barrier was one part. Due to the rising groundwater, eight specialist high 
volume pumps were brought in from Fire and Rescue services around the country, 
to keep the floodwater level down within the substation. The Incident Commander 
felt that all of the agencies involved in the response were focussed on the same 
goal, rather than thinking that their own agenda was more important. 
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The relationship between the Fire and Rescue service and the military at Walham was different; as 
Table 5.2 suggests, the military goal was to support the Fire and Rescue service in whatever way 
they could. From prior training with the emergency services, the military LO identified the Bronze 
Commander as the individual ‘in charge’ of the incident response; he then set about understanding 
what the Bronze Commander wanted the military to do and liaised with the various military units to 
see if this was possible. Where decisions were required from the military, these were passed up to 
their superiors at Gold Command, for example the decision to deploy military personnel on-site 
without any PPE. The military relied entirely on the Bronze Commander for their understanding of 
the incident, so whilst there were no difficulties due to differing perceptions, this put pressure on 
the Bronze Commander to supply answers to their questions and take quick decisions: 
“The military ask yes/no questions, which meant I had to give yes/no answers to everyone on site.”  
(Bronze Commander) 
5.3 Summary 
5.3.1 Overview 
The case study described in this chapter provides a detailed overview of the consolidation phase of a 
multi-agency major incident, showing how sensemaking was challenged by a number of factors. 
Retrospective interviews with personnel involved in commanding the response were used to 
overcome the difficulties in researching this aspect of emergency response work. The case study 
reflects many of the challenges associated with major incidents that were described in Chapter One 
(cf. Table 5.1), indicating that although every major incident involves a unique set of circumstances, 
the common themes that they exhibit may allow for generalization of learning points.  
Whilst the response to this crisis was rightly hailed as a success, features of current emergency 
response C2 networks, procedures and supporting technologies create additional barriers for 
emergency services personnel to overcome in order to make sense of the problem they are dealing 
with. These are addressed in the following sections of this chapter. The vignettes that have been 
used to illustrate the sensemaking as distributed cognition argument being put forward in this 
chapter are summarised Table 5.3 at the end of the chapter, which again links each vignette to one 
of the three research perspectives that have been applied in this thesis. 
5.3.2 Making sense with artefacts 
In a similar manner to the Control Room-based processes described in Chapter Four (and explored 
by Blandford and Wong, 2004), Gloucestershire Fire and Rescue Service Gold and Silver command 
levels (based within GTEC – the Gloucestershire Tri Service Emergency Centre) were able to make 
Chapter Five: Major Incidents 
142 
 
use of a range of artefacts (including IMS, GIS, status boards, radio and telephones) in order to 
support sensemaking during the county-wide emergency. In contrast, without access to the ICU, the 
Bronze Commander at Walham was left with only pen and paper to support him in making sense of 
and coordinating the response to the incident. Chapter Four highlighted the value of informal, 
private artefacts (including pen and paper) in supporting frame-seeking activity, however once the 
appropriate frame has been selected, they appear less well suited to supporting the C2 activities 
involved in executing the response than formal, public artefacts. For example, Chapter Four 
described how the IMS can function as a ‘to do’ list, tracking resources against tasks and reminding 
Controllers of outstanding tasks to perform – something which ICU staff (drawing on artefacts) 
would normally carry out during a major incident. This chapter proposes the argument that, without 
the support of an ICU, the Bronze Commander instead relied on people and physical features of the 
environment to act as representations and that by moving around the site and referring to the 
Incident Command Model as a sensemaking heuristic, the Bronze Commander was able to draw on 
these representations in lieu of a formal artefact-based ‘picture’ of the incident. What the Bronze 
Commander appeared to lack was specific artefacts to help keep track of issues and actions not 
readily attributed to the elements of the environment available to him (such as off-site traffic).  
As Chapter Four described, emergency services use of formal, public artefacts to capture, represent 
and communicate information means they represent the incident frame within a recognisable 
structure, enabling individuals to rapidly apprise themselves of the incident and contribute to 
sensemaking (for example elaborating or questioning the adopted frame). Were the ICU available, 
the process of developing and maintaining the incident ‘picture’ (i.e. frame-seeking, elaboration and 
questioning) could have been supported by formal, shared artefacts (such as status boards, maps 
and the IMS), allowing for wider dissemination and involvement of other personnel. This would then 
have assisted the Bronze Commander’s ability to brief staff and delegate many of the ‘control’ tasks, 
improving the efficiency of the C2 system and freeing up time for ‘command’ activities, such as 
collaboration with the other agencies. 
The knock-on effects of the lack of suitable artefacts to support sensemaking appear to have 
included hampering framing the problem (Section 5.3.3) and collaborative sensemaking (Section 
5.3.4). 
5.3.3 Making sense through artefacts 
Chapter Four describes routine emergency sensemaking as concerned with framing the problem. 
This is a distributed process, involving several agents from across the C2 network engaged in 
coordinated activity, supported by several artefacts. Within this process, the agents adopt clearly 
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defined roles and each predominantly tackles a discrete element of the sensemaking process. Once 
a routine emergency has been defined in terms of a recognisable incident type, the response 
involves implementing SOPs. Similarly, sensemaking during major incidents also appears to be 
concerned with framing the problem. During the Walham incident, the responding agencies framed 
the situation using existing incident types (flood barrier construction, flood response management – 
cf. Figure 5.9), which then cued the SOPs they applied in response (i.e., barrier construction, sandbag 
defences, use of pumps to drain water) which could be distributed amongst the agencies involved.  
The Incident Command Model (Figure 1.3) describes the approach Fire and Rescue Commanders 
adopt at major incidents and whilst they would normally employ support staff to gather and record 
information and communicate plans, on this occasion, the absence of the ICU meant that physical 
objects and people were instead used as resources for action. According to the Fire and Rescue 
Incident Command Model2 other agencies are seen as a source of information to draw on during 
response planning and Fire and Rescue personnel represent resources to control to ensure the plan 
is a success. Similarly, this chapter argues that the Bronze Commander drew on people by delegating 
tasks and then using them to cue his sensemaking activities, as is indicated by his responses to the 
CDM questions (Table 5.2). Despite this argued for use of people and objects as artefacts, the lack of 
ICU is expected to have hampered the Bronze Commander’s ability to brief personnel and delegate 
C2 tasks, thus increasing his workload. 
This case study suggests one reason why major incident response coordination has proved to be a 
recurring problem, which is that they can appear deceptively simple. Organisations will recognise 
familiar elements of the incident that relate to their training and procedures, without picking up on 
important characteristics of the situation that do not form part of their repertoire of past experience 
and which are not readily described within their formalised lexicon. As such, these characteristics 
could be considered to represent ‘unknown unknowns’, i.e. the organisations are unaware that they 
are missing important pieces of the puzzle. This major incident was described as being a “No 
brainer” (Bronze Commander) and both the Environment Agency and Fire and Rescue service 
framed the problem differently, based on their training and experience and ruling out more in-depth 
collaboration with one another as there was not thought time to do this. This problem is not helped 
by the view prevalent within emergency response doctrine, that the incident response should be 
undertaken using existing procedures (cf. LESLP, 2007), thereby reinforcing the view that there is 
nothing fundamentally different about multi agency major incidents.  
                                                          
2 The Incident Command Model, Avon Fire and Rescue Service presentation 
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This chapter demonstrates the fallacy within major incident response doctrine, of clearly delineated 
roles and areas of responsibility between the emergency services. For example, the Fire and Rescue 
service are to control the inner cordon surrounding the incident site, restrict access and oversee all 
activity that takes place within this area, whilst the Police manage traffic, rendezvous points and 
other arrangements within the outer cordon (cf. Figure 1.11). However, at Walham, the Police were 
not in attendance (due to the county-wide flooding emergency) and the Fire and Rescue service 
were not the only agency operating within the inner cordon and the combination of the lack of inter-
agency communications interoperability and the large numbers of personnel meant that the Fire and 
Rescue service were not able to maintain effective site access control (Figure 5.6). Similarly, during 
many of the large-scale crises studied in the major incident literature review in Chapter One, the 
entire area becomes a hazard zone, where no single agency is in control or has the whole picture 
and roles and responsibilities become blurred, suggesting a collaborative approach to sensemaking 
and response coordination. 
5.3.4 Making sense through collaboration 
Chapter Four identified the social and organisational characteristics of the C2 network as having an 
important role in shaping routine emergency collaborative sensemaking. These characteristics have 
again been identified in relation to both intra and inter agency collaborative sensemaking during 
major incident responses and are discussed in turn in this section. 
Organisational structures 
The major incident command hierarchy described in Chapter One is designed to ensure continuity of 
purpose across the command levels, providing mission command downward and oversight and 
feedback on progress upward. From a sensemaking perspective, Figure 1.8 (Chapter One) describes 
the iterative process by which the three layers of command communicate and collaboratively 
develop their understanding of (i.e. make sense of) the incident and associated requirements. As 
such, mission command could be viewed as a means of developing and communicating the incident 
command framework. The incident response at Walham and wider flooding emergency necessitated 
a number of ad hoc changes to the Fire and Rescue C2 network (Figure 5.2), for example in order to 
provide workarounds to the lack of interoperability between Fire and Rescue services. Whilst 
necessary, these alterations resulted in confused lines of communication and undermined the 
command hierarchy, disrupting the process outlined in Figure 1.8 and likely contributing to the 
problems experienced, in terms of the loss of continuity of purpose across the command hierarchy 
(Figure 5.4). 
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Multi-agency major incident doctrine states that the emergency (and other) services should 
collaborate at every command level, but maintain separate C2 networks (LESLP, 2007; NPIA, 2009). 
However, there appears to be a tension between the maintenance of single service C2 networks 
designed to facilitate intra agency activities and the need for collaborative sensemaking in order to 
correctly frame and thereby respond appropriately to multi-agency major incidents. This 
arrangement seems to have affected the social processes involved in collaborative sensemaking 
during the Walham incident. 
Social processes and collaborative sensemaking 
The vignettes in Table 5.3 show the importance of collaboration in making sense of this emergency, 
thereby demonstrating the insufficiency of Klein et al.’s (2006a) individual-as-sensemaker position 
(cf. Section 5.3.3) for describing multi-agency major incidents. By definition, multi-agency 
emergencies involve multiple C2 networks and commanders, each of which is in possession of 
specialist knowledge and expertise which forms ‘the pieces of the puzzle’ required to frame the 
problem. 
Chapter Four described how collaborative sensemaking during routine emergencies appears to take 
place within a community of practice, where – despite often initially high levels of uncertainty 
around the nature an incident – established procedures can be applied by a stable network of agents 
who possess extensive common ground. In contrast, the multi-agency response to the case study in 
this chapter shares similarities with Burnet et al.’s (2004) exploration network, including: 
 Networks that form and re-form depending on task and need; 
 Often poorly defined areas of common interest; 
 Short-lived, dynamic associations. 
(Adapted from Burnett et al., 2004) 
The purpose of the exploration network is to exploit the breadth of knowledge of the diverse 
agencies involved, in order to develop innovative approaches that overcome the failures of existing 
interpretations (Burnett et al., 2004; Umapathy, 2010). However, from this case study it appears that 
whilst the major incident response network could function as an exploration network, the 
responding agencies (at least initially) tried to function as Communities of Practice, drawing on 
standard frameworks and procedures to understand and respond to the incident. On reflection, this 
is not entirely surprising, given current major incident doctrine and the separate C2 structures. Two 
additional factors which were likely to have impeded the early development of an exploration 
network at Walham include the lack of collaborative artefacts and the effortful nature of 
collaborative sensemaking. 
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Chapter Four described how – when possible – police Officers make use of the digital radio network 
to monitor activity and collaborate to make sense of ongoing incidents, whilst other agents within 
the network make use of the IMS to collaboratively develop shared frameworks for routine 
incidents. By contrast, the lack of compatible communications technology at Walham mean that 
physical proximity was required for collaboration, which was difficult on a large, flooded 
construction site with multiple distributed areas of activity. The inability to widely share 
representations of incident information severely limits collaboration during what can often be fast-
paced events. This also curtails the ability for agencies to monitor one another’s actions and pro-
actively contribute, either to the sensemaking process or to deconflict proximal activities (Figure 5.7 
and 5.8). 
In Chapter Four, artefacts are able to function as incident frames because of the Community of 
Practice, which enables the use of highly compact, formalised communications which require the 
recipient to be in possession of detailed domain knowledge. However, it has been argued that for 
exploration networks to function effectively, they require agents to make explicit that which is 
implicit, i.e. the various agencies need to articulate their interpretations of the incident in plain 
language, in order to foster debate and the formulation of new interpretations of what is going on 
(Burnett et al., 2004; Weick, 2005). Consequently, whilst the support of ICU staff and formal Fire and 
Rescue artefacts would have undoubtedly assisted the Bronze Commander (cf. Section 5.3.3), the 
lack of common ground between the responding agencies suggests that it is questionable whether 
the presence of status boards and other ICU aides would have by themselves been of significant 
benefit in supporting inter-agency collaborative sensemaking.  
The military and Fire and Rescue Liaison Officers involved in the incident response functioned to fill 
the gap within and between C2 networks caused by the lack of multi-agency technological 
interoperability. In sensemaking terms, the LO roles described in this chapter appear so share some 
similarities with response Officers in Chapter Four, in that they arrive on-scene, try to establish what 
is going on (in terms of their own organisational drivers), and then report this assessment back in the 
language of their own organisation. Therefore, the LOs provide an important role in translating one 
organisation’s sensemaking output into terms that are meaningful for another, which would not 
have been replicated merely by providing access to shared artefacts. However, the role of LOs as 
sensemaking ‘translators’ falls short of Exploration Network-style collaborative sensemaking 
between the two organisations (i.e. to form new interpretations of the incident). 
According to Weick (1995), collaborative sensemaking is a culturally defined activity. Chapter Four 
demonstrated that within-service frame-seeking and modification is defined in terms of an 
established, formal ‘compact’ language, underpinned by implicit assumptions – all of which presents 
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a barrier to meaningful inter agency interaction. Further, within Exploration Networks it would be 
less obvious what information should be shared and with whom (Baber et al., 2008). In the absence 
of an obvious incentive to expend effort in collaborating on an apparently simple incident (cf. 
Section 5.3.3) and in the face of practical difficulties in doing so (lack of artefacts, overworked 
Bronze Commander) it is unsurprising that inter-agency collaborative sensemaking was initially 
limited. 
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Vignette Sensemaking activity Description 
#5.4: Requests for 
diesel 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination, 
breakdown in communication 
Ad hoc reorganisation of the major incident C2 structure required by the 
circumstances appears to have led to a breakdown of communications, which had 
the potential to threaten the operation to save the electricity substation. 
#5.6: Emergency 
evacuation 
improvisation 
Making sense through artefacts 
RNLI as a resource for action 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination, 
communication bottleneck 
Ad hoc arrangements were required to manage the risk to personnel, due to the lack 
of command support, shared artefacts and inter-agency interoperability limitations. 
#5.7: Multi agency 
collaborative risk 
assessment 
Making sense through artefacts 
National Grid and RNLI as a resource for 
action 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination 
Different agencies collaborated to enable the continuous review of the risk to 
personnel working on-site. 
#5.8: Inter-agency 
coordination of 
activity 
Making sense through collaboration 
Social organization / coordination, 
breakdown in communication, lack of 
common ground. 
 
Making sense through artefacts 
Military and RNLI as resources for 
action 
The Fire and Rescue Service and Environment Agency’s lack of mutual awareness of 
each other’s roles, methods, processes and requirements generated logistical 
difficulties that delayed the response. 
The lack of command support (and associated artefacts) limited the ability for 
information sharing and collaborative sensemaking – contributing to the C2 
bottleneck and delaying aspects of the response. 
#5.9: Contrasting 
perceptions of the 
incident 
Making sense through artefacts 
Contrasting frames 
 
Making sense through collaboration 
Poor coordination, lack of common 
ground. 
The Fire and Rescue Service and Environment Agency formed different perceptions 
of the incident, based on their lack of common ground, limited collaboration and 
understanding of one another’s activities. 
Table 5.3: The different types of sensemaking activity described by the vignettes presented in Chapter Five 
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6. Discussion 
6.1 Overview 
This thesis presents an original study of sensemaking within emergency response Command and 
Control (C2) systems. The aim of the study was to understand the role of distributed cognition 
processes within systems-level sensemaking activities, which was represented by the research 
question: 
How is sensemaking supported through distributed cognition during emergency responses? 
The thesis offers a novel approach to the study of sensemaking: that of sensemaking as distributed 
cognition. This approach comprises the three perspectives of making sense with artefacts, making 
sense through artefacts and making sense through collaboration, which were adopted as 
investigatory themes during the research. Two case studies from the emergency response C2 
domain are presented, which describe sensemaking as distributed cognition during routine and 
major incident responses. Their findings are summarised below, after which the remainder of this 
chapter discusses the implications of these findings in relation to sensemaking and distributed 
cognition theory, models of C2 and the emergency services domain. 
6.1.1 Sensemaking during routine emergencies 
Sensemaking during routine emergency responses was found to be concerned with framing the 
problem; once an incident has been defined in terms of a recognisable ‘type’, SOPs can be applied in 
order to guide the process of resolving it. The process of framing the problem is a distributed 
cognitive activity involving multiple agents from across the C2 system, supported by several key 
artefacts. Informal artefacts support rapid frame-seeking, questioning and elaboration, before 
formal artefacts (with high distribution potential) are used to present the frame-seeking ‘product’ 
and enable communication with other agents within the network. 
Agents within the C2 network largely concentrate on specific elements of the sensemaking problem, 
with their output forming the basis of action for the next – via a shared artefact. More infrequently, 
in order to ‘bridge the gap’ of inconsistent data and violated expectations, sensemaking becomes a 
collaborative activity; this is supported by the digital radio network, which allows for wider 
monitoring and (occasionally) can become an open forum for collaboration and coordinated action. 
The agents within the C2 system make use of rapid, highly compact, formalised communications in 
the entries in artefacts and during radio communications, which leaves much of the meaning and 
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relevance of information as implicit. This is underpinned by extensive common ground between 
agents, formed through shared training, experience and a common purpose. Even during 
collaborative reframing of more complex incidents, communication is still defined in terms of the 
established language and procedures, i.e. routine emergency sensemaking is a culturally defined 
activity (Weick, 1995). This indicates that – as expected –routine emergency response sensemaking 
does appear to function as a distributed Community of Practice, which is enabled by the artefacts 
available to them. 
6.1.2 Breakdown of sensemaking during a major incident 
As with routine emergencies, from the case study in Chapter Five, multi-agency major incident 
sensemaking is concerned with framing the problem, in order to identify appropriate SOPs to apply 
in response. However, the ‘un-ness’ (Hewitt, 1983) of multi-agency major incidents results in more 
fundamental questions surrounding the nature of the problem and the solution, which transcend the 
agency-specific common ground associated with familiar routine emergencies and requires inter-
agency collaboration. This was expected to take the form of an exploration network, however the 
responding agencies were initially found to maintain the individual organisational structures and 
social processes associated with Communities of Practice, drawing on standard frameworks to make 
sense of events and consequently forming incomplete pictures of the incident. 
This position was reinforced by the lack of artefacts, which within the Fire and Rescue service 
hampered the ability to delegate C2 tasks –adding significantly to the Fire and Rescue commander’s 
workload. Although the Bronze Commander stated that the incident plan was all in his head, Chapter 
Five argues that it is more probable that he made use of people and physical elements within the 
environment to represent information and act as resources for action. By delegating tasks and 
making regular rounds of the site, the Bronze Commander was able to draw on the various 
individuals to support sensemaking activity (Figures 5.4, 5.6 and 5.7, Chapter Five). However, an 
inability to track off-site issues that could not be represented by physical objects or people within 
the site meant that these tasks were harder to remember, with the result that some were not 
completed (Figure 5.8, Chapter Five). 
In terms of inter-service collaboration, the lack of shared artefacts to represent the ‘problem space’ 
or compatible communications technology meant that physical proximity between commanders was 
required, limiting the ability for distributed agencies both to monitor one another’s actions and to 
contribute to the sensemaking process. This would have exacerbated the difficulties associated with 
identifying important features of the incident that fell outside of an individual agency’s emergency 
response lexicon. 
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In the case study, Liaison Officers (LOs) were used to resolve interoperability shortfalls, both within 
and between C2 networks. The LOs provided an important role in translating one organisation’s 
sensemaking output into terms that are meaningful for another, which would not have been 
replicated merely by providing access to shared artefacts. However, the use of LOs led to the 
fragmentation of the Fire and Rescue C2 network, leading to a loss of sensemaking continuity 
(mission command) across the various command levels. The role of LOs as inter agency interfaces 
also falls short of inter-agency collaborative sensemaking, which was required to form new 
interpretations of the incident. 
6.2 Reflections on sensemaking theories 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Chapter two proposed a novel sensemaking approach – that of sensemaking as distributed 
cognition. This approach argues that cognitive processes involved in framing problems are mediated 
through interactions with artefacts and other agents. Within this approach, three perspectives on 
sensemaking as distributed cognition have been developed: making sense with artefacts, making 
sense through artefacts and collaborative sensemaking. These perspectives combine distributed 
cognition theory with current approaches to sensemaking, namely the process of representation 
construction, the mapping of data to frames and collaborative search-after-meaning (Pirolli and 
Russell, 2011). Current sensemaking approaches focus on specific aspects of cognitive activity within 
defined contexts and are limited in their wider utility. By adopting a systems-level view, the new 
approach views these sensemaking approaches as inter-related processes and draws on their 
strengths to produce a comprehensive description: the data-frame model provides the generic 
process by which sensemaking takes place at all levels of an organisation; the representation 
construction approach views frames as external to the individual, which supports individual and 
collaborative sensemaking; collaboration provides a means for novel frame development. Rather 
than merely combining these theories, the new approach extends beyond them into a holistic view 
of sensemaking as a technologically mediated and socially distributed cognitive activity. As Section 
6.1 describes, this approach was successfully applied to the study of emergency response activity, 
with Chapters Four and Five providing detailed descriptions of how systems-level sensemaking 
activity is mediated through distributed cognition processes. 
The following sections reflect on the three sensemaking approaches introduced in Chapter Two in 
light of the findings from this research and suggest future directions for sensemaking research. 
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6.2.2 Representation construction 
Chapter Four describes how artefacts support sensemaking by Call Handlers and Officers at the 
scene, as they forage for information, develop a model of what was / had happened, elaborate this 
and then ‘presenting’ a final product that is used by other agents in the system. This description 
broadly aligns with the representation construction sensemaking approach presented by Pirolli and 
Card (2005), and Attfield and Blandford (2011). It also supports the wider application of the 
representation construction view beyond the low tempo activities investigated in previous studies. 
Application of the sensemaking as distributed cognition perspective has enabled reflection on the 
criticisms levelled at this sensemaking approach in Chapter Two. In terms of ‘how are 
hypotheses/schemas/frames generated’, Chapter Four describes how pre-defined incident 
categories provide the framework for the incident, which are tested by the Call Handler and 
response Officers through interactions with artefacts and members of the public. This study also 
goes into greater detail regarding how different types of artefacts are used during the various stages 
of the representation construction process, thereby adding flesh to this approach. The flexibility of 
informal, private artefacts allows them to play an important role in supporting frame-seeking activity 
prior to the use of formal, public artefacts for frame-defined data collection and sharing. Disparities 
were also uncovered between the intended and actual use of artefacts during sensemaking, often in 
instances where either the process or artefact design do not fully support sensemaking activity. 
The representation construction approach was also criticised for failing to account for social 
processes. Whilst Chapter Four demonstrates that sensemaking can be an individual process, the 
activities described by Pirolli and Card (2005), and Attfield and Blandford (2011) are not entirely 
standalone, in that their products (intelligence/investigation reports) are used as resources for 
subsequent actions by other agents (e.g. criminal proceedings). In the same way, the sensemaking 
activities of the Call Handler sit within the wider emergency response process and the ‘product’ (the 
IMS log) initiates the next phase of activity by the Controller. Chapter Four argued that the highly 
compact, formal language used in shared artefacts, such as the IMS log, is only possible because of 
the common ground that exists amongst the agents within the system. Similarly, the products of the 
legal investigations observed by Attfield and Blandford (2011) are likely to be incomprehensible to 
those outside the judicial system. This argument was also made in Chapter Five to explain why the 
artefacts normally used to support Fire and Rescue major incident C2 may not have helped with 
inter-agency collaboration. Thus, in terms of representation construction as a process of developing 
a sensemaking ‘product’ for others to act on, social processes (Hutchins’ (1995b) cultural heritage) 
are an important factor to recognise when investigating the use of artefacts to support sensemaking. 
Chapter Six: Discussion 
153 
 
6.2.3 Mapping data to frames 
Whilst it has already been applied to the study of emergency response activity and a wide range of 
other dynamic, high stakes situations (Klein et al., 2007), this thesis lends further support to the 
process described in Klein et al.’s (2006) data-frame model (Figure 2.4, in Chapter Two). Responding 
to emergencies large and small is about making sense of complex and uncertain events. Responding 
appropriately requires an understanding of the nature of the problem, yet sensemaking is 
inextricably linked to action and interpretation, meaning that emergency response activity is a 
constant process of refinement of both the understanding of the incident and the associated 
response. The framework used to make sense of an incident defines subsequent action and 
interpretation. Thus, making sense of an incident becomes a question of framing the problem. 
However, the findings of this thesis do not support all of the assertions that are applied to the data-
frame model, as is discussed below. 
6.2.3.1 Sensemaking as an individual process 
Klein and colleagues (cf. Klein, 2011) have conducted extensive research into sensemaking, 
decision making and adaptive problem solving in a range of naturalistic settings; central to 
their work is the notion that these related activities are carried out by individual experts, as is 
shown in Figure 6.1 – Klein’s (2011) representation of how the ‘three strands of thinking’ relate 
to one another. Within large, complex C2 systems, they assert that subordinates (non-experts) 
are less able to make sense of the situation, which can actively hamper the ability of seasoned 
experts to identify data points and form their own mental models because expert commanders 
“…are forced to depend on the dots [information] and analyses that people at lower levels, 
with less expertise, are using” (Klein, 2011, page 193). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Three strands of thinking (redrawn from Klein, 2011) 
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This thesis supports the view that sensemaking can take place at the individual level, however 
it does not support Klein et al.’s (2006b) assertion that sensemaking during emergency 
response is primarily the preserve of the individual commander. Chapter Four describes 
sensemaking during routine emergency response as a highly distributed activity, with minimal 
direct Commander involvement and where ‘command’ activity is also distributed across the 
agents within the system. Where the opportunity permits, agents within the C2 system will 
collaborate to make sense of a situation and this collaboration seems even more necessary for 
complex incidents. Chapter Five illustrates the pitfalls of the ‘individual commander’ view, 
where multiple agencies working in the same physical space needed to closely collaborate in 
order to frame the problem and define appropriate response arrangements. The case study 
also underlined the importance of maintaining mission command (i.e. the sensemaking 
picture) across the various levels of the C2 structure. 
As with studies of Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) and Naturalistic Decision Making 
research more widely, Klein et al.’s (2006b) development of the data-frame model 
concentrated on gathering retrospective accounts of the actions of experienced commanders 
whilst they were dealing with crisis situations. This is perhaps understandable, firstly as from 
the outside, incident response C2 appears to be a Commander-centric process (Commanders 
are observed receiving reports and giving orders) and secondly, moments of crisis would seem 
to provide the most salient and succinct sensemaking situations. This is particularly apparent 
with Fire and Rescue services, given the number of personnel on each appliance and the 
formal command role. This also conforms to the traditional view of C2 as being a commander-
centric activity (e.g. Fire and Rescue Incident Command Model – Figure 1.3, in Chapter One). 
In contrast, this thesis approaches the study of sensemaking from a systems-level; seeking to 
describe the emergency response process from start to finish and drawing on a range of 
perspectives on both routine emergency and major incident responses. Consequently, it has 
revealed that sensemaking activity takes place throughout the C2 network and that 
Commanders are reliant on the support of a number of individuals and artefacts (as 
demonstrated by the absence of the ICU at Walham). This research has also captured 
sensemaking insights that are not obvious from a single Commander’s perspective, for 
example the Fire and Rescue Bronze Commander at Walham was not aware of the contrasting 
perception of the incident held by the Environment Agency (Figure 5.9, Chapter Five). This 
thesis demonstrates that the data-frame model is equally capable of describing collaborative 
processes. 
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6.2.3.2 Frames as ‘inside the head’ 
As Chapter Two noted, Klein et al. (2007) almost suggest that artefacts may function as frames 
before asserting that the frame remains internal to the perceiver of the artefact. Combined 
with their view of sensemaking as an individual activity, they appear to have adopted a stance 
which is firmly opposed not only to the possibility of cognition as a distributed process 
involving artefacts, but also of ‘socially shared cognition’, whereby mental representations 
may be distributed across the members of a group (cf. Section 2.3.2). What is clear from this 
research is that artefacts are able to act as frames for sensemaking, not merely supporting 
cognitive processes, but cueing and shaping the activity of agents within the emergency 
response C2 system. Chapter Four describes in detail how the agents within the C2 system are 
engaged in a collective information processing activity (making sense of the incident), with one 
agent’s actions forming the basis for the actions of the next, drawing on a common artefact – 
the IMS log. Again, it would appear that Klein et al.’s (2007) views relate to the perspective 
adopted in approaching the study of sensemaking (commander-centric), rather than to any 
fundamental argument within the data-frame model. 
6.2.3.3 Novel situations  
As Section 6.2.3.1 described, in previous research, the data-frame theory is studied in 
situations in which expert decision makers have relevant experience that enables them to 
rapidly make sense of dynamic situations (Klein, 2011). As Leedom (2001) points out, the more 
difficult case is to make sense of novel problems and uncertain situations. Chapter Six 
demonstrates that in complex emergencies, there is no single ‘expert’, rather that 
sensemaking should be a social process which actively involves all relevant participants. During 
the defence of Walham electricity substation, experts from different backgrounds drew 
different conclusions from the same information (one of Klein et al.’s (2007) assertions) 
precisely because they were not engaging in a collaborative sensemaking process, as they 
lacked the social and technological means to do this easily. This case study suggests that the 
view of commanders as individual experts may be actively damaging, as they will recognise 
some familiar elements of an incident, without understanding the significance of unfamiliar 
but equally important factors, causing them to apply existing (inappropriate) frames. In the 
data-frame models own terms, the distinction is between ‘frame-seeking’ and ‘frame-defined’ 
sense-making activity. In the former, a problem space is defined and explored; in the latter, a 
situation is recognised and a Standard Operating Procedure can be applied. While the latter 
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might lead to initiating a faster response to the problem, in complex and situations it might 
also lead to ‘recognising’ the wrong solution. 
These criticisms are largely aimed at the way the data-frame model has been applied, rather than at 
its suitability a generic description of sensemaking activity. This study has applied the data-frame 
model as the generic process by which sensemaking takes place at all levels of an organisation and 
uses it to bolster the representation construction and collaborative search-after-meaning 
approaches, which are also founded on the use of frames to structure the search for meaning, but 
which fall short of explaining how it takes place. The case studies and vignettes presented depict 
many of Klein et al.’s (2007) types of sensemaking (frame-seeking, frame-defined data collection, 
questioning the frame, reframing), lending weight to their argument that sensemaking is a complex 
group of associated activities.  
6.2.3 Collaborative search-after-meaning 
This thesis demonstrates that responses to emergencies – both small and large – feature 
collaborative sensemaking processes. Chapters Four and Five provide a number of examples of 
sensemaking processes from across the emergency response C2 system which display the 
characteristics identified by Weick (1995) described in Chapter Two (i.e. identity, retrospective, 
enactment, etc.). During collaborative emergency response activity, the crucial sensemaking 
element is the identification of and agreement on the most plausible understanding of the event (i.e. 
the frame). Once the frame has been established, it is then largely possible to apply SOPs to deal 
with the response. This underlines the point that sensemaking is not an end in itself, but merely an 
input into the wider C2 processes involved in emergency responses (i.e. decision making, planning, 
etc.).  
The findings of this thesis enable comment on the limitations of this approach identified in Chapter 
Two. Weick (1995) views sensemaking as firmly grounded within social activity, taking the 
organisation as the level of analysis. Whilst it is clear that collaboration is taking place during the 
responses to both routine emergencies and major incidents, it is not correct to view sensemaking as 
being fundamentally rooted in social activity. To do so would risk missing important features of 
sensemaking activity that take place at a lower level of granularity (such as those described in 
Chapter Four). 
Chapter Two hypothesised that Weick’s (1995) view of sensemaking as single organisations engaged 
in culturally defined disagreements may have more to do with the types of environment studied in 
the development of the approach, rather than the actual phenomena itself. This thesis lends weight 
to this argument, demonstrating that collaborative sensemaking takes place not only during ‘normal 
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operations’ (i.e. single-agencies dealing with a defined problem space), but also during ‘exceptional 
situations’ (i.e. multi-agency responses to complex, novel and uncertain events), which more closely 
represent Umapathy’s (2010) view of sensemaking as involving coalitions of groups with different 
worldviews. The thesis indicates that the notions of Communities of Practice and Exploration 
Networks are relevant and useful descriptors of collaborative sensemaking, not least because they 
offer some explanation for how collaborative sensemaking may take place (which is largely missing 
from this approach). However, the major incident case study demonstrates that whilst a particular 
inter-agency collaborative style may be preferable for specific incident conditions, it cannot be taken 
as a given that organisations will reorganise themselves to meet this ‘ideal’ arrangement. 
The main problem with Weick’s (1995) view of sensemaking as a systems-level activity is that it 
offers little explanation of how sensemaking takes place. This thesis has successfully applied Klein et 
al.’s (2006) data-frame model to the problem, arguing that artefacts are able to act as shared 
representations (of the frame), thereby facilitating collaboration, including amongst geographically 
and temporarily distributed agents. Chapter Four provides an account of the use of artefacts to store 
and represent information, to support reflection and reinterpretation, to cue activity and the 
communication of findings, thereby providing a mechanism by which sensemaking may be carried 
out amongst distributed groups working on a common task.  
6.2.4 Future directions for sensemaking as distributed cognition 
The approach to sensemaking as distributed cognition presented in this thesis is not intended to 
represent a fully comprehensive sensemaking model that applies to all situations, however it does 
provide a coherent holistic approach to describing sensemaking within complex C2 systems. Klein et 
al. (2006b) and Weick (1995) begin their descriptions of sensemaking ‘in’ the situation, describing 
the sensemaking processes of individuals and organisations during and after the event. Similarly, the 
descriptions of representation construction provided by Pirolli and Card (2005) and Attfield and 
Blandfort (2011) begin after the ‘problem’ has been detected. This thesis goes some way towards 
addressing the question of what happens before this, by taking the opportunity to study emergency 
response C2 from across the incident lifecycle, demonstrating that collaborative sensemaking begins 
long before a Commander arrives at the scene, as well as playing an important role incidents without 
a ‘Commander’. This suggests that to an extent, the C2 system is less ‘bridging a gap’ and more 
‘starting from scratch’ with every new emergency. This thesis demonstrates that emergency 
response sensemaking is influenced by a range of factors, including the situation, organisational 
structures and procedures, common ground (or lack of) and supporting artefacts (or lack of). 
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In discussions of Crime Scene Examination, Baber (2013) notes that “…it is not always apparent 
where the act of ‘cognition’ is situated” (page 131). Similarly, this study of emergency response C2 
raises the question of where within this process sensemaking takes place. Formal organisational 
structures and doctrine would suggest that there are central sensemaking foci for both routine 
(Controller) and major incident (Commander) responses. Previous sensemaking theories would 
suggest that it is either a) ‘within the head’ of key individuals (Klein et al., 2006b), b) arises during 
collaboration (Weick, 1995), or c) a process of artefact transformation (Pirolli and Card, 2005’ 
Attfield and Blandford, 2011). The three perspectives of making sense with artefacts, making sense 
through artefacts and collaborative sensemaking applied in this thesis indicate that sensemaking 
during emergency response activity is a complex, interwoven combination of individual, 
collaborative and artefact-based activity, with specific elements coming to the fore at various stages 
of the process and depending on the situation. 
In terms of future directions for research into sensemaking as distributed cognition, the origin of 
distributed cognition research – more stable work environments – suggests a potential area for 
investigation. Whilst prior studies have tended to focus on moments of crisis that bring sensemaking 
to the fore, this does not automatically mean that sensemaking does not take place during slower 
tempo activities, i.e. where a process is not only geographically and socially distributed, but also 
temporally extended. The researcher witnessed something akin to this process taking place within 
the emergency response domain. At the start of a shift, response Officers are briefed by their 
Sergeant; this briefing will include an informal team debrief of the incidents of their last shift – 
where Officers will relay the narratives of particularly interesting incidents to one another and 
update them regarding individuals of note. This activity is combined with a slower-tempo formal 
sensemaking loop, which comprises intelligence messages given during the brief, that are collated 
and ‘sanitised’ (the origins of the information are concealed) by analysts from various sources, 
including formal incident records within the IMS and crime files. Frequently, these formal and 
informal organisational sensemaking loops are combined during briefings, whereby Officers pool 
their various insights on individuals and events named in formal briefings, to collaboratively form 
their own interpretations of what the criminal fraternity might be up to. The approach taken within 
this thesis offers a means for investigating less obvious but nevertheless important systems-level 
sensemaking activities. 
Klein (2011) argues that sensemaking, decision making and adapting are closely related activities 
(Figure 6.1); as this thesis proposes distributed cognition over individual expertise as the vehicle for 
sensemaking (at least within emergency response C2 systems), this suggests a wider application of 
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distributed cognition to include adapting as distributed cognition and decision making as distributed 
cognition. 
As an explanation of sensemaking as a systems-level activity, the sensemaking as distributed 
cognition view proposed in this thesis is vulnerable to the argument that it has only been applied to 
emergency response C2. This in turn suggests further study to evaluate the relevance of this 
approach to sensemaking during planned C2 activity (e.g. air traffic control), as well as to other 
domains where ‘control’ is not only latent, but also where it is entirely absent, such as the artefact-
based mediated activity of civilian members of social networking sites as they form ad hoc networks 
to collaboratively make sense of and respond to large-scale crises (cf. Duffy and Baber, 2013). 
Finally, given the unique nature of major incidents and the absence of normally available command 
support in the case study presented in Chapter Five, further study of sensemaking during major 
incidents is warranted, not least to begin to redress the imbalance represented by the volume of 
Commander-centric studies. 
6.3 Revisiting Command and Control models 
Whilst this research has focussed specifically on ‘reactive’ incident response (which is only one 
element of the purpose of C2), it does enable reflection on current thinking on the nature of C2. 
Returning to the generic process model of C2, the notion of ‘command’ and ‘control’ as activities, 
rather than roles is supported by this thesis. For example, during routine emergencies, ‘control’ 
functions are performed by a number of agents and whilst there is no active Commander input1, a 
large part of the ‘command’ activity is performed by response Officers. The notion that units on the 
ground are in control of the incident is at variance to traditional notions of C2 and is surprising, given 
that emergency service organisational structures appear to show highly centralised and rigid 
networks. Given the opportunity, response Officers will collaborate to make sense of incidents, 
forming ad hoc sub groups of the overall network. Thus, in some ways, the police emergency 
response C2 network described in Chapter Four offers hints of how it could function as an edge 
organisation, if access to relevant information and the ability to form ad hoc collaborative networks 
were not constrained (cf. Section 6.4). 
When compared to the case studies presented in this thesis, the generic C2 model fails to give any 
sense of the uncertainties involved in incident resolution or the effort required to frame the 
problem, having only the two discrete steps of ‘determine mission’ and ‘determine events’. In 
reality, during emergency responses the problem is rarely neatly defined from the start and this 
                                                          
1 Commanders are present within the C2 system, but rarely take an active part in routine emergency 
responses. 
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thesis suggests firstly that a number of ongoing activities are hidden behind these two steps 
(potentially including the development and maintenance of the: problem frame, mission command, 
inter-agency collaborative networks and building common ground), but also that ‘determine 
mission’ and ‘determine events’ are interwoven activities, as the developing problem frame shapes 
further sensemaking. This model also takes a linear view of the process of responding to an incident; 
whereas the case studies presented in this thesis demonstrate that sensemaking is a fundamental C2 
activity that is conducted both throughout the life of an incident and throughout the C2 system. 
These criticisms may stem from the fact that the model is predominantly based on studies of normal 
operations and activity planning cycles, rather than reactive operations or crisis response.  
As an entirely technologically focussed approach, the edge organisation (Alberts and Hayes, 2003) 
does not give any suggestion as to how or why agents within a large, heterogeneous network would 
form ad hoc collaborative groups. This thesis demonstrates that rapid ad hoc collaboration requires 
a pre-existing community of practice whereas during large, complex, multi-agency operations, 
disparate organisations with little common ground do not have an obvious incentive or 
understanding of the requirement to engage collaboratively. 
Within the field of C2 research, Common Operational Pictures (COPs) have been proposed as a 
method for improving information sharing and coordination within and across organisations. A 
Common Operational Picture (COP) is a single representation of relevant incident information that 
could be shared across service command centres during a multi-agency response (Keuhlen et al., 
2002). These are often envisaged as an information product, i.e. a picture of the state of the 
situation – typically a GIS-based system for marking the positions of incidents and assets (McNeese 
et al., 2006). This thesis suggests that a lack of common ground is likely to preclude simply 
implementing a shared GIS, or an inter-organisational version of the Incident Management System. 
Similarly, the notion of a COP that uses translation layers or filters to only show certain information 
to certain users – a Common Relevant Operational Picture (Flentge et al., 2008) – is also flawed, as it 
fails to acknowledge the important role of collaboration in making sense of an incident, assuming 
that the nature of the problem and associated solution are clear. An alternative view is that of the 
COP as an integral part of C2 processes that represents the combined incident knowledge space (i.e. 
a frame generation support tool) and enables the development of a shared understanding of an 
incident (McNeese et al., 2006). Possible ways of applying the COP concept to emergency response 
activity are discussed in the following section. 
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6.4 Future directions for emergency response C2 
Routine emergencies and major incidents share a number of common features; however, this 
research has identified important differences in the nature of the problems faced and the associated 
sensemaking demands. Consequently, different COP solutions would be required to improve 
sensemaking during the different types of emergency – suggesting further avenues for research 
which could offer valuable academic and pragmatic insights. 
6.4.1 Routine emergencies 
During routine emergencies, the IMS (Incident Management System) performs a central role as a 
record of events, a resource for action and a means of communication between Call Handlers and 
Controllers. It also provides a frame to structure sensemaking and represents the key incident 
features. At the same time, the digital radio network can facilitate collaborative sensemaking 
between response Officers, by enabling mutual monitoring and providing an open forum for 
discussing incidents. As such, the IMS and use of the digital radio as a forum for collaboration 
already come close to representing a COP for routine emergencies. However, there is currently a 
significant information bottleneck between Controllers and responding Officers (who do not have 
data access), as well as limited opportunity for collaborative use of the radio, both of which restrict 
the Controller’s ability to allocate incidents intelligently and the ability of response Officers to 
coordinate their actions. With minor adjustments to emergency service communications networks, it 
should be possible to better use the capabilities of the digital communications equipment to 
produce an environment that supports greater collaborative sensemaking during incident responses.  
With the Airwave digital radio network, it is possible to have ‘nested’ talk groups (Heikkonen et al., 
2004). One (or more) talk groups could be used as dedicated forums for Officers to collaborate 
during incident responses, whilst another talk group maintains the ability for Control to share 
important information with everyone (Figure 6.2). This would free up the Controller’s talk group for 
urgent incident allocation, Officer Safety and Officer inquiries. Responding Officers would then be 
able to communicate in a less formal open forum, enabling them to pool their knowledge and 
experience and to coordinate activity, without compromising critical broadcasts. Emergency 
broadcasts would automatically switch to the Controller monitored talk group, ensuring that they 
are picked up and responded to. Airwave also allows the transmission of data and therefore would 
support the use of data terminals in patrol vehicles. Figure 6.3 shows a data terminal inside a 
Helsinki Police patrol vehicle, which connects to a digital communications network operating on the 
same standard as the UK Airwave system. The data terminal in Figure 6.3 shows a GIS-based 
interface, which is used to mark the position and status of response vehicles and active incidents.  
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Figure 6.2: ‘Nesting’ of talk groups through use of scanning and talk group prioritisation 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Data terminal in a Helsinki Police patrol vehicle (2011) 
This information would be beneficial to responding Officers trying to work out who is best 
positioned to respond to an incident, whilst access to the IMS and other police databases would 
allow them to conduct their inquiries directly, rather than having to go via the Controller and 
thereby reducing radio traffic. At the same time, direct access to information systems could have 
negative impacts on emergency response sensemaking. For example, this could reduce the ability for 
Officers to monitor one another’s inquiries and pro-actively engage in collaborative sensemaking. It 
may also be seen as removing the requirement for the pocket notebook, as information can now be 
entered directly into IMS or crime forms, thereby reducing time spent duplicating entries. However, 
this view ignores the current role of the back of the pocket notebook in supporting frame-seeking 
activities and as with Call Handlers, the requirement for an informal, private artefact may persist. 
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6.4.2 Major incidents 
Major incidents display many of the features that have been linked to Exploration Networks (Burnett 
et al., 2004) in that a temporary arrangement of individuals from diverse backgrounds with little 
shared experience are required to collaborate intensively, in response to a complex, unique and 
poorly defined crisis. However, Major Incident C2 structures are built on single service command 
hierarchies, and once established, the multi-agency response is not geared towards the context-rich 
collaboration required to explore the problem and develop novel frameworks, but concentrates 
instead on applying frameworks based on prior experience. As a result, agencies may only engage in 
collaboration once a crisis point is reached, resulting in the C2 system reacting to events, rather than 
pro-actively working to understand and anticipate the causal elements and potential outcomes. This 
may help to explain the causes of some of the problematical themes of multi-agency crisis response 
identified in Chapter One relating to coordination, information sharing, mutual awareness and 
integration. Major incidents can require the emergency services to closely cooperate with a wide 
range of other agencies, public bodies, private companies and the military, so these are issues they 
will continue to face. During multi-agency operations, the emergency services therefore require the 
organisations, social processes and supporting technologies to enable the rapid collaborative 
development of an agreed frame for the problem and the associated response.  
The COP suggested for routine emergency responses relies on the single-service community of 
practice and so would not be suitable for use by ad hoc multi-agency networks that may have very 
little common ground at the start of an incident. Instead, what is required is a means for distributed 
agents to be able to articulate and represent their perspectives on the key features of the incident in 
order to engage in a collaborative process of novel frame generation. The preference for informal, 
unstructured artefacts to support frame-seeking described in Chapter Four would seem to suggest 
providing some form of digital equivalent that allows multiple users (both co-located and 
distributed) to add, manipulate and question information in a highly informal manner. For example, 
a range of digital artefacts exist that mimic the behaviour of paper and whiteboards. These combine 
advantages of informal, unstructured analogue artefacts with distribution potential of digital 
artefacts. Combined with verbal communications (for example through a radio Talk Group) this 
would enable users to identify connections between information fragments and establish points of 
commonality and thereby begin to develop some form of concept map for an incident. Once a frame 
had been defined, the various agencies would then be able to apply the most appropriate SOPs to 
resolving the problem, whilst maintaining the option to revisit and reinterpret the incident frame 
should the need arise.  
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Whilst interactions between the command layers of a service are currently supported by the use of 
digital radio communications and IMSs, it is argued that they would also benefit from the use of a 
shared, informal concept mapping tool. The role of Gold, Silver and Bronze Command during major 
incidents is – at least at the start of the incident – largely concerned with framing the problem and 
ensuring continuity of purpose across the command levels. Such a tool would also help to ensure 
that mission command is maintained during the life of what may be very large and complex incidents 
– particularly where the situation requires adaptation of the C2 network (such as making use of aid 
from neighbouring services). A simple digital artefact could therefore be used to rapidly develop and 
share the incident frame between command levels and across agencies. In a similar manner to the 
mutual monitoring seen in Chapter Four, this may have the added benefit of cueing individuals to 
‘push’ information to one another, as visibility of the problems being worked on across the 
distributed network would suggest ‘who needs to know what’. 
Developing a COP that can support multi-agency collaborative sensemaking as an exploration 
network does not automatically mean that agents will behave accordingly, especially given that the 
participants will be starting off from within their service-specific communities of practice and may 
not see the requirement to discuss an apparently obvious emergency. Collaboration is effortful, 
being outside of the normal response process and organisations may be tempted to concentrate on 
their own activities when their workload dramatically increases during times of crisis. Therefore, 
there is also a requirement to develop ‘exploration network thinking’, i.e. to encourage command 
staff to actively engage with other agencies and to articulate (avoiding technical jargon), question 
and explore the implicit assumptions that underpin service-specific perspectives. Given that major 
incidents can involve a broad array of public and private organisations, many of which will have had 
no prior training or involvement in emergency response activity, the onus will be on the emergency 
services to lead this collaborative effort, which should begin by making explicit the roles, capabilities, 
constraints and expectations of all of the organisations involved. 
6.4.3 Emergency services interoperability 
The findings from this research raise doubts over the current UK emergency service programme of 
interoperability improvement (cf. Chapter One). This initiative risks constraining collaborative 
sensemaking, as it includes restrictions on wider incident monitoring and discourages improvisation 
(NPIA, 2010b). The programme also fails to address data interoperability issues and so information 
sharing between the services will remain effortful, rather than becoming part of normal practice. 
This initiative appears to be founded upon flawed major incident doctrine (LESLP, 2007; NPIA, 2009) 
which underestimates the level of interaction and collaboration required to make sense of even 
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relatively simple major incidents. This thesis suggests that the intended course of action for 
interoperability is likely to perpetuate the problems associated with emergency responses. Both the 
routine and major incident case studies discussed in this thesis demonstrate that intensive 
collaboration is often required in order to make sense of and resolve highly uncertain situations and 
that different forms of technological support will be required, depending on the nature of the 
problem faced. 
6.5 Review of thesis design 
6.5.1 Approach 
Despite extensive published research, the emergency response domain remains a relevant topic of 
investigation. Notwithstanding the overall goals of the emergency services having remained largely 
static since their inception, the organisations, processes and technologies used to achieve these 
goals have undergone constant change. At the same time, the demands placed upon them have 
steadily increased and there is constant pressure to improve performance with ever fewer 
resources. The nature of the emergency response domain naturally lends itself to the application of 
both sensemaking and distributed cognition theories; incident response activity involves 
understanding and tackling uncertain, risky and urgent situations, which are responded to via large, 
complex, artefact-based systems. Sensemaking and distributed cognition are themselves both 
relevant subjects of study; both concepts are under active development, comprise multiple 
perspectives and no formal research methodology exists for either, presenting ample and varied 
opportunities for novel research. As naturalistic phenomenon, sensemaking and distributed 
cognition require a suitable real-world context in order to study them; emergency response work 
provides both organisational and task complexity, making the important elements of both 
phenomena more salient. 
6.5.2 Method 
The naturalistic nature of both sensemaking and distributed cognition phenomena necessitates 
study ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995b). Both phenomena are considered highly context specific, and so 
whilst controlled experiments may be able to replicate some of the processes involved, the 
artificiality of the situation would likely lead to distortions in how people make sense of events and 
interact with artefacts. The approach taken in this thesis was centred on an extended field study; 
this enabled the gathering of large volumes of data and enabled sufficient breadth and depth of 
observation for the researcher to develop a comprehensive description of sensemaking during 
emergency responses. The approach chosen is not without its pitfalls, with the main concerns 
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surrounding the credibility of the findings. According to McKinnon (1988) threats to credibility come 
from observer caused effects, observer bias, ‘the complexities and limitations of the human mind’, 
and data access limitations (cf. Section 6.5.3). As Chapter Three described, in order to maximise the 
trustworthiness of the findings, a methodology was developed which drew on many of Krefting’s 
(1991) strategies for field studies, including prolonged and varied field experience, establishing the 
authority of the researcher and multiple levels of analysis. 
The solitary nature of the doctoral thesis precluded the use of multiple investigators, leaving the 
research open to the criticism of observer bias. Consequently, checking with practitioners was used 
to confirm that the observations reported represented typical practice (Paton, 1990). However, this 
became of decreasing value as the research moved beyond simply describing the emergency 
response process and began to interpret it as sensemaking activity (Krefting, 1991). Consequently, it 
was important to maintain a clear distinction between observations and the researcher’s reflections 
during data collection and analysis, to ensure that interpretation followed from observation 
(McKinnon, 1988). The thesis endeavoured to reflect this separation through the presentation of the 
findings; the case studies in Chapters Four and Five are separated into activity descriptions, followed 
by discussions of the researcher’s inferences. Continuity from the researcher’s inferences back to 
the original observations is demonstrated by providing vignettes, which illustrate the points being 
made. In turn, the vignettes were corroborated with multiple data sources or collection methods. 
Although expected, the time consuming nature of the data collection process associated with 
distributed cognition research had knock-on effects with regards to maintaining access to the 
domain of study. 
6.5.3 Access and data collection limitations 
Police Officers who were key points of contact regularly changed roles and a number of senior 
Officers retired during the course of the data collection. Whilst collecting data with WMP, the main 
point of contact for the Force Communications Centre changed three times, each time necessitating 
the revalidation of the research approval. Additionally, the Assistant Chief Constable who had 
originally authorised the research retired, which meant that establishing contact with and securing 
approval from WMP senior management had to be conducted a second time, before further 
research could be conducted. Similarly, the main point of contact within Warwickshire Police’s 
control room retired, although by this point the Researcher was working for Warwickshire Police as a 
Special Constable and so the data collection hiatus was considerably shorter. The consequence of 
these stoppages was firstly that data collection took longer than originally expected and secondly 
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that the process became somewhat disjointed and made developing working relationships with 
control room staff more difficult.  
Access restrictions also precluded the kind of highly detailed analysis seen in studies such as Heath 
and Luff (2000), who were able to undertake the extensive observations necessary to examine the 
minutiae of control room activity. During some of the earlier observations within OCU control rooms 
supervisors were concerned that the researcher’s presence would interrupt the Controllers. Whilst it 
was possible to allay their fears and to interact with Controllers in an unobtrusive manner, early on 
the researcher decided to instead opt for a broader review of sensemaking across the emergency 
response C2 system, rather than risk a more intrusive level of inquiry which may risk loss of access to 
the control room environment. 
The initial request to conduct research with WMP expressed the desire to observe response police 
Officers at first hand, during incident responses. This was refused due to safety concerns, limiting 
data collection to control room observations. However, once the researcher had been recruited and 
trained as a Special Constable, this restriction was lifted. The study of sensemaking during major 
incidents relied on procedural interviews with SMEs concerning how the system would work, 
retrospective interviews with major incident commanders on how it did work, observations of 
training exercises and analysis of publicly available information on how organisations behaved. 
Direct observation was limited to participant observation during several planned major incidents. 
Field studies featuring direct observation or participant observation of spontaneous major incidents 
would have been a preferable form of data collection. This limitation places restrictions on the depth 
of the analysis and the strength of the arguments in relation to major incidents. However, there is a 
question over how feasible it would ever be to for a single researcher to conduct sufficiently 
comprehensive observation of C2 processes during a spontaneous major incident. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The argument put forth by this thesis is that sensemaking is a process of problem framing. At the 
same time, the research demonstrates that distributed cognition is more than merely collaboration 
between agents, instead it involves the mediation of cognitive processes through interactions with 
artefacts and other agents. Within complex distributed environments such as emergency response 
C2, the system is heavily dependent on a range of artefacts to support sensemaking activity and 
communication and collaboration are largely artefact based. These artefacts can represent frames 
for sensemaking and therefore sensemaking becomes a distributed cognition process. By 
implication, changes to the nature of artefacts within this system have the potential to beneficially 
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modify sensemaking processes. However, this would only be the case if changes to artefacts are 
transformative, i.e. if they change the nature of the distributed processes that are being performed.  
Sensemaking at various levels of the emergency response C2 system has been the subject of a 
number of previous studies (cf. Chapter Two), however this thesis represents a unique and useful 
contribution to the study of the emergency response domain: 
 By combining sensemaking and distributed cognition theories, this thesis has developed a novel 
approach to the study of sensemaking – that of sensemaking as distributed cognition; 
 This thesis took advantage of a rare opportunity to study C2 in a real context, collecting data 
from across the emergency response network and from throughout the incident response 
lifecycle. 
 In applying a systems-level view, this thesis presents a comprehensive description of emergency 
response C2, detailing the role of artefacts and collaborative processes in supporting 
sensemaking activity during routine and large-scale emergency incidents; 
 The thesis also suggests a number of future directions for sensemaking, distributed cognition 
and C2 research. 
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